



EXPEDITIONARY CONSTABULARY POLICE FORCE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
MODELED FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

A Propositional Thesis By:
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Introduction

Keep the Peace, Protect the Innocent, Enforce the Law

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At present, the United States confronts the most complex and uncertain international environment in its history....

Such an international environment obviously carries with it serious implications for the U.S. military. It suggests that the threats to American interests, as well as those of its allies and partners, will range across the spectrum of conflict from peace keeping to peace enforcement to mid-level conventional conflict, all the way in the best case to deterrence, and in the worst case, war at the high end. Thus, the ability to adapt at every level of war from the tactical to the strategic and political would seem to be more important to the American polity and its military than at any time since 1941. There is going to be no simple path for the preparation of the U.S. military to fight the wars of the future....

Murray Williamson, Military Adaptation in War, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2009

WHAT THIS THESIS DOES

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the process for developing an organizational structure that can perform stability missions, and through the course of that process develop a stability force. It demonstrates an approximation of what a serious civilian based effort at performing stability missions should look like. A holistic review of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), and occupation¹ needs is provided with a focus on stability requirements, to address the idea of “*how to*” organize a paramilitary constabulary force². The author points toward developing relevant doctrine, and designing a functional constabulary corps with a brigade-centric organization. This thesis also provides a context for using a civilian paramilitary constabulary to do a variety of operations: from humanitarian aid to post conflict stability.

¹ Though operationally S&R has much in common with occupation, they are in principle very different: S&R is a form of peacekeeping, occupation is an extension of war.

² Constabulary is the historical term used by the U.S. Army during the Philippine and German occupations. It is a paramilitary organization that exercises police powers.

The shortfall in many discussions is the lack of a defined organizational structure around which technical deliberation can be held. Such insight is needed before legislators can act to support any significant modifications to national policy and practice. One has no illusions that this proposal reflects a best or final solution. No, it is intended as a start point from which a solution can be molded.

This thesis delves into the gamut of needs and recommendations for stability operations that various analysts and major agencies have written on the subject of during or post conflict, as well as related conflict prevention and peace building principles.

It sets forth the unique requirements and measurable deliverables for designing and establishing successful constabulary organizational structures. This would allow the Department of State to step out from behind the military and stand as an independent entity on the battlefield.

The immediate purpose for revealing and expounding upon these standards is to conform to international conventions, minimize human suffering, satisfy ethical expectations, and enhance global security that impacts the United States. The product goal is to create (*not just principles, but*) tools that can establish functional states that exercise just governance with minimal corruption, facilitates the people's ability to engage in international commerce, and pose no threat to global peace.

THE PROPOSAL

Out of the requirements emerges the Constabulary Brigade (Figure I-1). This proposal demonstrates the systematic process for the development of doctrine for organizations that have the planning capabilities to enable civilian led paramilitary police forces to perform S&R operations proficiently. They are configured with the assets, personnel, facilities, and materiel to be self sustaining. The thesis proposes a boots on the ground, people in the community, pragmatic yet charismatic style of visible help. This brigade is a "first responder" focused on the most immediate and critical need: stability. This brigade is a rapid reaction force that can step into the breach of a collapsing country and provide immediate (*governance*) triage, securing and calming the local populace, then prioritizing governance deficiencies or infrastructure damage for treatment according to the seriousness of the condition: a battlefield-stability mission.




Figure I-1: A high level view of a fully developed Constabulary Brigade. It consists of 6,500 to 6,600 troops. It could operate in an area alongside three to six Army brigades.

INDIVIDUAL UNIT DESIGN

The thesis looks at the internal structure of proposed constabulary units down to the company level in technical detail. This is done to show civilians who are unfamiliar with

military organization how military design principles would be applied to civilian functions. A rudimentary effort is made to estimate the size of such organizations. This provides government executives with a rough level of effort to plan for future developments when trying to secure funding.

DELIVERABLE OUTCOMES

The unique characteristic of a paramilitary constabulary is that during critical periods, only a military style force has the structural capability to execute stabilization, civil administration, and reconstruction efforts during and until well after the violent disruption of a crisis event has passed. The deliverables of such an organization:

- ♦ Timely Governance
- ♦ Whole of Government Participation
- ♦ Collaboration
- ♦ Public Security
- ♦ Judiciary Rule
- ♦ Medical Services
- ♦ Restoration of Infrastructure
- ♦ Early Responder
- ♦ Self Protecting

TAKEAWAY THOUGHTS

For all its ability to wage war, the US military is unprepared to mount major stability operations and secure a lasting peace. Furthermore, U.S. civilian agencies lack the tools to take the job over from the military. Likewise, the American government's capacity to plan for and oversee both civilian and military post-conflict nation-building operations is wanting.

*Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan," e-International Relations, October 20, 2008
http://www.e-ir.info/?p=575#_ednref4*

This analyst suspects that there is no structured multi-year plan for what's next in our nation's strategy for dealing with security force assistance, peace enforcement, or occupation operations. Yet, the evolving complexity of the international environment and the history of the most resent conflicts suggest that defaulting upon the military to conduct politics beyond Americas' shores is self limiting to the nation, and unrealistic burden upon the Department of Defense.

This thesis proposes an organization that is focused on stabilization efforts during and just after combat, in accord with the laws of land warfare and United Nations charter. The thesis provides an earnest look at the missing requirements that have plagued U.S. led stability operations. Out of these missing requirements evolves a solution for a Constabulary Brigade.

What this analyst is presenting is a design and a design process for a paramilitary organization that addresses the issues brought up by the multitude of other analysts cited in this thesis. Hopefully, the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense will review this thesis and use it as a resource to collaborate on a solution to stability operations.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	i
Table of Contents.....	iv
1. Asserting Stability in a Crisis.....	1
Background	2
Purpose	4
Scope of Design Methodology	4
Scope of the Organizational Solution	6
Assumptions.....	6
2. Current State of Affairs	11
The Current Department of State Solution	13
Stabilization And Reconstruction Divisions.....	14
The Current Department of Defense Solution	16
Professionalizing a Dedicated Stability Force.....	24
3. Requirements of Crisis Event Management.....	26
Functional Requirements of a Constabulary Force	26
Organizational Technical Requirements	29
1 st Requirement: Arrive Ready to Work, Even as the Crisis is Unfolding	29
2 nd Requirement: Be Robust Enough to Handle the Magnitude of the Crisis	33
3 RD Requirement: Operate as a Government Led, Civilian Activity	35
4 TH Requirement: Police Civilians and Adjudicate Criminal Activity	40
5 TH Requirement: Peace Enforcement Code	42
6 TH Requirement: Provide Medical Support to the Host Community.....	44
7 TH Requirement: Self Sustainment during Deployment	45
8 TH Requirement: Coordinate and Incorporate NGOs and Other Civilian Activities.....	46
9 th Requirement: Use the Structural Principles of Army Field Units	47
10 TH Requirement: Use a Brigade Structural Configuration.....	49
Summary of Capabilities	50
Take Away Thoughts.....	52
4. Constabulary Brigade	53
The Constabulary Brigade Functional Structure.....	54
Organizational Features.....	55
The Constabulary Brigade Technical Design	58
Training / Mission / Reset - Lifecycle Management	60
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (<i>Stability Mission Configuration</i>)	62
Repurposing Soldiers	63
Constabulary Battalion Command & Headquarters, in General	65
Company Command, in General	67

Contracting and Acquisition	70
Putting the Plan into Effect.....	72
5. Conclusion	74
Author's Epilog	i
Appendix A: Subordinate Unit Specifications	- 1 -
Brigade Command and Field Headquarters Operational Staff	- 1 -
Brigade Troops Companies.....	- 2 -
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Constabulary Brigade	- 4 -
Crisis Analysis Unit	- 4 -
Advance Party.....	- 8 -
Signal (<i>Network Support</i>) Company	- 10 -
Multi-Media Company	- 11 -
Support Operations Company (<i>SPO</i>).....	- 12 -
The Constabulary Police Battalion	- 16 -
Constable Police Company	- 18 -
Civil Action Battalion	- 19 -
Aviation Company.....	- 21 -
Engineering Company:	- 23 -
Medical Company	- 23 -
Training Academy.....	- 26 -
Justice Battalion	- 27 -
Constabulary Investigations Company	- 29 -
Constabulary Confinement Company	- 31 -
Judiciary Affairs Company	- 32 -
Sustainment Battalion.....	- 33 -
Distribution Company	- 36 -
Supply Company	- 37 -
Water Company	- 39 -
Maintenance Company	- 41 -
Constabulary Forward Support Company:	- 42 -
Infantry Battalion Taskforce	- 44 -
Appendix B: Terminology	- 46 -
Appendix C: Acronym List.....	- 50 -

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1. Asserting Stability in a Crisis

In the future, the United States cannot afford the luxury of preparing its forces for one particular form of war, whether that form be conventional or insurgency. Nor can it dismiss the period after the end of active military operations as someone else's problem. The ability to adapt to the unforeseen conditions and contexts of the future becomes of even greater importance in the effectiveness of military forces than was the case in the twentieth century.

Murray Williamson, Military Adaptation in War, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2009

This thesis is two part: On one side is the proposal to establish a **Constabulary Brigade** that can rapidly deploy civilian forces to undertake state-building functions; the content. On the other side, is the informative effort to advance a **“process for designing”** such an organizational structure: the process. Historical evidence, needs and advocated solutions, and best practices for organizational development are pointing toward developing relevant doctrine, and designing a functional constabulary corps with a brigade-centric organization. This thesis is both a case study, and a proposal.

The author is working from two major assumptions: First, most civilians do not understand the unique nuances of military unit organizational structures. Next, most civilians and many military people cannot distinguish between a paramilitary organization and a military organization.

How is military activity different from civilian functional activity? “A **military** is an organization authorized by its greater society to use lethal force... in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats.”³ The distinction is, the military exists primarily to be the nation's warriors and protectors. “First and foremost is **the military's distinct mission**. The military is the only organization with the mission to **destroy and kill enemies of the nation**. No one, neither police nor police-like organizations, is authorized to kill in this manner. Although the military may be charged with a host of other missions, **the foremost use of deadly force against the nation's enemies**, weather by aggressive and defensive actions, is its defining characteristic. No other organization has a similar mission.”⁴ They are tasked to take and hold land by inflicting casualties amongst the enemy whose center of gravity they seek to destroy.

Whereas, “Police power is the capacity of a state to **regulate behaviors and enforce order** within its territory, often framed in terms of general welfare, morals, health, and safety.”⁵ As a civilian organization, the general mission of police is to establish and **administer a system of security and promote and foster the enforcement of law and order** advocating the rule of law. Article 43 of the Hague/Geneva Conventions would extend this authority beyond the

³ “**Military**,” From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_military, 18 April 2012

⁴ Daniel Druckman, Jerome E. Singer, and Harold Van Cott, Editors; *“Enhancing Organizational Performance,”* The National Academy Press, 1997

⁵ “**Police Power**,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9060615/police-power>. Retrieved 2007-02-08.

political boundaries of a state into the occupied territories. For police, this is done by working with the community citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility. A very important tool of police is community policing based on a partnership between the police and the community whereby, together, neighborhood problems are solved and the quality of life is enhanced. For a constabulary, the use of military organizational tools and equipment does not alter its fundamental policing mission. *(The author researched about twenty mission statements from police departments around the country to identify a common theme, which led to the above principle.)* That distinction has little to do with paramilitary organization, equipment, automated infrastructure, uniforms or even guns.

This propositional thesis is in essence, an instruction manual on **“how to”** structure a paramilitary organization that is focused on conducting stability operations and humanitarian assistance at the community level. This thesis refers to such an organization as a, Constabulary Brigade.

THE CENTRAL ISSUE

A prominent feature of several of the reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a recommendation to develop rapidly deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term stability and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict country. Many view the development of civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible.

*Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions”,
Congressional Research Service, March 4, 2011*

In the public discourse over the internet on the subject of post conflict military operations, or civil-military operations there have been a chorus of advocates for the establishment of an expeditionary police force. Yet, there has been no movement in that direction. *The itch that needs to be scratched:* There is no single need or requirement which has proven to be compelling enough to prompt the U.S. Federal Government to fully implement a solution. Still, most of the government stakeholders seem to accept that there is a looming threat, for one reason or another, to some greater or lesser extent from the absence of this functional capability. *(This begs the question, why has this issue been allowed to languish, unresolved?)*

BACKGROUND

At the beginning of each president’s term of office, the Department of Defense provides him with a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It is an assessment of the state of the military, and the sources of likely threats. Shortly thereafter, the Congress and the Department of State host an independent panel to review the review; making its own assessments. The Department of State offered President Obama their assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review that the Department of Defense had presented. In spite of the presence of the

Civilian Response Corps (CRC) within the Department of State, the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (QDRIP) still felt more was needed.

1. Legislative Branch: National Security reform effort

a. Finding: The Panel acknowledges Congress's crucial role in providing for national defense with both authorities and appropriations. However, the Panel notes with extreme concern that our current federal government structures – both executive and legislative, and in particular those related to security – were fashioned in the 1940s and, at best, they work imperfectly today. The U.S. defense framework adopted after World War II was structured to address the Soviet Union in a bipolar world. The threats of today are much different. A new approach is needed.

b. Recommendation: The Panel recommends a legislative reform package containing the following elements:

ii. Review and rewrite other authorities to create and expand deployable capabilities of civilian departments, agencies, and institutions (particularly State, State/AID, Treasury, Energy, Justice, DHS, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Transportation).

3. Enhanced civilian “whole of government” capacity

a. Finding: Today civilian department and agencies lack the capacity to provide the array of capabilities required for effective support to the Department of Defense in stability and reconstruction operations in unstable host nations. In many cases, even pre-conflict and certainly post-conflict, our civilians will be deployed in situations of – security// insecurity - and thus will have to be able to operate in an integrated way with security forces [whether with indigenous forces (especially in a pre-conflict, failing state case), with international peacekeepers, or with U.S. forces (especially in post-conflict situations)].

*The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
QDRIP, Chapter Two: The Comprehensive Approach
July 29, 2010, pages vii – x*

The articles and documents advocating the American employment of a paramilitary police force for responding to international crises events are numerous. The National Defense University in 2003 had proposed the creation of five (*so-called*) S&R Divisions (Figure 2-4) that were intended for stabilization, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping tasks. (S&R = Stability and Reconstruction.) ***This thesis refers to such a security force as a constabulary.*** However, this thesis reiterates those needs and their supporting arguments in a different context. Each argument will be treated as a need requiring incorporation into the solution proposed by this thesis.

This thesis assumes the U.S. government would like to have a more robust yet cost effective capability to deal with: Humanitarian Relief, Peace Enforcement, Stability Operations, etc. Hence, this thesis proposes ***“how to”*** design a Constabulary Brigades and their component elements to be used as tools for achieving these goals. Here, this thesis is about developing what Kieran Neeson calls, “the tools....”

PURPOSE

Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

"Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. 1-2

This thesis is written for civilian leaders who are seeking to create an organization that can conduct stability operations and related missions. It is offering is a ***concept for the structural design*** of such an organization, and a demonstration of how to work the ***structural development process***.

One suspects that for a government leader to be giving serious consideration to this thesis, a concerted desire has been reached or a decision has been made to establish a new organization; one that will allow the Department of State to operate its own organizational agent on a battlefield (*or such similar crisis environment*) which is self securing and self sustaining.

Though this thesis will argue for the consideration of certain technical requirements, functional requirements, or design criteria; it is not intended as an argument for that which in oratorical terms is known as the ***indictment of the status quo*** in the arena of political policy. The merits of any specific occupation or nation-building public policy are outside the scope of this thesis. However, when the President of the United States decides to take a certain course of action, he needs to know that the correct tools are available which can achieve those objectives.

SCOPE OF DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Currently, the United States of America is not capable of consistently satisfying its commitments under agreed upon international law, as it pertains to the conventions of land warfare and the treatment of civilians. This is particularly true for stability operations during or just after a conflict of combat.

Hague Regulations, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: 18 October 1907, Section III: Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State:

Article 43: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety...

The business analyst (*or systems analyst*) profession uses various procedural tools for developing operational processes. The product of such development efforts can range from software to machines, from job descriptions to, in this case, institutional sized organizations.

This thesis examines a mechanism for optimizing the successful satisfaction of Article 43 of the Hague/Geneva Convention (*cited above*) and other needs-based requirements in Chapter 3 (*Requirements of Crisis Event Management*). Article 43 is a well defined

international standard that can be used to measure the effectiveness of tools used for occupation or stability operations. This is not to suggest the U.S. has ignored or violated international law; that discussion is a separate subject, far beyond the scope of this thesis.⁶ What this thesis is focused on is **process improvement**. All of the major quality management systems (i.e., ISO 9000 and CMMI) share relatively common problem solving concepts for process improvement.

A critical consideration of developing process based solutions is the identification of requirements. This is done by gathering together all the relevant functional “needs.”⁷ Accepting and restating the needs as requirements. Then, apply the requirements to the development of a solution.

To give order to the development of this thesis, we will step through product development from a high level general view to detailed specific organizational structures:

- 1st. We identify strategic mission and goals,
- 2nd. Identify objectives and their supporting business functions,
- 3rd. Lay out functional requirements using related literature (*as a substitute for live stakeholder input*),
- 4th. Identify technical (*non-functional*) requirements based on the principles of military organization, and finally
- 5th. Create organizations that are structured to satisfy the above requirements.

In its most basic sense, this thesis says “**what**” will be done, “**why**” it will be done, and then “**how**” it will be done.

Then at this point, the thesis will stop our inquiry into the development of a crisis management organization. If we were to continue, the next step would be to create doctrine to govern the use and valid activity of this organization. Then as developers, we would create a work breakdown structure to define each specific process this organization would be expected to perform.

Ultimately, this thesis is more focused on the idea of “**how to**” organize a paramilitary constabulary force than the constabulary’s actual structure.

⁶ Marco Sassòli, “*Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century*,” Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, June 2004

⁷ “**need**”: A motivating force that compels action for its satisfaction. Needs range from basic survival needs (common to all human beings) satisfied by necessities, to cultural, intellectual, and social needs (varying from place to place and age group to age group) satisfied by necessities. Needs are finite but, in contrast, wants (which spring from desires or wishes) are boundless.
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/need.html#ixzz1t3ffUby9>

SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION

"Development, security and human rights must go hand in hand; and that there can be no security without development and no development without security and neither can be sustained in the longer term without being rooted in the rule of law and respect for human rights."

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, 14 December 2006

The Task: Based on the authoritative comments and documented regulations and requirements cited up to this point, we have the foundation for a solution, which at the high level, would be a paramilitary organization. Hence, this thesis now (*formally*) proposes: Develop a constabulary force with a mission to: **Keep the Peace, Protect the Innocent, Enforce the Law.** It will be tasked (Figure 1-1) to perform the following mission sets: 1.) Humanitarian Relief, 2.) Security Force Assistance, 3.) Peace Enforcement, 4.) Combat zone civilian protection Stability Operations with post-conflict Occupation, and 5.) Post-conflict Stability Operations with limited support for Reconstruction programs.

The Conditions: Using military criteria for unit development, and the functional requirements commonly incurred during crisis management. Explore historical evidence, relevant organizational design principles and business best practices.

The Objective: Provide organizations that incorporate a functional whole of government, civilian led solution into a paramilitary constabulary with brigade-centric structures. Further, look at alternatives such as opportunities for repurposing military units for Stability Operations by infusing civilian law enforcement and civilian regional developers into military units.



Figure 1-1: Constabulary Brigade mission sets

ASSUMPTIONS

History suggests that military organizations have been more committed to the ethos of the past than to preparing to meet the future. Most military organizations and their leaders attempt to impose prewar conceptions on the war they are fighting rather than adapting their assumptions to reality

Murray Williamson, "Military Adaptation in War," Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2009

The reader needs to accept that because this thesis has been written by a single author, everything proposed is done as a hypothetical situation; it is a conceptual demonstration of

the potential opportunities available with a paramilitary organizational structure. Hence, there are a number of assumptions and limits to the context of this thesis.

This thesis is not proposing a singular solution with a “fixed” organizational structure; this thesis is focused on applying design criteria principles and mission requirements for use in creating an organizational structure. And, oh by the way, it simultaneously looks at a civilian organization that handles crisis management of distressed or threatened populations. It would be an organization that can deploy into potentially violent events and work to restore order and shore-up or establish good governance beginning at the local community level. The constabulary solution presented here suggests that another type of organization would be needed to handle reconstruction at the national level; but, the nature of that organization is outside the scope of this thesis.

For such a brigade to exist, it would have to be subordinated to a parent organization. In this thesis, that parent organization is for convenience referred to as the Constabulary Corps. Such an organization or bureau would have to assume responsibility for championing the brigade before the various divisions of government. Such an agency would be responsible for managing the strategic needs of the constabulary brigades, such as: recruiting, training, equipping, directing, etc. However, the exact nature and configuration of such a Constabulary Corps is beyond the scope of this thesis. It would be better addressed as a complete subject in its own white paper.

This author is a systems analyst who does not pretend to have the technical experience to say what the best ***political policies*** are for providing humanitarian aid during the spectrum between humanitarian crisis to post-war occupation; such politics are outside the venue of this author’s training and professional experience. This thesis is not about policy, beyond the question of validating⁸ that the actions taken achieve the intended result; this is known as meeting product standards, or conformity.

It is this author’s second hand assessment of subject matter experts’ first hand opinions that at best, the U.S. performance has not been consistent in establishing stability during a crisis. Usually after nonconformity has occurred, a root cause analysis would examine the economic effectiveness of: input resources, the process flow to which the resources were/are subjected, and the infrastructure supporting those processes.⁹ Lodged amongst the inputs are the product standards¹⁰ that beg the question of, will the product be sufficient to address issues or resolve the needs that originally drove the producers and service providers to create the product in the first place? This is known as product validation. At this point, it appears that neither peace-building nor occupation efforts are controlled nonconformities. One has to recognize that the state of the art in this arena is still unfolding. Conflict by organized armies can be traced back to Samaria and Acadia, some 5500 years ago. The United Nations’ endeavors to promote peace are not even 70 years old; peace-building processes are all still virgin territory. There is a lot of room for exploration still left here.

⁸ ISO 9001:2008, Section 7.5.3 Validation of processes for production and service provision

⁹ ISO 9001:2008, Section 8.3 Control of nonconforming product

¹⁰ ISO 9001:2008, Section 7.3.2 Design and development inputs

With specific regard to applying the effect of this thesis's proposal to specific occupation or nation-building policy, a solid definition of authorized government policy would have to be presented. Then it would be possible to bounce the merits of a constabulary organization against the needs of a specific nation-building program. Literature over the last ten years would suggest that in spite of Joint Publications originating from the Department of Defense, well defined doctrine by the other instruments of U.S. national governance are still in flux; this has resulted in hard to pin down policies by our civilian government.

This huge involvement in nation-building efforts by the US is in stark contrast to what the present Bush administration believed the American military should be used for. The Bush administration came to office concerned about the overuse of the military. As early as January 2000, the future US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice was arguing that the military was meant to be a lethal instrument, "not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build civilian society"¹¹. Yet by 2003, the Bush administration had deployed a significant number of American forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, where they are deeply involved in fundamental nation-building efforts. Judging from the post-Cold War nation-building attempts, it could be questioned whether the U.S. is prepared for the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Historically, nation-building attempts by outsider powers are notable mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs. America is undoubtedly the world's most active nation builder. In the words of Robert Orr, "the US is in the nation-building business".¹² At present the US is more involved in nation-building than any time in its history, and it looks likely that post-conflict reconstruction will be the fixture of international life in the twenty-first century. Thus, it is essential that America and the international community learn from the lessons of the past.

*Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan", e-International Relations, October 20, 2008
http://www.e-ir.info/?p=575#_ednref4*

Some people raise the argument that nation-building is not an achievable endeavor. This thesis does not portend to know that answer. *(This author believes that for anyone to vent a definitive opinion at this time is premature; more experience with different approaches is needed before anyone can pronounce a conclusive answer.)* Still, as long as our nation is expressing a desire to engage in stability operations and nation building, then this thesis is offering a venue through which we might maximize such opportunities that may still exist.

Any discussion of crisis management normative issues (*i.e., issues pertaining to acceptable and unacceptable conduct in terms of public opinion*) is hard because it deals with opinions about the ethical right and wrong, the subjective feelings good and bad, and is mired in the diverse global community's fuzzy opinions about standards of conduct. To avoid that

¹¹ "Foreign Affairs, 79," no 1, January/February 2000, p53

¹² Orr, R. (eds), 2004, "Winning the peace: An American strategy for post-conflict reconstruction," The CSIS Press, Washington D.C, px

circular argument, the focus of this thesis is limited to the needs driving requirements, and whether the subsequent organization satisfies those requirements.

The impetus to change how the U.S. is currently doing business, S&R wise, will have to come from other forums (*e.g., the document above by the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (QDRIP), or the Institute for Defense Analyses*). Where such opinions and policy statements are referenced to in this thesis, it is this author's intent to uncover the functional or technical performance needs driving requirements, and validate their significance for being applied to the design development of a proposed Constabulary Brigade. Within the scope of this thesis, the necessity of incorporating any of the raised requirements into a part of the structural performance capabilities of the proposed constabulary is a valid subject for debate.

There would invariably be a large number of legal, status of forces, legislative and funding issues that would have to be resolved before moving to establish or employ a Constabulary Brigade. The scope of this thesis is limited to a discussion of organizational structures and performance capabilities within a Constabulary Brigade. Hence, the legal and funding issues are only raised as they pertain to structural design and performance related issues at the concept level; otherwise, though they are very relevant in a different context, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.

This author is not suggesting that a "single" Constabulary Brigade will be sufficient to hold a country together after a crisis event. The reader will later see that the National Defense University in 2003 had proposed the creation of five S&R Divisions. A similar effort would equate to around 15 to 20 of the Brigades suggested in this thesis. However, the number and mix of brigade types are doctrinal considerations beyond the scope of this thesis.

This author assumes that the U.S. Army intends to (*even if it hasn't committed to*) provide at least one Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) for conducting stability operations¹³ during the course of the next decade, should the need arise. (*A more in-depth discussion on the MEB and ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is to be addressed in following chapters.*) Aside from policy statements made in FM 3-90.31, projections made in this thesis about MEB utilization are speculative.

Likewise, even if the Department of Defense is not the lead agency for S&R, it will still be a major stakeholder and active participant in post-conflict S&R operations. However, the author believes that as a rule of thumb, about twenty brigades of all types would be the most that the Army could afford to dedicate to any one S&R mission, based on the way ARFORGEN is structured. Yet, considering the strain on the Army's security responsibilities and the volume of its global commitments, the idea of devoting so many brigades to a single S&R mission would have to be driven by very dire demands. On this matter, there are few hard references beyond Joint Publications from the Department of Defense and Field Manual 3-90.31, about how the Army operationally plans to deploy for S&R missions. One has to wait to cross that bridge before one can know with certainty (*with 20/20 hindsight*) what resources will be available for any such enterprises.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-90.31 "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations," February 2009

ACCEPTING THAT OCCUPATION IS AS SIGNIFICANT AS WAR

Why would we help a vanquished foe back up on their feet? Why would we engage in nation-building?¹⁴ The immediate purpose for doing this is to conform to international conventions, minimize human suffering, satisfy ethical expectations, and enhance global security that impacts the United States. The broad purpose for doing this is to establish a functional state whose people are equipped to engage in international commerce, exercise just governance with minimal corruption, and pose no threat to global peace.^{15, 16}

As Americans, we have to stop thinking of occupation as a dirty word. Such emotionally laced judgments don't negate the realities of the cost, or mitigate Americas moral responsibilities. We need to recognize that the real tragedy of occupation is in how unprepared we are to do it when the time comes. If we are going to spend the resources to go to war, we have to be just as ready to win the occupation that invariably follows. We have to stop thinking of occupation work as being something less than real combat, in order to justify not diverting resources from the Army. We will not know ultimate victory in our wars until we achieve peace in the post-war period. ***In the prosecution of any just war, the U.S. incurs post-war moral and legal obligations that are as odious as the act of going to war itself.*** The justification of going to war in the first place, does not automatically expand into the conduct of the post-conflict occupation. Hence, this author assumes that winning the peace is just as important as winning the war.

At the current time the U.S. has a substantial number of policy statements on doing stability operations. All of it is just academic intellectual exercises and hollow promises. The real evidence of true intent would be the presence of an organization that is functionally designed, with divisions of labor that are especially trained and equipped to execute such policies.

¹⁴ Hague-Geneva Convention IV, Article 43 sets the standard as the major requirement.

¹⁵ National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD-44, December 7, 2005

¹⁶ See the information on the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which seems ideal for leading in reconstruction work (page 13).

2. Current State of Affairs

Proverb, "If you don't know where you're going, you'll probably end up somewhere else."

This exploration into the organization of an expeditionary constabulary force is put forward in the context of recent history. In terms of the United Nations, they have performed 53 peacekeeping missions beginning in 1948, and are still conducting 16 more missions (*as of November 2011*).¹⁷ The trend is that during the latter half of the 20th Century, 25% of the world's nations became the subject of a United Nations sponsored peacekeeping mission. These disruptions in global tranquility are likewise affecting American interests. Toward this issue, the U.S. financially subsidizes 25% to 30% for the approximately seven billion dollars that the United Nations needs each year to conduct Article 17 peacekeeping operations.¹⁸

How the U.S. conducts intra-conflict and post-conflict stability operations is probably one of the more unrecognized issues of American strategic security. National Security Presidential Directive 44 of 2005, *"Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,"* lays the foundation for the national effort in stability operations through the following order: **"The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead** integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."¹⁹ All too often, ***stability operations are done as a subset of a military occupation, after the combat phase of a conflict has occurred.***

The U.S. has been engaged in occupation or nation-building activity once every six to six and a half years over the last century; and there is every indication that this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. During the last century, the U.S. spent 67% of its time engaged in occupation, and/or nation-building activity with an 80% failure rate.²⁰ Our reputation for usually leaving behind despotic or weak governments which leave the people poor and voiceless has sullied our reputation as an honorable adversary, a truthful peacemaker, an objective arbitrator, or a real upholder of democracy. These failures have spoiled America's reputation, bred ill will toward the U.S., and generated a skeptical resistance to even the peaceful development of U.S. activities around the world.

Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

Albert Einstein

¹⁷ Wikipedia, *List of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping_missions, November 30, 2011

¹⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml>, December 12, 2011

¹⁹ National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD-44, December 7, 2005

²⁰ Pei, M. and Kasper, S.; *"Lessons from the past: The American record on nation-building"*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003

VESTED INTERESTS OF AMERICA

The U.S. has its own interests that are beyond those of the United Nations and the international community. Most of those reasons are commercial/economic. About 60% to 70% of all reserve currency²¹ and economic activity on this planet is done with the U.S. dollar²², even though only 12% of that activity is U.S. direct commercial activity. In spite of the isolationist sentiments of some American extremists, any failure to actively monitor and protect the global economic infrastructure will have profound repercussions. Hence, the U.S. would understandably be intolerant of anything that will infringe upon or destabilize the dollar. Today, the U.S. has found itself in a position where, due to the prevalence of the dollar in global markets, the U.S. economy is tied to the global prosperity and hardship of each of the nations on the planet in proportion to the dollar's presence. And, the great crash of the U.S. housing market has demonstrated that the reciprocal is true

The normative issues of any particular military intervention or the morality of political and economic motivations for a military intervention is beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, any time the U.S. does step forward with decision to engage in a military enterprise, there is a cost in national treasure and the injury or death of our young. By international accords, the victor of a war is responsible for exercising police powers, judicial authority, populace sustainment, medical support, and care for displaced children. There is the success of winning the conflict; there is the question of whether political and economic goals were achieved; then there is the question of how resilient those achievements are over the long term. Thus we have an aphorism about winning the battles, and losing the war.

GLOBAL SECURITY BY DEMOCRATIZATION

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies.

*National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD-44, December 7, 2005
SUBJECT: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*

The idea of occupation as being simply nation management implies that developing a representative democracy has not always been an objective of American foreign policy and military occupation. Though great lip service was given to the value of democratization up

²¹ Eichengreen, Barry, *"Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future: Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition,"* (May 2005). NBER Working Thesis Series, Vol. w11336, pp. -, 2005. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=723305>

²² Since the mid-20th Century, the *de facto* world currency has been the United States dollar. According to Robert Gilpin in *"Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,"* (2001): "Somewhere between 40 and 60 percent of international financial transactions are denominated in dollars.

through the fall of the Soviet Union, American strategic policy was previously focused on securing trade routes and countering the expansion of other hegemonies (*particularly communism*) that were hostile to American commercial expansion. (*Regardless of the preceding assumption,*) U.S. foreign policy now views democratization as the best means to global security and the expansion of commercial opportunity. The inspiration for this new value appears to be the success the U.S. had with Germany and Japan in countering communism.

THE CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE SOLUTION

In August of 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created to handle issues relating to conflict. This office is responsible for coordinating federal government efforts relating to countries at risk of or in conflict. In November 2011, the United States Department of State created the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (*CSO*), headed by an undersecretary. The bureau's mission is to advance U.S. national security by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace.²³

CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS BUREAU



Within the bureau is a team of subject matter experts who deal with bolstering fragile states, and nation-building. This team is known as the Civilian Response Corps (*CRC*). Comprised of about 100 active members and 1,000 standby members, tasked with deploying rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. The CRC is an inter-agency body which promotes a “whole of Government” approach.

The CRC Active Response Component (*CRC-A*) consists of subject matter experts, supported by the CRC Standby Component (*CRC-S*) consisting of volunteer Federal civil servants. They are diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others – offering the full range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law, and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as possible.²⁴

Although the CSO Bureau is developing strategic capacity, it has no tactical level capabilities to address the S&R Gap.²⁵ The current bureau has five **performance gaps**:

²³ Department of State. "*U.S. Department of State Launches Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operation*," United States Department of State, November 22, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177636.htm>.

²⁴ Wikipedia, *Civilian Response Corps*, 26 June 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_Response_Corps

²⁵ The “S&R Gap” is fully described in Chapter 3, under the 2nd Requirement

1st. The CSO's CRC works fine for fragile states; but, is nullified in a combat environment where state organs are non-existent (*i.e., vanquished*).

2nd. The focus of the CSO's CRC is limited to working at the top levels of the local national's government; with no mechanism for dealing with collapsed infrastructure or street violence at the community level.

3rd. The CRC is not structured as a self-sustaining independent entity that can operate in a violent environment which is devoid of resources, without piggybacking off the military.

4th. The CRC has no doctrine for routine interaction with the military in the field at the battalion level or below to synchronize military and civilian efforts.

5th. The CSO-CRC is too small in number and abstract in its benefit to raise popular support for foreign intervention, from the people who are the victims of a crisis event.

The CSO-CRC employs a top-down approach that is indicative of the ambassadorial processes that are familiar to the Department of State, but vulnerable to any of the performance gaps mentioned above. These gaps could scuttle the CSO's efforts in a combat environment. It is especially vulnerable because of its being underfunded, and under staffed. (*Congressional appropriation gaps at the end of 2011 will leave the SRC-S sort of the funds need reach the goal of 2,270 personnel by more than half.*)²⁶

This begs the question of; aside from advocating stabilization, what good are coaches and cheerleaders without a football team out in the field to move the ball?

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION DIVISIONS

Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, including adversarial groups. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security therefore, is fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and, ultimately security of the state.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom (MOD-UK), Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, "Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution," November 2009

To address stabilizing a nation before reconstruction, the National Defense University in 2003 had proposed the creation of five so-called S&R Divisions (Figure 2-4) that would be intended for stabilization, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping tasks. The major elements of an S&R Division were to have consisted of four S&R brigades, a Stryker BCT (*to provide combat power*), and a support command. In total, five S&R Divisions would equal approximately 15 of the proposed Constabulary Brigades.

²⁶ Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions", Congressional Research Service, March 4, 2011, pg. 20

The S&R commands would comprise military police, medical, civil affairs, engineer, and psychological operations battalions. The support command would include an area support battalion for each S&R group. The Stryker BCT would have had the same structure as those now in the Army. The division base for an S&R Division would feature an explosive-ordnance-disposal battalion and a training-assistance battalion as well as more-common support elements. This proposal would have cut two active combat divisions in order to create five "peacekeeping" divisions. Though it might have improved peacekeeping capability, it would have been at the expense of warfighting ability.




Figure 2-4: An S&R division used for a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study done in May 2005.

Still, in the larger context of mitigating the enablers that threaten international peace and security, the S&R Division offered some promise in the post-conflict phase. Human security is a requirement for building and sustaining stability. It is met when the personal security needs and basic physiological needs (*e.g., food, water, and shelter*) of the population are met. In a failed state or vanquished state scenario, it is only logical that a desperate population would turn to insurgents and foreign fighters, as well as belligerents and opportunists. These groups exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services, and even a crude form of justice. Securing the population (*as expressed in JDP 3-40 above*), therefore, is fundamental to the development of a local national government's authority and ultimately the national security of the state. As a population moves away from the temptations offered by violently subversive radicals, then the subversives become less of a factor in the international arena, and less of a threat to America. The implementation of an

S&R Division would have demonstrated that the U.S. military truly understood and was willing to react to the challenges of a stability mission.

During the period of time just after the end of major fighting in Iraq, the question of how to handle the post-war rebuilding of Iraq came up regularly in government circles. However, by 2006, most of these discussions had died off. What happened to all this developmental exploration into S&R during the 2005 period? It was that the imminent discussion within the Army turned to the Army's transition from division-based fixed combat formations to brigade-centric flexible modular organizations.²⁷ Developing S&R capability was further overshadowed by the U.S. economic downturn.

THE CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOLUTION

The recent end of the cold war and other geopolitical events have placed Army personnel in new situations and redefined its role with respect to "preserving peace and security." Along with its central and more traditional role of warfighter, the Army and the other services have been asked increasingly to act as peacekeeper and peacemaker, and as an instrument of international humanitarian aid. These added roles are often strange to many military members who may not have received adequate training to deal with the varied aspects of operations other than war.

*The Changing Nature of Work: Implications for Occupational Analysis
The National Academies Press, 1999*

Any time U.S. troops enter foreign soil with a mandate to exercise any form of military authority, the American people incur a cost. It is not enough to win only the combat phase of a war; we have to demonstrate that we can win the occupation phase of a war, too. Our current problem is, how do we make such "*total success*" during the conflict phase of a war repeatable during the post-conflict phase? If we can't win the occupation (*no matter how short or how long*), our enemies could develop a strategy that will accept losing the war, knowing that later, they can resurface to defeat America during the occupation and post-occupation period.

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

Should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

²⁷ Colonel Jeffrey P. Marlette, "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade: The Quest for Legitimacy," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, March 30, 2010: section titled, "Modularity – Movement to the Brigade based Army." (Author's Note: This is the best succinct analysis of an MEB.)

Recently, the Army has fielded a new type of multi-role brigade which in accord with Sun Tzu's water analogy is very flexible. The second challenge which Sun Tzu speaks of (*above*,) is a question of how to organize for 360-degree defense of all assets with limited assets. Even the Brigade Combat Teams (*vans*) moving toward the battle front need protection until they can adjust into battle formation against the intended threat. This is perfectly understood by the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Amongst the mission sets of this new brigade is a stability operation. It is the Army's response to post-conflict security nonconformities. (*The use and value of this new unit will be discussed prominently throughout this thesis.*)

This new unit type is called the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (*MEB*, *Figure 2-5*).²⁸ It is a skeletal brigade that can be configured to address a variety of combat support²⁹ or special function³⁰ operations. It has a brigade headquarters company (*Bde HHC*), signal company, and a brigade support battalion that are a permanent part of its organizational structure (*organic elements*). This is one example of what Sun Tzu refers to as being formless like water. Before the MEB and the Sustainment Brigade, the U.S. Army did not have a standing combat element of battalion or brigade size, with no fixed internal functional structure. Hence the mission sets that different Army units could perform were constrained by their fixed design structures. The functional flexibility of MEBs is still very novel to the Army at large. It is projected to be the Army's primary executor of S&R missions.³¹ The concept for this brigade began in 2005 as a "Protection




Figure 2-5: A Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) demonstrating flexible configuration.

²⁸ During the early days of the Modular Brigade's conception, developers had a vague idea of what they were trying to do, but no fixed precedent. Hence, they referred to "Units of Action" (UA) as a generic term for tactical brigades, and "Units of Employment" for theater-level operational units. From there, TRADOC developed eight UAs. William M. Donnelly, "*Transforming an Army at War: designing the modular force, 1991-2005*", Center of Military History, United States Army, 2007, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/transforming_an_army/CMH_70-108-1.pdf

²⁹ *Combat Support*, are direct combat functions (killing the enemy) that do not take and hold real-estate.

³⁰ *Special function elements (SFE)* are military tasks or operations using specialized skill sets on behalf of (not the parent, but) the grandparent organization. (*The author's simplistic definition.*)

³¹ <http://www.ng.mil/media/factsheets/MEB.pdf>

Brigade” which became the Combat Support Brigade (*Maneuver Enhancement*) (CSB-ME). In 2007, the name “Maneuver Enhancement Brigade” (MEB) finally stuck to it.³²

MEB Mission: *The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) enables, enhances, and protects the operational and tactical freedom of action to the supported force. It receives and integrates mission tailored forces to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and support brigades. It commands and controls forces necessary to conduct security and functional operations in a designated area of operations (AO) in order to enable force application, focused logistics, battle space awareness, and protection. The MEB has four key tasks to conduct:*

- 1) *Maneuver support operations*
- 2) *Support area operations*
- 3) *Consequence management*
- 4) *Stability operations.*

Capabilities: *Having few organic elements, an MEB is capable of providing command and control (C2) over an array of subordinate units. They are designed for both a war-fighting and the operational combat support role. The Army is expected to activate 23 MEBs by 2012 - four active-duty, 16 in the National Guard and three in the Reserve (allowing for 4 units to be available at any given time while the remaining 19 are dormant for refit or training).*³³

Commentary: *Beyond its three organic units [HHC, Signal Co, and a Brigade Support Battalion (BSB)], the MEB has no fixed structure. When assigned or attached in support of a theater specific operation, operations order, operations plan, or contingency plan, the brigade staff will conduct a mission analysis to determine the capabilities, task organization, and command and support relationships necessary to accomplish the mission. The organization is tailored to respond to the elements of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time and civilian (METT-TC) considerations. It receives a mix of modular units; from small detachments to full battalions. In many cases, the broad geographic responsibilities and extensive functional capabilities that the MEB represents requires a variety of subordinate, functionally based units that are mission tailored to the mission environment.*³⁴

At this time there are 21 MEBs in the whole Army (2 Active Army, 16 National Guard, and 3 in the Army Reserves), most in the National Guard and the Army Reserves.^{35,36} Plans call for 23 MEBs (Figure 2-5) to be established by the end of 2012. Because of the MEB’s mission flexibility, this unit has great potential in both the combat support, and the stability arena.

³² LTG James Thurman, Army Message “*CSBE-ME Redesignation to MEB*,” November 7, 2007.

³³ Maj. Gen. William H. McCoy, commanding general of the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center and commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., “*New Maneuver-Enhancement Unit Activates at Fort Polk*,” Jean Dubiel, Army News Service, Oct. 3, 2007

³⁴ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-90.31 *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, February 2009

³⁵ COL Chuck Williams, “*The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade*” briefing slides, Maneuver Support Center, February 24, 2009

³⁶ Michelle Tan, “*Little-known MEBs Adapt to Multiple Missions*,” Army Times, April 24, 2012

Still, there are two structural issues which the MEBs face in trying to deal with the S&R Gap: 1st) finding enough of the right units needed to configure it for an S&R mission, and 2nd) finding more than one available MEB because of how few there are in the Regular Army, National Guard or Reserves. There are only two MEBs on active duty, with the next one more projected to be available in late 2012. However, considering the way ARFORGEN rotations work, there is only one unit available for duty at any one time (*they are on a three-year rotation schedule*). Right now, the National Guard has 16 MEBs with only two MEBs available for deployment during any one year (*they are on a seven-year rotation schedule*). The U.S. Reserves has 3 MEBs with only one available every other year (*they are on a six-year rotation schedule*). All the other units are stood-down undergoing: dormant, reconstitution or training. During any given year, only four MEBs are mission available.³⁷

LIMITS OF PROTECTION

"Every unnecessary expenditure of time, every unnecessary detour, is a waste of power, and therefore contrary to the principles of strategy."

Von Clausewitz, "On War" - Book VIII-Chapter 9, 1832

One should not think that "Protection" missions by MEBs had anything to do with the protection of civilians. It was about protecting what in military jargon is called the lines of communication: the major supply routes between the rear areas and the combat front. (*The concept of rear and front is in a technical sense is an obsolete operational tactic. It is loosely relevant for this discussion.*) Still, in terms of S&R missions, the MEB is best tool in the Army's bag.

In discussions about S&R, there is often an unspoken understanding at work in the minds of the military planners. Any attempt to re-purpose military assets on the battlefield cuts into the "Offensive" force and "Economy of Force" principles. (*These principles are moot if not irrelevant once the combat phase is concluded.*) For a military leader to violate either of these two principles is almost an act of profanity. Violating the principles of war risks the unnecessary death of a soldier. In the minds of many strategists, civilian refugees are a detour. Diverting resources to take care of civilians is a conflict of interest. One has to appreciate the reluctance of generals to divert resources from defeating a threat into protecting civilians.

FINDING UNITS TO FILL AN MEB

Regarding the first issue, modularity in the Army is not a free giveaway of units out of some warehouse of plug and play companies that can be cobbled together like a Lego set. (*Briefing charts for the early Modular Brigade development era of the mid 2000s made it look like that.*) Virtually every company and battalion is assigned to a designated brigade or division. It takes almost three years of planning before a unit begins stand-up and refit

³⁷ HQDA Pentagon, 2010 Army Posture Statement, Addendum F, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), The Army's Core Process.

(Reset in ARFORGEN³⁸ terms). Then it takes 18 months to train a battalion for some projected mission. Redirecting a unit to some non-combat activity, away from its projected mission, is not a happy situation for the commanders in the field who were waiting for that unit.

ARMY COMBAT PRIORITIES

Do essential things first. There is not enough time for the commander to do everything. Each commander will have to determine wisely what is essential, and assign responsibilities for accomplishment. He should spend the remaining time on near essentials.

*General Bruce C. Clarke
Commander of Continental Army Command from 1958–1960
and Commander, U.S. Army Europe from 1960-1962*

In the near term, the MEB would be the ideal brigade level parent unit to shepherd constabulary battalions on to the battlefield. The real problem is that one can't say, even a year ahead of time, when a war will happen. And, when a war does happen, the Army gets real focused on winning the fight, not on babysitting civilians.

During war, MEB units will be critical for protecting the supply lines, and for removing obstacles on the battlefield which might impede the maneuver of combat units. It's all about facilitating the combat brigades' ability to maneuver, and MEBs can't be everywhere; so, they are focused on fighting, first. Anything else that isn't real soldiering is a distraction that will have to wait according to good doctrine. For the Department of State to lay hands on just one MEB before the end of conflict will be a challenge.

It would be analytically incorrect to ignore the capabilities which the military, and in particular the Army provide to humanitarian relief, peace enforcement, and stability operations. This author identifies nine business functions which are pertinent to S&R operations. To assess the overall ability of the Army to successfully perform S&R operations, we must examine its capability of executing each of the nine business functions. The following table provides a quick reference. A more detailed analysis of each function follows the table:

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS:	CAPABILITY
1. Unified command providing direction and mission focus	Fully, w/ Caveats
2. Security police enforces the law and suppresses civil unrest	Limited
3. Public judicial or confinement services capacity	None
4. Medical Services	Fully, w/ Caveats
5. Restoration and maintenance of public infrastructure	Fully

³⁸ ARFORGEN: a rotating lifecycle process where a unit is stood-up, trained, deployed on a mission, and then returned home for an overhaul of equipment and personnel. The Active Duty has a three year rotation cycle. The Reserves and National Guard are on six year rotation cycles.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS:	CAPABILITY
6. Internal Self-Sustainment	Fully
7. Community Sustainment	Limited
8. Local National operational and tactical Incorporation	None
9. Agile quick reaction military force	Fully

UNIFIED COMMAND PROVIDING DIRECTION AND MISSION FOCUS

In every structural sense, at the operational level (*i.e., at the brigade and battalion levels*) this type of organizational structure is the ideal model for any organization operating in a conflict or crises environment. The modifier for the Army of “almost” has to do with the primary nature of the Army, itself; its primary functional goal is to vanquish (*kill*) the enemy. Hence the caveat, getting an Army unit to redirect its activities during the combat phase of a conflict is hard because of the principles articulated by Von Clausewitz and General Clark.

Caveats: The gap³⁹ in not addressing the civil stability needs during the combat phase of the war had profound “down range impact” (*military euphemistic jargon*) on the course of the occupation.⁴⁰ Here, the caveat is not a problem with organizational structure as much as it was with mission priorities. It is this variance in mission priorities that causes one to examine the opportunities for a civilian led police powered organization.

SECURITY POLICE ENFORCES THE LAW AND SUPPRESSES CIVIL UNREST

The Army's Military Police can be utilized in direct combat and during peacetime. The Military Police have five main functions:

- Maneuver and mobility support operations
- Area security operations
- Internment and resettlement operations
- Police intelligence operations
- Law and order operations

The assessment of limited capability is in the severe scarcity of well trained or sufficiently experienced police available for community policing. The shortage of M.P.s during the latest conflict was such that National Guard combat arms units had to be put through a four week course and temporarily re-designated as M.P. units.

At this time, there are approximately 70,000 military police officers in the U.S. Army, including National Guard and Reserves. However, when ARFORGEN is factored in, there are

³⁹ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., *“Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,”* National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003

⁴⁰ Kieran Neeson, *“Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan”*, e-International Relations , October 20, 2008

only about 16,250 M.P.s available for deployment at any given time; the rest of the force is dormant. This is roughly four available brigades, if support troops are included into that figure. In the event of a surge, it should be possible to draw upon about three more brigades that are involved in training. The whole of available M.P.s would be insufficient to police the county of Los Angeles.

PUBLIC JUDICIAL SERVICES CAPACITY

None exist to handle civilian issues for the local populace of a failed or vanquished state. Military judicial operations exist solely to adjudicate soldier violations of military discipline, and to reinforce the commanders' authority. The military uses the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as the legal foundation of its judicial system. For purposes of civil law, military courts default to federal law, and then local statutes.

MEDICAL SERVICES

American military medical services hold the distinction for being capable of providing a robust variety of medical procedures in the most primitive of environments. However, the caveat is because of the Army medical focus on stabilizing a patient long enough to transport them to an out of zone hospital. Medical services would have to be reoriented into providing full service on site for the local community; this is something that occurs only after the combat phase of the conflict is completed.

RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

This is predominantly the ability to contract for services by acquisition agents. At the beginning to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Army had a very disjointed capability in this arena. Around 2007, the Army Material Command (AMC) created Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), which over the next three years, transformed acquisition, lifecycle logistics, and technology (ALT) functions and capabilities. These units operate at the regional/theater level. Their presence has brought the Army a long way toward standardizing, controlling and managing acquisition and contracting support in the overseas (OCONUS) environment.⁴¹

At the community level, civil affairs soldiers work closely with AFSBs to build or restore community infrastructure.

INTERNAL SELF-SUSTAINMENT

Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.

Napoleon Bonaparte

⁴¹ FMI 4-93.41 – “*The Army Field Support Brigade Organization and Operations Overview*,” 22 February 2007

Army logistics is a central discipline within any military. In this functional arena, the U.S. Army has no equivalents. It would behoove any government officer engaged in logistics to be fully conversant in military logistics.

The internal logistics of any operational unit is the S-4 Logistics staff section. The logistics section is responsible for managing logistical support and providing all manner of supplies and services such as ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, materials, engineering, and transportation. In U.S. military, all medical equipment, maintenance activity, transportation, consumables supplies, and support equipment are included under logistics.

Sustainment support, ***which is the logistic services provided to entities beyond the organic structure of the unit***, is managed differently. If a unit is mission tasked to provide support services, those services for external entities are managed and coordinated by the S-3 Operations section. Service and support, or sustainment units have dedicated "Support Operations" (SPO) sub-sections within the S-3 staff sections which handles planning of future operations and coordination of current operations. *(The need for and use of a SPO will be a **critical tool** for any military or paramilitary organization providing humanitarian relief.)*

(As the Army has gone through its Transformation process, the terminology related to logistics, sustainment, and service and support has been going through revisions, and is still in flux. The author asks the reader to get the general sense of the above without being swallowed up in terminology debates.)

COMMUNITY SUSTAINMENT

There are only three operational level units which have organic community sustainment capabilities: Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEB), Army Field Support Battalions (AFSBn), and Sustainment Brigades. It takes all three of these units working in concert with each other to perform S&R. It would also require that MEB and the Sustainment Brigade be mission-task reorganized to perform civil support operations.

LOCAL NATIONAL OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INCORPORATION

The U.S. Army does not incorporate units from a vanquished foe into its organizational structures. That would create security and legal/disciplinary issues for the military. Still, the U.S. military has had a mixed history on this point. During the Vietnam War, the Army and Marines made an effort to support local national security. Yet, the locals were never internalized into the U.S. military. However in Europe, local nationals work as military civilians in support of military communities. Hence, the opening sentence to this paragraph is historically debatable, but the constraints against incorporating ex-enemies are exstrem.

AGILE QUICK REACTION MILITARY FORCE

The problem for small units (*such as M.P. squads*) moving around on the battlefield is that they are susceptible to being isolated and destroyed. This is known in military jargon as, "defeat-in-detail." The availability of a quick reaction force has to be planned into the operations using a dedicated reserve element. When such a reserve force is in place, they usually work wonderfully.

PROFESSIONALIZING A DEDICATED STABILITY FORCE

A permanent, standing force would not be warranted primarily because of the episodic and widely fluctuating nature of the demand.

*Robert Perito, "Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations,"
Special Report 118, United States Institute of Peace, April 2004*

This author is in complete disagreement with the above comment. The above report failed to address the statistics which show the U.S. engaging in war and occupation on an average of once every six or seven years, having a duration of over five years.⁴² ARFORGEN has recognized that from Reset to Available for deployment, it takes 18 months of training to ready a brigade for combat. That leaves, even for rapid mobilization, a one year gap between initiation of combat and the availability of a stabilization force.

The logic that justified adopting a large standing professional military force is fast becoming the same logic which justifies having a dedicated professional stability force. As it stands today, the logic that all countries would obviously host a standing professional army is historically not a foregone conclusion. Countries are most likely to begin professionalizing the military in response, not to war or the threat of war, but to dire military defeats, which are defeats resulting in the occupation of national territory, abnormally high casualties, and the recognition of military incompetence.⁴³

The reason that America established a professional military was how close we came to not being a country when the British seized New York and Charleston. The American Revolutionary Army experienced the problem of ill-trained militias behaving erratically or breaking ranks in front of British professionals. Likewise, America had a terrible time with nonprofessional, politically connected generals and gentlemen officers whose thirst for glory and poor understanding of battlefield tactics cost America the needless loss of thousands of men in several single battles, with few losses for the British.

TRAIN TO HIGHER PROFICIENCY

A professional military (*more than just a standing army*) allows countries to train to higher levels of proficiency than any part-time, draftee or amateur military could. This means that performance standards are established for the military force which encourages officers and troops to mature into professional personnel that can perform very technical procedures. America needs people with high levels of skill to do many military jobs today. And just as in any other job, professionals are usually better at technical jobs than part-timers or amateurs. Further, over the long term, professionals produce higher quality at lower cost.

⁴² Pei, M. and Kasper, S.; "Lessons from the past: The American record on nation-building", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003

⁴³ Nathan W. Toronto, "Why War Is Not Enough: Military Defeat, The Division of Labor, and Military Professionalization", Ohio State University, Dissertation 2007

Let's ***apply this same principle to the performance of occupation*** and S&R operations. Military professionals are not stability professionals. It takes four years of college and eight to ten years of experience to create a seasoned combat captain.⁴⁴ Yet, who is asking how much S&R training and experience it takes for people working to build or re-build a country? Does the combat experience of an Army officer make him equally prepared to restore the country of an enemy he has vanquished? The Civilian Response Corps is a great start, in that regard. Yet, the current Department of State, Civilian Response Corps – Standby Component (*CRC-S*) will prove itself to be inadequate for the task of stabilization; in part for the above reason; they are part-timers and incorrectly equipped.

...the U.S. Government continues to lack the capacity for timely deployment of civilian police trainers in the early phases of stability operations. Using military personnel to train and advise civilian police is being justifiably criticized. Military personnel, even military police, are not prepared to train and advise civilian police in most tasks. Instead, their training is skewed toward the higher end stability policing tasks such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons training. The emphasis on such tasks makes it more difficult to transition to community-based policing.

Dennis E. Keller (Col, U.S. Army, Retired), "U.S. Military Forces And Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option To Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010

⁴⁴ DOD Instruction 1320.13 requires 4 years time in service for promotion to captain (O-3), and 10 years time in service for promotion to major (O-4). Here, the subjective modifier is "seasoned" combat captain.

3. Requirements of Crisis Event Management

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

As the U.S. moves into the future, America will continue to find itself drawn into wars in distant lands. Even though the historical rivalries and animosities might predate the founding of America, if those conflicts impinge on U.S. interests, the U.S. will sooner or later be drawn into the conflict and have to create a settlement, or write off those interests as a sunken cost. Victory in war is not enough. Occupation is not enough. If those wars impact U.S. national interests once, and ***we don't resolve it right the first time, we can expect to be drawn back*** into those distant lands, again and again straining the resources of the state.

The test of this thesis's proposal for a Constabulary Brigade is if it works over the long term as a tool which furthers U.S. conformity to international expectations, facilitates the objectives of going to war, or helps sooth the impact of a non-conflict crisis event.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A CONSTABULARY FORCE

Let's begin with the scope of stabilization. At this point, the defining document for the U.S. Government is "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07.

Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

"Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. 1-2

It is from this document that one can draw a consolidated list of functional activities which produces stabilization.

Stability Operations Functions: Individually, the functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a functional sector. Collectively, they are the pillars upon which the U.S. Government frames the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. The functions described here are security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation.

"Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. xv

In this instance, designers would have to be drawn first to stabilization, before reconstruction. One cannot begin to talk about reconstruction in an unstable environment.

ORGANIZATIONAL DELIVERABLES

Providing protection for the population stimulates economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it generates confidence in local people about their own local security situation – their collective human security – and an economic interest in ongoing stability. It also denies adversarial groups one of their principal strategies for expanding their support base.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom (MOD-UK), Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, "Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution," November 2009

Based on the body of requirements, experiences and literature, we are in a position to create the functional requirements for a constabulary. At this point, it should be evident that the military is not the right tool for the job. Even the military confessed that it does not have dedicated constabulary units. Yet, regardless of whatever department of the government is tasked with the job, to discuss this in any detail, we need to define the functions. A stabilization force would have to effectively exercise:

1. **Timely Governance:** Mounts major stability operations to secure a lasting peace,^{45,46,47} by providing essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief^{48,49}, establishing security for the local populace concurrently with the defeat of an enemy military,⁵⁰ working at the community level.
2. **Whole of Government Participation:** Represents the Department of State, facilitating its responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization involving an array of U.S. Government departments and agencies, including Department of Defense and component Services and agencies,⁵¹ in the political administrations of the target country.⁵²
3. **Collaboration:** Coordinates with other instruments of national power,^{53,54} having the ability to plan for and oversee both civilian and military post-conflict nation-building operations.⁵⁵ Provides the Department of State with a mechanism through which to coordinate U.S. interagency participation in a whole-of-government, comprehensive

⁴⁵ Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan", e-International Relations, October 20, 2008

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

⁴⁷ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-2

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

⁴⁹ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-2

⁵⁰ Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations", National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003

⁵¹ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-1

⁵² Pei, M. and Kasper, S.; "Lessons from the past: The American record on nation-building", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003

⁵³ Department of Defense, Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

⁵⁴ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-2

⁵⁵ Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan", e-International Relations, October 20, 2008

approach to stabilization efforts; that includes not only the U.S., but also the local population, other nations, international governing organizations (*IGO*), cooperating non-governmental organizations (*NGO*), and other participants.⁵⁶

4. **Public Security:** Conducts activities that encompasses various (*limited*) military missions, tasks, and activities,^{57,58} (*specifically, occupation*) providing U.S. and local national civilians with reasonable protection in the face of systematic violence or combat,⁵⁹ that can affect regime change or support a regime that would otherwise collapse.⁶⁰
5. **Judiciary Rule:** Provides judicial accountability for past injustices.^{61,62} It must be recognized by policy makers that judiciary activity is an inherently governmental function. Failure to provide judicial services will result in the populace resorting to vigilantism, tribal law, or subversive elements offering street justice.⁶³
6. **Medical Services:** Provides support to the local national medical institutions⁶⁴
7. **Restoration of Infrastructure:** The logistics organization, is the same as its Regular Army counterparts (*not unique, but a critical feature*). Here the table of organization fits Army principles and the equipment used is the same as Army inventory. Using Army procedures allows the regional military theater command to resupply the brigade, and provides a unified accounting process for tracking resources and financial expenditures.⁶⁵
8. **Early Responder:** The brigade the same rapid deployment capability features that are prevalent in most modular brigades.⁶⁶
9. **Self Protecting:** It is understandable that government civilians would turn to the military for help entering a battlefield. However, if having civilians on the battlefield will be a regular part of national strategic and foreign policy doctrine, then it is time for the civilian organs of government to create their own organizational vehicle for going on the battlefield.⁶⁷

⁵⁶ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-1

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

⁵⁸ "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-2

⁵⁹ *The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel*, July 29, 2010

⁶⁰ Pei, M. and Kasper, S.; *"Lessons from the past: The American record on nation-building"*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003

⁶¹ James Dobbins, et al., *"America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq"*, RAND, 2003

⁶² Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

// Part III : Status and treatment of protected persons, Section III : Occupied territories

⁶³ MOD-UK, JDP 3-40, *"Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution,"* November 2009

⁶⁴ Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

// Part III : Status and treatment of protected persons #Section III : Occupied territories; Articles 56 & 59

⁶⁵ Sustainment doctrine is derived from Army FM 4-93.2; Chapter 2

⁶⁶ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003

⁶⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest, *"Expeditionary Police Service,"* Military Review, June 1993, pg. 50-56

ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Once the general design principles for field units are in place, we next examine the requirements or criteria for an organization that can conduct spectrum of operations, even as combat operations are occurring. In the short form, the requirements are as follows:

- 1st. Arrive On Site, Ready to Work, Even as the Crisis is Unfolding
- 2nd. Be Robust Enough to Handle the Magnitude of the Crisis
- 3rd. Operate Government Led, Civilian Activity
- 4th. Police Civilians and Adjudicate Criminal Activity
- 5th. Peace Enforcement Code
- 6th. Provide Medical Support to the Host Community
- 7th. Self Sustainment during Deployment
- 8th. Coordinate and Incorporate NGOs and Other Civilian Activities
- 9th. Use the Structural Principles of Army Field Units
- 10th. Use a Brigade Structural Configuration

A clear understanding is needed of the above requirements. It is this author's belief of that **any effort to circumvent** any of the **requirements** would **seriously compromise** the effectiveness of the proposed solution. However, this is a valid point of debate within the scope of this thesis. Thus, the next question is: **Describe and justify the above criteria for a stabilization organization.**

1ST REQUIREMENT: ARRIVE READY TO WORK, EVEN AS THE CRISIS IS UNFOLDING

A stability organization needs to be structured and equipped with the technical ability to arrive on scene of an unfolding crisis during the early period of the event.

RATIONAL:

Although reconstruction of a failed or vanquished state may wait until the cessation of conflict, the local populace has a functional need of security and stability as soon as combat has reached their vicinity.

U.S. forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom, and even United Nations presence.

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003

When one looks closely at what occurred in Iraq during the combat phase of the invasion and the initial phases of the occupation, what we see is a complete void in the effective presence of legitimate governance exercising police powers. Furthermore, the American

Army was too quick to remove members of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party from their positions within the Iraqi government and military.⁶⁸

This act exacerbated the instability of Iraq, and opened the door to Al-Qaida and sectarian infighting. The U.S. military degraded local governance mechanisms by removing the key technocrats, leaving the country without any leadership resources, while the U.S. took a thin occupation stance. To this author's knowledge, the U.S. never effectively engaged a post-conflict population-focused S&R effort before the onset of domestic destabilization, looting and secular in-fighting erupted.

The result can be seen in the death toll of American soldiers in Iraq where a frightening disparity occurs. The failure of the U.S. to get a handle on establishing civil security and averting lawlessness cost the American people eight years of occupation duty. During the three months of major conflict (*March 19, 2003 until May 1, 2003*), the U.S. lost 108 soldiers. During the remaining eight years of occupation, the U.S. lost about 3,400 soldiers, or an average of about 106 soldiers for each three-month period of the occupation.

The failure to act decisively, **reinforcing the existing organs of national governance** with rapid policing in a timely fashion actually exacerbated domestic instability and sullied the reputation of America. It horribly grayed any good will that had been developed by deposing the despot. Emasculating the centers of police powers and governmental activity at that juncture in the takeover of Iraq was a clear violation of best practices that were recognized over two thousand years ago by Sun Tzu: doing that undermined any semblance of nation-building.




Figure 3-1: A traditional model of the relationship between combat and post-combat rebuilding, depicting the effort expended. This model which underlies popular beliefs is idealistic, and not usually indicative of real history.

Part of the value for a Constabulary Brigade would be to mitigate the possibility of this happening again. We won't know prosperity when our potential trading partners are ravaged by the effects of natural disaster or violent political instability.

⁶⁸ Wikipedia, Coalition Provisional Authority, 16 December 2011;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_Provisional_Authority

Peacekeeping during an occupation is as dangerous as warfighting. The casualty rates for the war in Iraq demonstrate this.

This performance failure and the resulting loss of life in the post-conflict occupation belie the U.S. military's claim of being able to handle S&R operations. There is little excuse for this performance failure. During the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. built a large repository of institutional experience in the Philippines, Germany, Japan, and so forth. Likewise, there is a wealth of knowledge to be gained from watching the exploits of the colonial powers as they divested themselves of their former possessions.




Figure 3-2: Since the end of the cold war, U.S. military conflict has been typified by Rapid Decisive Operations or Rapid Dominance Operations (RDO). Here, stability operations are deferred until major combat operations have been completed, which is the current practice (but not the official policy) of the U.S. This is a major component of the failures that happened in Iraq, which resulted in a post-conflict insurgency




Figure 3-3: Here, we see the relationship of an S&R mission (military or paramilitary) inserted between military led major combat and civilian agency based nation-building.

This lack of peace keeping and ability to protect the innocent is a product of an erroneous notion that after hostilities ends, people will return to their peaceful ways (Figure 3-1). The

truth is that the destruction of infrastructure related to combat activity becomes the fertile breeding ground for frustration and violent discontent.⁶⁹

During the Iraq war, strategic and operational planners made no consideration for the civil reaction to their Shock and Awe campaign's success against the Iraqi government. Then once combat operations were concluded, the military's Department of Defense, not the Department of State, retained control of the provisional government for the next year. There was no systematic plan for how military troops were to be reoriented from warfighting to doing S&R (Figure 3-2). *(This is not to suggest that the U.S. was not doing any S&R work in conjunction with its military victory over the Iraqi government. The Department of Defense established the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under Lieutenant General Jay Garner as a caretaker administration in Iraq.)*

Historically, there has been a problem with a gap (Figure 3-2) between the end of major combat operations and the transitioning into a follow-on effort to alleviate human suffering by creating a self-sustaining government with the capacity of taking care of the people.⁷⁰ This is referred to as the **S&R Gap**.

Though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

To address the issues engendered by the S&R Gap, stabilization operations need to be underway in conjunction with combat operations (Figure 3-3).

Delay in combat is not an iconic issue for American strategists who are well taught in rapid dominance in combat. The delay that is usually the obstacle to claiming success in modern warfare is that of initiating S&R (*especially the stability portion of a military venture*) which leads to an expensive, protracted, and usually unfruitful occupation. The waste of taxpayers' dollars in states that emerged hostile to U.S. interests after a less than successful occupation cannot be overlooked, and in due course outweighs any redeeming quality that the combat victory may have possessed. Ultimately, the U.S. needs to be as accomplished at occupation as we are at combat if we are going to have successful wars.

Regardless of whether the disruption of local national government services is caused by combat operations, insurgency or natural disaster, there will be a need for stability operations to establish or restore civil security and control, and provide humanitarian relief even while such turbulent events might be ongoing. *(The diversity of operational situations where stability operations would be a component of the response is beyond the scope of this thesis.)* If during the course of a war, the U.S. seeks to remove a regime from power, it could be months before local national government services and infrastructure resources can be reorganized and restored to the local populace. This is why the 4TH Convention, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 says, "... the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to

⁶⁹ MOD-UK, JDP 3-40, "Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution," November 2009

⁷⁰ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations", Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, November 12, 2003

restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety....” This requirement is a legal obligation affirmed by Senatorial confirmation.

It is this author’s **contention** that the late initiation of “stability and reconstruction” operations (*especially stability*) during military events is having a profound impact on downstream events, setting the stage for America’s failures at crisis event management. Billions of taxpayers’ dollars and the blood of our nation’s best are being squandered in trying to salvage wasted opportunities.

2ND REQUIREMENT: BE ROBUST ENOUGH TO HANDLE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CRISIS

Once a humanitarian crisis, failed state, or war has transitioned to open conflict and violence, a stability organization will need to be of sufficient size to preempt and suppress (*non-military*) lawlessness; reinforced with the military capabilities to redress the emergence of military threats.

RATIONAL:

So, what do we know about doing crisis event management right? The singularly most comprehensive and objective analysis comes from a study by James Dobbins. During the 1990s, Mr. Dobbins served as special envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia:

- *Many factors -- such as prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity -- can influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building, but the single most important controllable determinant seems to be the level of effort, as measured in troops, money, and time.*
- *There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the military stabilization force and the level of casualties. The higher the proportion of troops relative to the resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most of the post-conflict operations that were generously manned suffered no casualties at all.*
- *There is no quick fix for nation-building. None of our cases was successfully completed in less than seven years.*

James Dobbins, et al., “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq”, RAND, 2003.

If one were to ascribe a theme to the failures of American crisis event management, it would have to be, “too little, too late.” Nation-building is not impossible as long as the planners keep in mind the above, “*...the single most important controllable determinant seems to be the level of effort, as measured in troops, money, and time.*”

Once civil unrest has solidified into organized violence, the progression to successful peace is not a straight line where every little bit helps. A certain threshold level of effort comes into play, which if not achieved will fail to counter the downward inertia of violence, causing the entire peace enterprise to collapse. A half-hearted effort will morph into a complete loss of investment and waste of resources (*including good will, and lives*).

Now the author must acknowledge a constraint to this argument; the interventions of S&R forces in the analysis (Figure 3-4) were reactive to events. In many war and occupation scenarios, the use of one soldier (*or even a constable*) per fifty local civilians is just not feasible. Still, this requirement has to be taken in the context of the 1st Requirement. It

suggests that getting an early start on stability operations could off-set the need for a 1-to-50 ratio. In the above cited events (Figure 3-4), the peace enforcement troops or occupiers arrived on the scene of the conflict after the collapse of the local government; or after the situation had solidified into active civil strife if not civil war.




Figure 3-4: A historical comparison of level of effort versus success. James T. Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory", Rand Review, Rand Corporation, September 15, 2010

The absolute requirement for mass may be misleading. Although mass is undoubtedly relevant, metrics of persistency and density may be more helpful. Favorable force capacity can be achieved not only through numbers of international forces, but also by population control measures; raising indigenous or militia forces; the availability of technology such as biometric data; access to intelligence obtained through constant contact with the indigenous population; and attrition of adversaries.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom (MOD-UK), Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, "Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution," November 2009

It is possible to hypothesize that if peacemaking forces had initiated an early-on proactive peace enforcement intervention, the number of stabilization troops required might have been substantially fewer. To better define this understanding, more investigation and experience is needed.

3RD REQUIREMENT: OPERATE AS A GOVERNMENT LED, CIVILIAN ACTIVITY

"If men were angels we would need no government".

*James Madison, The Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,
Independent Journal, February 6, 1788*

At the end of major combat operations, the Department of State is delegated the responsibility and appropriately equipped to exercise control and occupational agency of stability operations by the direct presence of a command authority within the destabilized region or area of conflict.^{71,72} This civilian command authority is equipped with designated organizational assets to take over from the military⁷³ (*after combat*), and tasked to establish a forward based headquarters activity, forming the unity of command that is essential in a crisis event operation.⁷⁴

RATIONAL:

This requirement has two subordinate issues: a) Precluding the use of contractors from exercising "Inherently Governmental Functions," and b) Rely upon a civilian body to perform S&R, not military forces.

a) INHERENT GOVERNMENT FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION

It might seem obvious for the government to preclude contractors from exercising "Inherently Governmental Functions; but, that is an assumption which needs to be identified. There are people within the government who believe they can reduce the cost of S&R by not only contracting out for the services, but also by turning over executive responsibilities to the lowest bidder. In the past, the government has attempted to delegate this function to police mercenaries/contractors. This is in contravention of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (*FAR*).

, Subpart 7.5—Inherently Governmental Functions

7.500 Scope of subpart: The purpose of this subpart is to prescribe policies and procedures to ensure that inherently governmental functions are not performed by contractors.

(a) Contracts shall not be used for the performance of inherently governmental functions.

(c) The following is a list of examples of functions considered to be inherently governmental functions or which shall be treated as such. This list is not all inclusive:

(1) The direct conduct of criminal investigations.

⁷¹ Department of Defense, Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

⁷² "Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-2

⁷³ Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan", e-International Relations, October 20, 2008

⁷⁴ James Dobbins, et al., "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", RAND, 2003

(2) The control of prosecutions and performance of adjudicatory functions other than those relating to arbitration or other methods of alternative dispute resolution.

(3) The command of military forces, especially the leadership of military personnel who are members of the combat, combat support, or combat service support role.

(4) The conduct of foreign relations and the determination of foreign policy.

(5) The determination of agency policy, such as determining the content and application of regulations, among other things.

(7) The direction and control of Federal employees.

(8) The direction and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

On February 24, 2000, the Clinton Administration released a white paper.⁷⁵ At that time, there was no organization to perform stability operations, not even a general model or structural design. What we had were vague promises and wish lists, from a white paper by the Department of State during the Clinton administration. It identified needs and requirements, and then suggested solutions.

That document advocated that CIVPOL⁷⁶ be tasked as the primary respondent. As a result of this white paper, the Clinton administration released Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71). However, the PDD-71 only took what the Department of State had originally written, and used it as paraphrased boilerplate. Otherwise, PDD-71 had no appreciable impact on the status quo. In the initial sense, there were no problems with how it describes the needs which are driving the requirements. However, the proposed solution has a very serious problem with the powers that the Department of State is tasking CIVPOL to exercise. CIVPOL is not a government organ; it is not any type of organization or legal entity; it is a contracting vehicle. The CIVPOL program uses contractors to recruit advisors (*police mercenaries: i.e., commercially contracted personnel operating under force of arms, exercising police powers outside their own homeland*) which are then sponsored by the Department of State to work with foreign countries.

Any good contractors would see that there are two difficulties with taking independent initiative: 1) the government will not reimburse the contractor for unauthorized expense incurred by independent initiatives, even if it is beneficial to the government; and, 2) contractors are not allowed to perform such activities that are within the domain and jurisdiction of inherently governmental functions.

First: There are about five contracting firms providing personnel and services through the CIVPOL contracting vehicle. The current “headquarters” is nothing more than an overseas branch office providing corporate project management and personnel support. Under the

⁷⁵ The full text is provided in the appendix of this thesis as “The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations,” and is taken from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71.htm>. It is also available from: Office of International Information Programs, U.S., Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov

⁷⁶ Civilian police (CIVPOL) from the United States and more than 50 other countries are deployed around the globe in support of international post-conflict stabilization and redevelopment operations. (Department of State website)

Federal Acquisition Regulations (*FAR*), contractors can perform services which are only within the limited scope of their contracts. In the above document, it says, "*Ideally, the CIVPOL component should be capable of operating independently,....*"

Seriously, was the Department of State advocating that contractors be given money and a license to operate independently, representing the U.S. government? Such unsupervised independent action will always beg the question of, "*who authorized you to do that?*" In which case, the contractor knows he will not get paid.

Second: Under our domestic law, occupation of a nation is merely the continuation of hostilities, and thus S&R falls within the war powers of the federal government. The CIVPOL portion of the Clinton Administration's white paper recommendation are illegal; "*...the CIVPOL headquarters should be capable of assuming responsibility to coordinate and oversee the overall reform process for the criminal justice sector.*" What the white paper is advocating is to have civilian contractors (*police mercenaries*) formulating and executing political policies on behalf of the Department of State.

Even in an occupation environment, the U.S. government cannot delegate inherently government executive functions to contractors or other nongovernmental actors. What that white paper advocated was that CIVPOL contractors be granted powers that are tantamount to an 18TH Century *Letter of Marque and Reprisal*, which authorized merchant raiders to hunt enemy shipping (*a legalized form of piracy*) for profit. Although not exactly the same, it would fall into the same general category of activity since under Article 43 of the Geneva Conventions, occupation is a subset of war, and war is an inherently governmental activity.⁷⁷

Such a delegation of authority would open the door to unconstrained profiteering. It is a conflict of interest for a contractor to award itself additional work. Thus, leadership has to be exercised by government executives or officers, not CIVPOL contractors. It takes a government to exercise governmental functions....

The law and the Geneva Conventions on land warfare do accept the presence of non-governmental actors on the battlefield, but not as independent combatants or occupiers. Thus we have a legal requirement for a Government agent (*military or civilian*) to lead occupation and stability operations.

b) RELY UPON A CIVILIAN BODY TO PERFORM S&R, NOT MILITARY FORCES

The requirement for the U.S. as victor to perform S&R operations during and after hostilities is set forth in broad terms by Article 43 of Hague/Geneva Convention. Part of making S&R go faster revolves around the question of *who is best suited for the job*. At the beginning of the 20th Century, this was seen as a military job.

By the end of the 20th Century, the U.S. Government's position was ambiguous. Let us examine how this ambiguity has evolved:

⁷⁷ Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998; "inherently governmental function"... It includes activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the making of value judgments decisions for the Government, including judgments relating to monetary transactions and entitlements, or the interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States.

Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.

*U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, May 3, 1994*

During the Clinton administration and moving forward, the U.S. Government viewed peace operations on a contiguous spectrum, ranging from a politically dominant to a militarily dominant environment. A close read of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25 (*of the National Security Agency*) shows that the policy author and the Clinton administration were predominantly viewing peace operations as being a United Nations activity, and neglected to ponder how this would apply to unilateral U.S. military missions, especially war. (*Sometimes, one thinks that Americans are in complete denial about how warlike we are.*) The problem was that in the event of a sudden need for peacekeepers, peace enforcers or support for military operations, the U.S. did not have (*nor does anyone else have*) a rapid response capability to establish and defend interim governance for the noncombatants. There is an understandable reluctance to rush in, and then find that our joint partners are stonewalling, leaving the U.S. holding the bag alone to do the S&R heavy lifting. Yet, the U.S. government's and the military's delayed responsiveness to disasters or conflict usually results in protracted S&R operations, risking greater expense and loss of life.

It is DoD policy that: Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Department of Defense Directive, DoDD 3000.05, November 28, 2005

And thus, with the stroke of the pen, the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr. Gordon England, put S&R on equal footing with combat operations. Four years later, the above referenced document was updated to read as follows:

a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:

(3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.

Department of Defense Instructions, DoDI 3000.05, September 16, 2009

Then, in late 2011, the Department of Defense released its overarching doctrinal guidance on stability operations. There in its opening preface, it made a humbling confession:

"Although the Armed Forces of the United States are not designed or trained, by and large, to be a constabulary force, the joint force may be called upon to conduct certain constabulary functions on a temporary basis until HN (e.g., Host Nation) or other security forces can assume those responsibilities."

"Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, 29 September 2011, pg. xvii

These juxtaposed statements about S&R operations raise the question of how could this have happened? The military has told themselves (and the American people) that they can walk on water. Then six years later, they confess that they're not ready to even swim across the pool. They have defined and again reiterated a self-imposed mandate to be able to lead stability operations, and three years after their latest posturing confess that they are not the right tool to do the job. This latest document then abrogates this duty over to the Department of State:

Stabilization efforts are primarily the responsibility of development and US Foreign Service personnel from across the U.S. Government. The Department of State (DOS) is charged with responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of U.S. Government departments and agencies, including DOD and component Services and agencies. DOS also coordinates US interagency participation in a comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts that includes not only the US, but also the HN, other nations, IGOs, cooperating NGOs, and other participants.

"Stability Operations", Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. I-1

Currently, it's the practice of non-military civilian S&R functionaries to imbed themselves into military units. This is done to protect them while they seek to influence an S&R solution. This begs the question of how does the Department of State staff lead in S&R when they are tenants attached to military units engaged in warfighting? If a military unit is diverted from its combat mission, it becomes distracted from expeditiously and victoriously resolving the military belligerence: a job for which is best suited. The problem with such diversions is that it violates a military principle of "unity of command." The result is either a mediocre effort at S&R, or an S&R Gap between the end of the military mission and the start of the S&R mission.

Protecting the innocent is critical to social stability and the generation of good will toward U.S. foreign policy. However, a primary concern for military commanders is maintaining the fighting integrity of their military units. Military units are sociologically the same as corporate entities. Functionality is contingent on each individual's working towards the commander's intent. Too many military leaders feel that their units cannot afford for individuals to take on the intricacies of addressing a single individual's pleading for justice. Such activity would draw individual soldiers away from the work of the larger unit (*i.e., killing bad guys*), siphoning off the commander's unit cohesion and focus from winning battles.

The military has thus far resisted creating a separate constabulary entity to solve this problem. The thinking has apparently been to keep warfighting structure intact by arguing that forces prepared to meet difficult combat challenges are able to handle "lesser" missions such as constabulary work. Military leaders fear losing major organizational pieces--a

*division or carrier battle group--in order to form **social service** organizations. They have not wanted to trade tooth for tail and sap warfighting strength. The author thinks this reasoning has been counterproductive and that it could lead to a crisis of American military professionalism and even serious loss of military prestige in American society. Constant assignment of units to perform missions that are neither military in nature, nor have broad popular backing, are bound to erode institutional support. It deflates morale, depresses recruiting, and mortgages the success of future deployments.*

*Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest, "Expeditionary Police Service,"
Military Review, June 1993, pg. 50-56*

If the reader is in doubt, recall the story of Capt. Lawrence P. Rockwood, an Army intelligence officer, who literally took to heart President Clinton's statements that the September 1994 mission to invade Haiti was to protect human rights. As he saw it, the military was too preoccupied with protecting its own invasion force to attend properly to the human-rights abuses in Haiti. He left his post, and went alone into the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince. There, he demanded (*successfully*) that the prison commandant not torture or kill the political prisoners being detained there.

For leaving his post against orders. Capt. Rockwood was court marshaled. At Capt. Rockwood's trial, the prosecution contended that the human rights issue fell under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of State. Let me emphasize that point again; in court, the **U.S. Army argued that human rights protection is not their job!** And, with this argument, they **successfully prosecuted an Army officer.** This is a point is not lost on the rest of the Army. It is for this reason that constables will eventually need to operate under their own command, without military oversight.

4TH REQUIREMENT: POLICE CIVILIANS AND ADJUDICATE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

In 2004 the US Institute of Peace (USIP) came to the following conclusions on Rule of Law in Iraq: Establishing public order in the aftermath of an international military intervention is "job one." Military combat units, however, are neither trained nor equipped for riot control and law enforcement functions. No rapidly deployable U.S. civilian capacity exists to provide the full spectrum of rule of law functions. The optimal way to remedy this critical deficiency would be to establish a Rule of Law Reserves (RLR) and a single federal Office for Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) that would have the permanent authority to recruit, deploy, and manage constabulary police units and individual police, judges, attorneys, court staff, and corrections officers in peace and stability operations. Locating ORLO in the Office of the Secretary of State would give it the access to senior policymakers that its mission requires.

*"Rethinking Rule of Law Efforts in Iraq"⁷⁸
Kevin Govern, Assistant Professor of Law,
US Military Academy, West Point, NY,*

Deploy a full service judiciary and police force with police support activities that exercise police powers and administer public justice that is focused on general lawlessness,

⁷⁸ <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/02/rethinking-rule-of-law-efforts-in-iraq.php>

organized criminal activities and subversive plotting which could destabilize a community that is otherwise lacking the services of a local national government.

RATIONAL:

The obligation to ensure and restore public order and safety entails police functions with the requirement to protect, for example, museums, religious sites, hospitals, public infrastructure, public buildings, embassies and consulates against looting or destruction is rooted in the Hague/Geneva Conventions.

Contemporary peace operations and other complex contingencies, though aimed at mitigating military conflict, often confront considerable civil disorder, violence, and crime. Time and again, we have seen that as military conflict ends (and armies demobilize), a security vacuum develops that indigenous law enforcement organizations cannot fill, at least initially. These institutions usually have been destroyed, rendered ineffective by the conflict or corruption, or become part of the conflict due to partisan behavior.

The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. usinfo.state.gov

This obligation has pragmatic relevance to the U.S. forces as the occupier, as well as to the civilian community under occupation. Any disruption to the domestic tranquility of the occupied community creates a disturbance which will eventually translate to the occupier.

To plan for and execute an intervention, CDRs and their staffs conduct an in-depth analysis to provide relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The key lies in the development of shared understanding among all agencies and countries involved about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. This conflict diagnosis should deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and resiliencies, drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

Stability Operations, Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. xvi

To address this threat, the U.S. will have to exercise police powers and administer public justice that is focused on such activities as organized crime and subversive plotting. Here in a post-conflict or even a natural disaster environment, the threat is organized criminals who are seeking to abuse or defraud members of the public by either deliberately contributing to the chaos of the crisis, or exploiting it for profit.

- *Accountability for past injustices can be a powerful component of democratization. Such accountability can be among the most difficult and controversial aspects of any nation-building endeavor, however, and therefore should be attempted only if there is a deep and long-term commitment to the overall operation.*

James Dobbins, et al., "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", RAND, 2003.

5TH REQUIREMENT: PEACE ENFORCEMENT CODE

When UN-mandated forces have effective control over a territory and its inhabitants, a recurring issue is the arrest and detention of individuals by these forces. This issue is made more complex by the lack of clarity of the mandate, which often authorizes forces to detain some persons but without giving any guidance on permissible grounds for and methods of detention.

*Red Cross, "Report, Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations,"
Geneva, 11-12 December 2003*

Any time this Constabulary Force arrives on the scene of a mission, it brings with it a legal code, which we will call for the purposes of this thesis, the "Peace Enforcement Code." This is a predominantly "civil law" legal code that is the type of legal system most common in the developing world (*not an English common law system*). This Peace Enforcement Code is a codified law that relies heavily on German Civil Code and Egyptian Civil Code of 1949. Once written, it is vetted by both the U.S. Senate and the United Nations (*through the "advisory opinion" of the International Court in The Hague*) as a reasonable and humanitarian set of laws to implement during war, occupation or a civil crisis.

RATIONAL:

When the U.S. intervenes in another country to conduct war or crisis management operations, Americans incur three obligations: 1) conduct one's self according to the standards of international order, 2) adhere to the scope and objectives of the U.S. mandate and interests, and 3) effect stability while respecting the norms of the target society (*which may have to bear the brunt of the intervention*). A central issue in the establishment of public justice administration is the instituting of judicial systems (*courts and detention*) that are accessible by the local national public, whose endorsement is needed. The process of instituting a legal system that is credible in everyone's eyes has to accommodate and reconcile all three of the following obligations.

*Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949. // Part III: Status and Treatment of Protected Persons.
Section III: Occupied Territories:*

Article 64: The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.

Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

Article 65: The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.

Article 66: In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64 the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the occupied country.

In the international arena, there are many treaties and legal precedents that come into play. However, the seminal treaty is Articles 64 and 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In an endeavor to conform to this treaty, the U.S. Department of State needs to be ready to establish a field or circuit court system that can serve as a jurist tribunal, arbitrator of civil rights, and adjudicator for civil criminal trials. In discussions held by the author on the proposals in this thesis, prior to its being written, he heard all sorts of half-informed opinions on the subject of Occupation Law. Many very familiar people believe that law in an occupied territory is all but immutable, and cannot be changed.

What emerges from reading the Fourth Geneva Convention is a clear description of the flexibility to alter law, albeit using a civilian judicial system that is not capricious, vindictive or indiscriminate in its rulings. The work of a constabulary with an organic judiciary is essential to satisfying Section III, Article 64, Paragraph 3, “...essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory....”, and Article 66, “...the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country.” The performance of such obligations would have to be exercised concurrent with combat operations in order to satisfy international obligations; and more pragmatically, to expedite the transition to local governance, facilitating the reduction and total departure of U.S. troops from the occupied territory.

“Most justice systems do not regard ignorance of the law as an excuse for transgressions. If this tenet is to be applied in the realm of international law enforcement (peace enforcement), as it should be, a massive effort would have to be put into communicating the essentials of this law to the population in the area of operations — especially the belligerents, who are most likely to transgress this law. This means that the law must be reduced to terms clearly understandable to the population at large, as well as to the law (peace) enforcers.

The analogy between law enforcement and peace enforcement obviously does not end here. Peace enforcers must also be bound by due process of law, which includes provisions for the detention, trial, and possibly incarceration of offenders. Such processes either do not exist, or are not effective at present. This, however, is a political rather than a military [issue]....”

*Mark Malan, 'Peace Enforcement': The Real Peace Support Challenge in Africa,
Published in African Security Review Vol 7 No 5, 1998*

A major tool needed by the Constabulary Force will be a special legal code to guide its actions during an expeditionary deployment/mission. As international treaties have evolved, they have become a disorganized hodgepodge of principles and guidelines. When referencing the “laws in force in the country” for a failed state, or after a civil war, where the legal system has broken down, determining what laws are to be enforced is a gray area. The

gravity of this dilemma was expressed by the international community during a conference sponsored by the International Red Cross:

A primary objective of the Peace Enforcement Code is to address the vagaries of how the U.S. will conduct an occupation. It will preempt the criticism that occupation rule is *ex post facto* to suit the passion and clamor of the victor without a comprehensive regard for the welfare of the occupied populace.

The unique characteristic of the proposed Peace Enforcement Code is that it is modular, and the particular statutes that the constables will enforce will depend on the circumstances of the situation. Circumstances will govern the modules that will be implemented. Such modules will define criminal statutes, civil law, domestic relations statutes, election of local officials, military court jurisdiction, civilian court due process, jurisdiction of local police authorities, incarceration of locals, incarceration of non-local nationals, status of forces, etc.

6TH REQUIREMENT: PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE HOST COMMUNITY

*Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949. // Part III: Status and Treatment of Protected Persons.
Section III: Occupied Territories:*

Article 56: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the public Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

If new hospitals are set up in occupied territory and if the competent organs of the occupied State are not operating there, the occupying authorities shall, if necessary, grant them the recognition provided for in Article 18. In similar circumstances, the occupying authorities shall also grant recognition to hospital personnel and transport vehicles under the provisions of Articles 20 and 21.

In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into consideration the moral and ethical susceptibilities of the population of the occupied territory.

In those situations where the U.S. asserts military control over the territory of a vanquished foe, engages in peace enforcement the U.S. incurs an obligation for the health and medical welfare of the local population. Likewise, in a voluntary effort to provide humanitarian assistance, medical services will be a major need.

RATIONAL:

Based on the above requirements, there is an implied obligation to act preemptively to provide stable regional medical care for the local community; even before combat operations have ceased. At the conclusion of military combat, the occupation authority has an added obligation to redirect military medical assets to areas of civilian need for the remainder of the occupation. This is a priority.

Military health support for stability operations is a core US military mission that the DOD military health system shall be prepared to conduct throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations. Military health support for stability operations shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all military health system activities.

“Stability Operations”, Department of Defense, Joint Publication; JP 3-07, pg. 1-9

There is a subtle distinction between military medical practices, and those required for crisis event management. Military medical services are focused on stabilizing and evacuating soldiers. In a crisis event, local nationals are not being evacuated. They need full treatment on their home turf. Making such an adaptation is readily handled with a few structural adjustments. Here, it is sufficient to simply recognize that this is an ongoing obligation during crisis event management.

7TH REQUIREMENT: SELF SUSTAINMENT DURING DEPLOYMENT

Only by living and operating among the people can an outsider gain an understanding of local security needs, and intelligence on the adversary. Embedding in the local security forces and engaging with the population enables personal relationships to be forged, the conduit for the two-way passage of influence. But placing forces amongst the population carries with it a risk of placing them closer to potential threats – a risk that may have to be carried in order to achieve progress.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom (MOD-UK), Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, “Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution,” November 2009

The stabilization organization has to be able to perform mission tasks in an austere regional environment where sustainment resources are not available due to conflict or natural disaster. It will be the task of this organization to coordinate with the U.S. Army’s global supply systems for resources to support itself, affiliated U.S. and Allied military units, and the local population.

RATIONAL:

There will be times when the President will want the option to employ the constabulary in places where an Army Sustainment Brigade is not available, and there are not sufficient local resources to support the operation. In such situations, the constabulary will have to be capable of performing self sustainment.

*Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949. // Part III: Status and Treatment of Protected Persons.
Section III: Occupied Territories:*

Article 55: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

Article 59: If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.

Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.

For the U.S. to conform to Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a constabulary unit has to stand ready to facilitate the logistics needs of the community it's governing or supporting, while the local people attempt to get back on their feet. This would require a level of robustness that exceeds a normal combat brigade, as well as administrative capacity to coordinate the support of NGOs and other civilian organizations.

8TH REQUIREMENT: COORDINATE AND INCORPORATE NGOS AND OTHER CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES

The Constabulary Brigade acts as a forum, a clearing house for information, and a locus where allies and affiliates can base their community recovery projects.

RATIONAL:

- *Multilateral nation-building is more complex and time-consuming than a unilateral approach. But the multilateral approach is considerably less expensive for individual participants.*
- *Multilateral nation-building can produce more thorough transformations and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts.*
- *Neighboring states can exert significant influence, for good or bad. It is nearly impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors try to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.*

James Dobbins, et al., "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", RAND, 2003.

Ecological and manmade disasters impact large populations every year. The concern is in targeting immediate needs with whatever resources are available as expeditiously as possible, while minimizing duplication of efforts. Hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, thousands of aid workers, and billions of dollars are sent in response. Yet, there have been recurring problems with coordination, leading to wasted efforts and funds. The objective here is for the constabulary to provide a forum where NGOs can exchange information regarding humanitarian activities and policy decisions in the crisis event of the afflicted territory. Due to the situational awareness of community affairs possessed by the constabulary, the activities of NGOs can evolve with the changing situation inside the Constabulary Brigade's territory. The constabulary's coordinating leadership would include skilled and committed disaster managers who can formulate clear and quantifiable goals.

Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete.

So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it.

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

Ultimately, the stability work of the Constabulary Brigade will most directly affect the local national population. It is the local population whose support will contribute the most to the long-term success of the American's efforts to stabilize and reconstruct the region that is the focus of U.S. efforts. The more the local population feels ownership of the processes and products, the sooner the Americans will be able to turn the situation over to local governance.

Policy and doctrine will have to be established that make it possible for local national police and military units, as well as large numbers of individuals to be recruited into the Constabulary Brigade with honest authority to execute stability tasks. Such individuals will likewise be eligible to draw a salary for the U.S. government.

9TH REQUIREMENT: USE THE STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES OF ARMY FIELD UNITS

• Unity of command is as essential in peace operations as it is in war. This unity of command can be achieved even in operations with broad multilateral participation when the major participants share a common vision and tailor the response of international institutions accordingly.

James Dobbins, et al., "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", RAND, 2003.

To create an organization that can function in a field environment, this thesis advocates the use of military principles for the ***"process for designing"*** a stability organizational.

RATIONAL:

The purpose for which a group exists should be the foundation for everything its members do — including the choice of an appropriate way to organize. Here, the goal is to create an organization that can stabilize a foreign community during a crisis. The technical requirement is to create a way of organizing that best suits the purpose to be accomplished, regardless of the way in which other, dissimilar groups are organized. Organization structure defines the formal relationships among people and specifies both their roles and their responsibilities.

The danger is that the patterns of activity that help one group to be successful may be dysfunctional for another group, and actually inhibit group effectiveness. Such is the case of using peace time business organizational structures in an unstable field environment. To optimize effectiveness, the form of organization must be matched to the purpose it seeks to achieve, and harmonize with the environment in which it will operate.

Structural Design Principles: The military organizational structure has evolved over history as the best structure for crisis management in a violent environment. The U.S. has adopted the continental staff system (*also known as the general staff system*) in structuring their militaries' staff functions. This system, is based on one originally employed by the French Army in the 19th century, which evolved from the Berther and Napoleon system of

1795. The principles of designing a formal military organization (Figure 3-5) can be synthesized into five basic structural points:

1. **Emphasis on Wartime Tasks:** Organizations must be structured to accomplish its wartime or field deployment tasks without reorganizing. This is a critical distinction between how civilian organizations are structured versus how military units are structured. Civilian organizations are designed to operate in environments where infrastructure resources are assumed to exist (*i.e., water, electricity, phones, roads, etc.*), and could not readily translate their operations into the woods.

The use of tailored taskforce units or modular elements does not violate this principle. This flexibility is pre-designed, using elements with an authorized Table of Organization and Equipment (*TO&E*).




Figure 3-5: Task Organization of a Field Unit. This is a high level depiction of military structural design principles as they would be applied to a stability focused field deployable organization.

2. **Functional Grouping:** Organizations have these characteristics:
 - Clear-cut purpose, goal and scope
 - One individual in charge
 - Parts that form a logical, separable activity
 - Close relationship among the parts, constituting a complete entity
 - Natural divisions of work that clearly define where responsibility begins and ends
3. **Lean Organizational Structures:** Organizations must encourage rapid decision making, so they should be flat structures without intermediate levels, unless mission requirements cannot otherwise be met. When used, intermediate organizations will consist of tactical functions only, without a full range of staff functions. Organizational

levels that exist only to review and transmit information or tasking are usually eliminated. Both the number of supervisors and the number of internal subdivisions within organizations should be designed to minimize layers and maximize worker-to-supervisor ratios.

4. ***Skip-Echelon Structure:*** Major commands (*MACOM*) sit on top of a skip-echelon staffing structure. Each command level possesses the full range of consultant and staff functions needed to support the commander in performing required tasks. Tactical echelons are designed to achieve operational objectives, rather than to review and transmit paperwork. The chain of command and responsibility for mission accomplishment runs through commanders at all levels. Problems, however, often are solved by staff communication through the functional support chain, bypassing echelons where the function is not found. The command structure, staff structure, and consulting support structure operate as parallel channels of communication. *(These multiple parallel channels afford greater bandwidth for human communication.)*
5. ***Standard Levels:*** The military uses standardized terms for each organizational level (*i.e., general grade [corps, divisions], field grade [brigades, battalions], and company grade [company, platoon]*) to design organizations. Organizations are established at the lowest level required to successfully accomplish a functional mission/activity. Factors such as scope of responsibility, span of control and functional grouping of related missions/activities are the predominant factors that determine organizational kind. Coordinating Staff levels are designated as: staff section, staff division, staff branch, and bureau or office.

To use any other structural format would present the Army with a foreign configuration whose appearance and communication channels would appear unfamiliar. An unfamiliar organizational template would cause Army personnel to ignore the civilians, as being distracting.

10TH REQUIREMENT: USE A BRIGADE STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION

The stability organization is structured as a paramilitary brigade.

RATIONAL:

During the post-Vietnam era, the Army found itself responding to a series of low and medium level conflicts. Aside from the Persian Gulf War, almost none of the other conflicts lent themselves to traditional division formations. The modular brigade formations (*back then they were called task forces*) were a solution that grew out of experience, and were formalized in the early 2006 period. *(The author was involved in this redesign process.)* At the time that the S&R Division was being conceived, TRADOC (*U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*) was leading an effort to make the U.S. Army into a brigade-centric organization. In the turbulence of the transformation to modular brigades, the S&R Division concept didn't fit the new organizational style as divisional organization became an un-favored organizational structure.

Rapid Deployment Ability: But again, the issue is not about its organizational structure; it's about that ***S&R Gap in mission capabilities*** which caused conceptual theorists to develop the S&R Division in the first place. The Constabulary Brigade proposed in this thesis has all of the key features of the original S&R Division, scaled down, and rebalanced to focus on

civilian led, rapid deployment and territorial stabilization: establishing law and order at the local level, followed by facilitating humanitarian aid in the near term. The advantage of a brigade over a division is the reduced mass and logistical encumbrances, which afford greater rapidity and agility.

In spite of the S&R Gap between the presence of the U.S. military and the need for a trained constabulary, the U.S. military is often left responsible for satisfying the U.S. government's need or obligation to provide a security force to protect a foreign nation's population. The S&R Gap is in the military's lack of civil policing capability, and mechanism for administering public justice. *(There will be more on the need for policing and judiciary later.)* What the Army did was create a generic skeletal brigade *(the MEB, discussed earlier)* that can catch the miscellaneous needs that might arise; one being occupation-security work. Thus, the brigade has evolved to become the ideal size unit for rapid deployment.

Coordinated Interaction: Communications is a critical requirement if a constabulary is going to function *(underfoot, so to speak)* while the Army is conducting combat operations. This is not just a function of having radios operating on the same frequency, or even a liaison in the offices of the regional combatant commander *(although that is also important)*. ***The communications of units engaged in battle is multichannel, based on functional areas of activity.*** Part of the fog of battle is the sheer volume of information-overload that occurs during contact with an enemy forces, or while being engaged in a rolling crisis. To address this challenge, the Army has divided up the commanders' headquarters into predetermined functional groupings, or staff sections. If for example, an Army staff officer has information for a civilian operation, he will seek out his counterpart to relay that information. If the structure of that organization is unfamiliar, and he cannot see his counterpart at a quick glance, he will abandon the effort and move to the next issue on his priority list. It might be counterintuitive to civilians, but on the battlefield, the burden of communication is shared between the sender and the recipient.

The Army doesn't have a problem with other actors being on the battlefield with them, as long as they have fluid and secure communications. Thus, we have a requirement for the constabulary to be organized in a fashion that is readily understandable by the military culture. Hence, this proposal's staff structure being as it is presented in the following chapters.

SUMMARY OF CAPABILITIES

This chapter has focused on the inputs and requirements to a process for stabilizing a population during natural disasters, failing states, peace enforcement, or post-conflict operations. The central design feature of an effective expeditionary civilian stability organization is its ***capability to resist the impact of violence*** while conducting stability operations. At the same time it must be self-sufficient long enough to perform its mission ***in an environment that is devoid of resources*** within the local infrastructure. Hence, if the S&R functionaries were to drive into the chaos of war with their own self-protecting and self-sustaining organization, they could begin high-grade stabilization operations, even as military conflict is occurring.

This is not to suggest that a constabulary unit could go head to head against a true military assault. They are not there *(nor would they be equipped)* to take and hold land by seeking to destroy or inflicting casualties. What this means is that constables can effectively withdraw

with minimal casualties and minimize collateral damage done to noncombatants. *(This is such that the situation doesn't devolve into a panic where it's "every man for himself," even for the local national civilians.)*

The unique characteristic of a military force or a paramilitary constabulary would be that during such a critical period, it is only military style forces that might have the capability to execute civil administration, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts during and until well after the violence of a crisis event has passed. The disparity between civil authority and military capability is wide and heavily dependent on the level of destruction and threat of violence.

To satisfy any mandate to expand deployable capabilities of civilian departments, agencies, and institutions, there isn't a real alternative to the organizational structures used by the military. There is a reason that people in the profession of arms have developed the type of organizational structures that they have. These structures are best suited for withstanding the type of violence one can expect in a crisis state or absent state situation. If an attempt is made to stabilize a populace in the throes of upheaval, it behooves those undertaking such an enterprise, especially the early responders, to employ the same organizational tools that allow soldiers to effectively endure such rolling chaos.




Figure 4-5: Brigade Deliverable Processes. The Constabulary Brigade is not an all inclusive provider of Stability & Reconstruction functions, but is an early responder pending more tailored follow-on efforts

TAKE AWAY THOUGHTS

For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces to increase capabilities for peacekeeping and related operations.... The Army has long rejected proposals for dedicated peacekeeping forces, primarily on the grounds that it would divert resources from combat functions. Members of Congress interested in augmenting stabilization personnel may wish to examine non-military options.

Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," Congressional Research Service ~ Library of Congress: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division / May 18, 2006

So, what can we take away from all of this? The U.S. military has had only a 20% success rate at nation-building.⁷⁹ We don't need another root cause analysis. We need to overhaul the way we are doing business. The American soldier is among the most professional warriors in the world; and yet, they are like amateur militia in the arena of S&R. *(This is not to suggest that the military does not have a role to play during occupation.)*

Civilian organs of the U.S. government have not been fully supported or resourced to step out from behind the military and take full control of S&R operations.⁸⁰

At what point will American policy makers accept the fact that incremental half-stepping, always groping for a peace dividend, is actually very wasteful? ***America provides its soldiers with professional training, very expensive equipment, and organizes them into robust structures.*** When will the same be done for the peace makers?

Until we can take a country *whole* and functionally *intact*, we will not have won the war. Policy makers will have to be ready in advance of combat to stay the course for crisis event management, beginning after the first battle. ***The people engaged in occupation/S&R work need the same level of resources*** as the warfighters.

⁷⁹ Pei, M. and Kasper, S. "Lessons from the past: The American Record on Nation-building," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003

⁸⁰ Kieran Neeson, "Lessons in Nation-Building: The American Reconstruction of Germany and Japan," e-International Relations, October 20, 2008, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=575#_ednref4

4. Constabulary Brigade

The objective of this chapter is to connect the civilian functional and technical requirements needed for stabilization of the civilian populace to what the military understands about battlefield organization. It demonstrates the ideal organization to perform stabilization operations (Figure 4-1). It provides civilians with an idea of what a paramilitary unit will look like, when it's done right. On the other hand, people with military experience should understand that although the organizational structure is similar to the organizations that they know, the subtle internal functions (*the effects*) are very different from traditional soldiering.

An "Independent Panel" commissioned by Congress and the Department of State did a separate review of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which was produced by the Department of Defense. This time the panel got it right for the Department of Defense:

II. QDR INDEPENDENT PANEL FINDINGS⁸¹

WHEREAS, the QDR Independent Panel finds that the U.S. military is the only government institution with both the resources and personnel policies to plan, execute, and support mass deployments of personnel overseas;

WHEREAS, the QDR Independent Panel notes that the QDR states, "a strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. military personnel ... is an important investment in the nation's security;" (pg. 16) and;

WHEREAS, the QDR Independent Panel finds that creating a deployment capability for civilian departments, agencies, and institutions to prevent or respond to overseas crises would likely involve the development of a deployment mindset and more flexible personnel policies, among other things,

III. MISSION STATEMENT

THEREFORE, the QDR Independent Panel proposes that the President and Congress establish a commission to develop recommendations and a blueprint for increasing the capability and capacity of our civilian departments and agencies to move promptly overseas and cooperate effectively with military forces in insecure security environments.

*The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
29 July 2010, page 108*

We now have all of the requirements for a rapid deployment of civilians with a Headquarters capacity, that can enter an area under conflict, and can synchronize civilian government activity with the military and the local populace.: "At a minimum, the headquarters should have the ability to conduct current operations, plan future operations, collect and assess field information, and manage its logistical support." All of this is addressed by the Constabulary Brigade, described hereunder.

⁸¹ Hadley and Perry et al., "The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel," Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, at the behest of Congress and the Secretary of Defense, July 29, 2010

The real significance of this proposal is that - the Constabulary uses a bottom-up approach toward providing crisis event management, humanitarian relief or occupation. This is boots on the ground, pragmatic, yet charismatic style of providing visible help to people in an affected community.

THE DESIGN

Assuming that the United States government decides to establish and finance a permanent, professional, paramilitary, expeditionary constabulary force, how would it be organized? Its purpose is to conduct crisis management that restores basic civil governance services to OCONUS⁸² regions affected by war or some such crisis event. Services would include providing essential police and judicial services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, medical care and humanitarian aid coordination. Most importantly, this force is organized and equipped to conduct policing of a civilian population in the midst of battlefield combat operations. The *motto* of this organization is; “Keep the Peace, Protect the Innocent, Enforce the Law.”

In no way should this proposal be construed to suggest that the Constabulary Brigade ever be used as a “military force” to supplant military units doing military missions/work.

THE CONSTABULARY BRIGADE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

The Constabulary Brigade being proposed (Figure 4-1), is not an all-inclusive provider of S&R nation-building capability. This brigade is an ***“early responder”*** focused on the most immediate and critical need: ***stability***. This brigade is literally a ***rapid reaction force*** that can step into the breach of a collapsing country and provide immediate triage; securing and calming the local populace, then prioritizing governance deficiencies or infrastructure damage for treatment according to the seriousness of the condition. It provides security, limited humanitarian assistance, limited economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance; it works with local participation. The situational analysis generated by Constabulary staff sets the direction for all follow-on civilian assistance from the American people, and any of our international partners.

Because a battlefield is rolling chaos, commanders need a very direct organizational structure with a limited span of control. Out of such experiences has evolved the contemporary military structures. If the broad objective is for civilians (*American*) to take care of civilians (*of a foreign nation*) in a combat environment, a paramilitary organization is

⁸² OCONUS is an acronym that stands for, Outside the CONTinental United States

needed. The brigade offers six major structural elements which equate to functional requirements:

- **Brigade Headquarters & Command:** Unifies command and mission focus, channeling American foreign policies, with logistics reach-back capability
- **Constabulary Police Battalions (x2):** Provides security, enforces the law and suppresses civil unrest
- **Justice Battalion:** Punishes crime and affords restitution or reconciliation
- **Civil Action Battalion:** Restores infrastructure and medical services facilitating economic recovery
- **Sustainment Battalion:** Managing logistics support throughout the brigade region
- **Tactical Combat Force:** Military reserve rapid reaction battalion




Figure 4-1: Brigade Functional Organization. Notice that the first four battalions are functionally, direct police security and humanitarian relief activities. The Sustainment battalion provides a portal through which supplies can be shipped. Military reinforcements are available only to counter other military threats. Also, notice the provisions for local national auxiliary participation -- something a true Army unit could not do.

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES

Understanding how to structure an organizational entity that would be functional on a battlefield is not something that a civilian would be taught in a public business school. The

designer needs knowledge of military organizational principles. As one approaches designing an organization that is functionally focused on stabilization for S&R in a combat environment, the designer has to consider several questions. The design of any new project has to begin with defining the scope of that project, and limiting that project to the scope of what's essential. What are the situational challenges one can anticipate in a post-combat or failing state environment? What type of an organization would the host agency (*in this case, the U.S. Government*) be predisposed to support? In this regard, the design of the Constabulary Brigade varies significantly from the original S&R Division proposals.

Reconstruction would have to fall under the objectives and scope of a different organization. However, the Constabulary Brigade of 6,600 troops would have to be viewed as a major facilitator of reconstruction activity; with the capability of stabilizing a population of 330,000 to 660,000 people. In conjunction with three Army brigades, they could stabilize a million people at a time.

There are five unique features here, which were not a part of the original S&R Division design:

1. This Brigade is a civilian paramilitary organization. It can employ anyone of any nationality to serve within its ranks at any level without creating a military security issue. This relates to embedded press, contractors, non-governmental organizations (*NGOs*), international governmental organizations (*IGOs*), and local nationals.
2. The Brigade has the same rapid deployment capability features that are prevalent in most modular Brigades.
3. This Brigade has a Judiciary unit and a Confinement unit, that functions as part of a built in court system. This becomes an alternative, and even a barrier to street justice, vengeance, or vendetta in the absence of law based justice. The populace has immediate access to legal remedy even in the absence of a functioning government.
4. This Brigade is small enough to serve as a proof of concept without the expense of a full on combat division.
5. The Brigade's structure, especially the logistics organization, is the same as its Regular Army counterparts (*not unique, but a critical feature*). Here the table of organization fits Army principles and the equipment used is the same as Army inventory; hence, we have the intent of Sun Tzu's comment, above. Using Army procedures allows the regional military theater command to resupply the Brigade, and provides a unified accounting process for tracking resources and financial expenditures.
6. The Brigade is amenable to modular reconfiguration for mission tailoring (Figure 4-2). Here the exact composition of the individual Brigade is configured to the needs of the mission. This allows strategic planners the flexibility to adjust to situational emphasis by altering structural capabilities ahead of workload demands in the field.

Humanitarian Relief: This is a support mission to a nation with a functional government that has been severely impacted by an unexpected and misfortunate event. The focus of the Brigade is shifted to logistics and sustainment by adding extra Civil Action and Sustainment Battalions. Reduced numbers of Constabulary police are sent to provide basic deterrence security for Brigade operations (*not necessarily to exercise police powers over a local community*).




Figure 4-2: Modular Reconfiguration done for Mission Tailoring.

Security Force: Should a host nation or the international community petition the U.S. for assistance, before the failure of governance, the Brigade can be configured to favor the use of heavy police powers, with deference to the local judiciary.

S&R Gap -to- Post-War Occupation, or Stability Operations: In a rapid dominance campaign, conventional military units will be on the ground in a combat zone within sixteen to twenty-four hours after the President directs them to deploy. Within 72 to 96 hours, the first ground combat team of brigade size (*approximately 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers*) will be ready to move out of its Port of Entry into direct combat as a fully integrated entity. The advantage of a modular brigade is that it can deploy and organize much faster than an 18,000 soldier division, which could take three weeks to a month to form up.

Because the proposed Constabulary Brigade is of similar size to Brigade Combat Teams (*BCT*), the Constabulary Brigade can rapidly follow on after an Army brigade into the theater, and be ready to execute its mission within hours after combat operations have begun. In a non-combat mission, the Constabulary Brigade has an organic logistics Sustainment Battalion that can segue into the Army's global logistics network. Thus, the nation can have a nation-stabilization, rapid-deployment force available to be employed within the chaos of disaster or combat.

In this scenario, the assumption is that the judicial system of the host nation is failed or vanquished. It is non-existent, and the host nation has become a client territory because of international mandate or by virtue of war. In response to this situation, the Constabulary Brigade is fitted with a modular Justice Battalion. To enhance the rapidity of deployment, the Brigade can conduct S&R Gap operations without the Justice Battalion, until later.

Brigade Functional Constraint: Brigades do have one constraint that warrants mentioning; brigades do not have the self regeneration capability that divisions used to have. Divisions were capable of operating for indefinite periods of time on deployment. A brigade has a lifecycle of three years; it is spent after 15 months on deployment. Then it has to return to home base for reconstitution.

THE CONSTABULARY BRIGADE TECHNICAL DESIGN

"The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers."

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

Characteristics: A Constabulary Brigade is a self-contained, agile, paramilitary organization, with organic ability to function as an independent entity. Nonetheless, **it is not solely a policing activity.** The command and staff are specifically trained in the theory and practice of stability operations, for which this brigade is designed to take the lead role. Part of keeping the peace is to address or preempt those conditions that can lead to degradation, destruction, violence and hostility. The brigade is structured (Figure 4-3) as an authoritarian crises management organization.




Figure 4-3: A Constabulary Brigade Organization, using the latest in military structural design principles, but used for performing paramilitary functions.

Special attention has been paid to providing the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters element with the structural resources to enhance coordination and synchronization with the variety of civilian and military entities. This capability is called, “unity of command.” The internal design of the Plans & Operations staff is structured very similar to a SPO division found in an Army Sustainment Brigade. A SPO affords reach-back ability to U.S. based resources through Army supply channels. The brigade is purposely designed to accept additional personnel from the local national populace, embedded journalists, and NGOs. The Brigade as a whole facilitates a “whole of government” interagency civilian support process.

Although not depicted, the Constabulary Brigade is capable of supporting another battalion of local nationals working as police. Likewise, most teams, squads, sections, and platoons are able to incorporate individual auxiliaries to supplement their staffs and serve as cultural liaisons with the local populace. Doing this provides on-the-job training to the local populace on the procedures and values of American law enforcement. It also provides employment to people who have been displaced by the crisis, or lost their livelihood.

Mission: Perform civilian-based stability operations that conduct humanitarian relief, peace enforcement or stabilization operations that restores basic civil governance services to OCONUS regions affected by war or some such crisis event to: “Keep the Peace, Protect the Innocent, and Enforce the Law.”

Personnel:

Brigade Headquarters & Troop Companies:	≈ 755
1 ST Constabulary Police Battalion:	≈ 965
2 ND Constabulary Police Battalion:	≈ 965
Justice Battalion:	≈ 565
Civil Action Battalion:	≈ 775
Sustainment Battalion:	≈ 1,985
<u>Tactical Combat Force:</u>	<u>≈ (630)</u>
Constabulary Brigade, Total:	≈ 6,640

Capabilities: As a brigade with a Constabulary mission, thirty-five percent (35%) of the unit is comprised of paramilitary police. Specialized mission support is provided by either Judicial Support or Civil Actions battalions which make up twenty-five percent (25%) of the brigade. Logisticians and administrators providing mission sustainment make up thirty percent (30%) of the brigade. The remaining ten percent (10%) is military reinforcements. All personnel are prior-military service, or have attended Army basic training. The minimum age of a constable is 21 years of age.




Figure 4-4: The military has evolved some unique symbology that visually conveys place, function and relationship at a glance. However, stability operations are not in the lexicon of military symbols.

- A Constabulary Brigade establishes and maintains the orderly governance of a foreign territory in behalf of the U.S. and its allies
- Keeps civilians clear of military operations, so that soldiers can be free to focus on combat
- Provides information on the civilian situation to follow-on agencies and non-governmental organizations who will be conducting relief operations
- Coordinates the efforts to provide relief to the afflicted local population

Commentary: This brigade should come into existence after the civilian leadership gains training and experience under the tutelage of the U.S. Army. The Constabulary officers would have cut their teeth in battalions subordinate to an a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (*MEB*). Once enough institutional experience is in place, then it would be time for this brigade to solidify as an independent entity.

Uniform: It is important that civilians not be confused with soldiers, and yet be recognized as members of an organized force. To this end, regulations for Constabulary force and other attached Federal Government have personnel serving as trained paramilitary auxiliaries wear a field uniform. However, to differentiate Constabulary from military, the material of the uniform is a solid drab or cool color (*subdued green, brown, or police blue*). The material must not consist of a camouflage pattern.

Weapons: Trained paramilitary auxiliaries are qualified and authorized to carry personal side-arms, shotguns and short range full automatic carbines that fire a 5.56mm or 7.62mm NATO standard round. They are specially train in forced entry of civilian structures, and the use of non-lethal munitions. They do not carry or use crew served or heavy caliber weapons. Their primary weapon is martial arts.

First Aid Medical: All paramilitary auxiliaries qualify annually in advanced first aid to combat-life saver standards. Significantly, they perform the administration of intravenous fluids to keep traumatized and dehydrated casualties hydrated. This requirement includes officers.

Geneva Convention Code Status: Paramilitary forces are defined as auxiliaries, which are considered combatants (*even if they are not soldiers*).

TRAINING / MISSION / RESET - LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT

He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

Training will be a major cost component of an effective paramilitary force, such as the Constabulary. It is vital to developing a new division of labor in our nation's power projection strategy. Department level strategists will have to explain to Congress and the American public the nature of the expenses needed to prepare this force for S&R operations.

One of the differences between true military and civilians running around on a battlefield is the soldiers' knowledge of field craft. American rural police do have some understanding of

this, but the U.S. is a developed country. Constables will have to be ready to conduct S&R operations in underdeveloped regions where water and electricity are not reliably available.

The other issue is weapons training. One only needs to review the 1997 North Hollywood bank shootout to understand how wrong-headed professionals can be about the use of weapons. The perpetrators in the robbery are often portrayed by the media as carrying armor-piercing ammunition, which allowed them to rain havoc on the police. That was not true. The perpetrators were using regular assault weapons with standard ammunition. The problem was that the street police were not trained or equipped to address a threat with conventional military level equipment. The solution is correct training and adequate equipment.

For a Constabulary battalion to be escorted by an MEB into a combat zone, the battalion has to be ready to conduct operations for the normal one-year mission period of a deployment. If we look at the lifecycle policies used for ARFORGEN (Figure 4-6), it becomes evident that the civilian element of a mixed military/civilian brigade will have to parallel the ARFORGEN process. This requires three to five Police battalions rotating through a thirty month cycle, in order to have two battalions available to an MEB at any one time.

Reset Phase: Battalions at the end of their Mission-Ready Phase go into Reset Phase. During Reset, constables are released to take block leave (*vacation*). Equipment is sent to depot for refurbishment. In effect, the whole unit goes into stand down. At the end of Reset, new personnel are assigned different positions throughout the rank structure, and fresh equipment is issued to the units. At the end of Reset, the battalion is re-stood up. *(A battalion going through Reset would not be available for deployment in any context.)*

Train-Up Phase: Battalions are taken through progressive levels of training and certifications during the Train-Up phase. It begins with individual qualification on weapons, vehicles, rappelling, evidence collection, first aid and training on any piece of equipment the constable is expected to use. Next are squad and platoon procedures, followed by company field exercises. At the end of nine months, the battalion goes to the field for a one month Field Training Exercise. There in the field, the unit goes through a two-week certification test. At the completion of the field exercise, the battalion has a two-month window for constables to take leave. Train-Up is the most physically and emotionally demanding period of time.

If a deployment occurs, the battalion going through Train-Up would suspend its training and be the second Constabulary force to join the MEB on deployment.

Mission-Ready Phase: During the ready part of the phase, the battalion remains in garrison. Constables are expected to be ready for deployment on eight-hour notice. Leave is authorized only for family or medical emergencies. Personal travel is limited to a one




Figure 4-6: Battalion Training Cycle. This is a variation of the ARFORGEN process. It allows constabulary units to be synchronized with their Army counterparts.

hour drive time. Company commanders are expected to maintain 95% personnel and equipment availability. Should a crisis occur, this unit can expect to be deployed for a year.

During this phase, training is focused on individual skills, language skills, and college classroom education. All deployable members of the Constabulary are required to speak a second language (*from what is traditionally a third-world country*) at Level-II proficiency, and understand at Level-III. Before an individual can enter Reset, they have to certify on a native language and a second language. If they fail a language test, they have two months to take the test again. A second failure results in their being transferred to the active Army for at least the remainder of their enlistment.

Exceptions: Brigade commands, Regional Analysis Cells and Justice Battalions are not subject to the training cycle. This is because the work of the key personnel is too specialized to require squad or company level qualification testing. Call ups for these units require that readiness be focused on the individual's education, not squad training.

MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE (STABILITY MISSION CONFIGURATION)




Figure 4-7: A Maneuver Enhancement Brigade configured for stability operations. Except for aviation assets and logistical supply functions, this unit has all the essential elements and functions of the previously described Constabulary Brigade.

Even as the U.S. Air Force started out with the Army buying a few small squadrons of signal planes to do reconnaissance, the S&R solution will have to start out under the wing of the Army until it's mature enough to stand on its own. This proposal advocates that the U.S.

Department of State have the Department of Army mission plan that at any given time, one National Guard MEB be mission ready for a stability operation (Figure 4-7), under ARFORGEN. Then the Department of Defense will have to be prepared to accept civilian combatants into the formal structure of an Army organization, and learn to work with it. Doing so will probably require new wording in U.S. Federal Code.

At the same time, the Department of State and the Department of Justice need to begin recruiting training and establishing Analysis Cells, Justice Battalions, and Constabulary Battalions. This would have to be done in anticipation of the next war. Realistically, this will take about three years to establish: It will take 18 months to secure congressional mandate and funding. Then the Department of Justice will need six to nine months to stand up the training centers for constables. Then it will take ten months to train the first battalion, and possibly a year and a half to have the requisite two battalions ready for deployment. In total, this will take at least two and a half to three years of development time.

Personnel:

Regional Analysis Cell (RAC):	≈ 30
Justice- Bn:	≈ 680
1 ST Constabulary Police Bn: (±)150 + (4x191):	≈ 915
<u>2ND Constabulary Police Bn: (±)150 + (4x191):</u>	<u>≈ 915</u>
Attached Civilian Personnel, Total:	≈ 2,540

Civil Affairs: The MEB brigade headquarters S-3, and each of the Army battalions assigned, have Civil Affairs sections of at least one major and four captains each. Having civil affairs officers in the Constabulary units would be redundant.

REPURPOSING SOLDIERS

This thesis has raised several objections regarding the inappropriateness of using repurposed soldiers to perform stability work. However, it is not the position of this thesis that soldiers are never to be used. As soon as major combat has ended, military units will still need to be available, and rapidly converted to doing low intensity combat and policing. Soldiers can be used for community policing during stability operations, with two caveats: 1) Major combat must be completed. 2) They have to be mixed with experienced constables at the squad level (Figure 4-7). The principle used here is the same as when the Navy employs Coast Guard boarders for doing drug interdiction work. Otherwise, it is better to use unmixed combat-arms units for guarding, government facilities, infrastructure, and other such areas with limited public access.




Figure 4-8: An Infantry Brigade configured for stability operations




Figure 4-9: A Constabulary Conversion battalion is broken up into its component elements, and then distributed throughout a brigade, as suggested above.

Characteristics: An irregular Constabulary Conversion battalion is attached to Infantry and/or Stryker brigades to equip them for stability operations. Generally, these Conversion Battalions exist only in the Reserves, for activation during the combat phase of a war. At the completion of combat, the battalion is attached to its host brigade. The battalion brings with it the specialized vehicles and equipment needed to perform community policing.

Mission: Constabulary Conversion battalion equips infantry brigades to perform stability operations.

Personnel: \approx 625 - 700

Capabilities: Melding this battalion with any infantry brigade (Figure 4-9) creates a very powerful stabilization organization. It's most important feature is the Infantry Brigade's new ability to focus constructively on the community it oversees.

Command Element: The Constabulary Commander becomes the executive officer and Deputy Commander for the brigade. His Judge Advocate becomes the local Magistrate. The battalion staff is dispersed amongst the brigade staff. It is suggested that an Army field grade Military Police officer be installed as chief of staff to enable operational conformity to the principles of police powers.

Support Operations (SPO): This element accommodates community action projects and the increased logistics load the brigade will incur performing stability operations. It can be comprised of either military or paramilitary personnel.

Investigation Platoon: This element is attached to the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Company. This platoon is predominately made of detectives focused on finding organized criminals and terrorists. This platoon also investigates major crimes committed by individuals.

Constabulary Police Companies: The Company Commander becomes the battalion's Deputy Commander. The platoons of the company are filled with Warrant Officers and NCOs as cadre. The Warrant Officers become Deputy Platoon Leaders who are responsible for the quality control of S&R procedures. The NCOs are assigned at a ratio of one constable per squad. The Mission Support Platoon is attached to the battalion HHC. These companies are smaller than their regular Constabulary Brigade, counterparts.

Civil Engineering Platoon: This is a platoon of regional planners, construction project managers, inspectors, and contract officer representatives.

Direct Support Supply Company: This company accommodates the increased logistics load for the new mission of the reconfigured brigade. It can consist of either military or paramilitary personnel.

Heavy Weapons, Military Reserve: This is a combat support element (*in this example, the Anti-Tank company*) that is oriented toward engaging ground forces with point target weapon systems. The element retains its military functionality. If the community is attacked by a dedicated threat/enemy military force, this Reserve is tasked with responding.

Commentary: In terms of raw numbers, this battalion organization requires fewer constables per soldiers than any of the preceding unit types. It begs the question, "Why not save resources by using this organization as the universal solution?"

The basic reason is the higher level of training and prior experience required of the constables to implement this organization. All of the constables are veterans of prior-constabulary missions. There are no constables at the introductory level, to serve as feeders into this solution. It is because of the constables' seniority that they are able to act as cadre and assert the influence needed to turn the larger mass of soldiers away from military-think.

Once the Constabulary Corps has been in place long enough, it can be expected that a number of constables will be discharged into the public arena. Yet, a significant number can be expected to willingly retain a reserve commitment to the Constabulary. It is from this pool of individuals, along with active constabulary veterans, that a Constabulary Conversion Battalion could be formed.

CONSTABULARY BATTALION COMMAND & HEADQUARTERS, IN GENERAL

Characteristics: Over the course of history, there has evolved a basic structure to all battalions. The basic tactical unit of the Army is the battalion. It is usually task organized to perform activities that are of a related functional nature. It is usually dominated by a particular weapon system, or functional role. This structure (Figure 4-10) is a model of a generic battalion command and headquarters element for a Constabulary unit. This is the level at which decisions about tactical maneuvers originate and are communicated down to the performers of the processes.




Figure 4-10: A generic battalion command and headquarters element.

Mission: The battalion command provides direction, control and support to the subordinate companies that do the mission or produce the deliverable services for which the battalion is primary designed and organized.

Personnel:

Battalion Command & Staff:	~ 70
Company Headquarters Platoon:	~ 20
Battalion Signal Section:	~ 15
Battalion Medical Platoon:	~ 45
<u>Battalion Maintenance (Motor Pool) Platoon:</u>	<u>~ 40</u>
Battalion Headquarters, Total:	~ 190
Plus, Battalion Special Function Elements:	~ xx

Commander: He or she is the singular person who receives all local intelligence, sets policy, prioritizes responses, orchestrates maneuvers, and directs reinforcements. *(The Romans did try using joint commanders and almost lost the empire, while it was still only a city-state to Hannibal.)*

Personal Staff: A group of subject matter experts who serve as consultants to the commander.

Coordinating Staff: A group of functional specialists who communicate the intent of the commander throughout the command. Some use planning to fashion the situation indirectly in accordance with the intentions of the commander. Others write detailed operations orders, directly. *(Except for the SPO, this thesis does not elaborate on the work done by the main staff sections; such information is commonly available in military*

manuals on staff functions. However, the SPO is a new development in staff structures that is unique to the Army's Logistics Corps. This organizational tool will be critical to administrating humanitarian relief and civil support operations.)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (or, HHC): This is a *Troop Administration* company size support element. It attends to the routine administrative needs of the Commander, staff, and special function elements within the battalion level of the organization.

Special Function Elements (SFE): The composition and structure of the SFE can vary widely, depending on the unit mission. It can run the range of special weapons teams in a tactical unit to analysts and subject matter experts in a logistical unit. The SFEs are composed of low density skills which facilitate critical services, but are not mission-direct needs of the battalion. Three examples of SFE's would be an air defense platoon in an infantry battalion, Support Operations (*SPO*) element, or an evidence collection and storage platoon. *(This terminology is not what is used by the Army. It is paraphrased this way for civilians who have never been in the Army.)*

Functional Mission Companies: These are companies that do the fighting with the primary weapon system or produce the deliverable service for which the battalion is organized. These units perform the direct maneuvers, or primary functional objectives.

Mission Support Company: This company performs functions or provides services that are different than those done by the larger body for the battalion. Yet, it directs its efforts directly against the threat, or facilitates the larger design mission of the battalion toward its major objective. These units usually perform the indirect maneuvers. *(This terminology is not what is used by the Army. The author paraphrased this concept in a way that civilians who have never been in the Army might better grasp.)* The Army's combat arms branches call this activity a combat support unit.

Commentary: The use of this type of organizational structure will allow a large body of civilians to operate in conjunction with an army force that is maneuvering through combat. It is through such structural formats that the Army communicates its activities as it rolls through the chaos of battle.

To use any other structural format would present the Army with a foreign configuration whose appearance and communication channels would appear unfamiliar. An unfamiliar organizational template would cause Army personnel to ignore the civilians, as being distracting.

COMPANY COMMAND, IN GENERAL

Characteristics: The central character of a company is that it is structured to accomplish some predominant function at the tactical level.

Mission: The Company Command platoon provides the commander with staff and technical services needed for the smooth functioning of the entire company

Personnel: This (Figure 4-11 below) is a model of a generic company command and headquarters element. A typical Company Headquarters Platoon:

1/1/10/10+? = 20 to 30+ Personnel in the command section




Figure 4-11: The command element within a standard company.

Commander: The company commander is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do. This includes the tactical employment, training, administration, personnel management, maintenance, and sustainment of his company. He must know the capabilities of his men and supporting equipment and how to tactically employ them. He must also know the capabilities of potential threats.

The company commander exercises command through his subordinate leaders. The commander employs his company to support the accomplishment of the battalion and S&R missions. He requests additional support from the battalion when the situation exceeds the company's capabilities and resources.

Executive Officer: The executive officer's primary role is to oversee the management, collation, and processing of digitized information and to assist the commander in mission planning and accomplishment. He ensures that tactical reports from the platoons are forwarded to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). The XO is located where he can maintain communications with the company commander and the battalion.

First Sergeant: The first sergeant is the senior NCO and normally the most experienced constable in the company. He is the commander's primary tactical advisor and the expert on individual and NCO skills. He assists the commander in planning, coordinating, and supervising all activities that support the unit mission. He operates where the commander directs or where his duties require him. He directly supervises the command section, and is responsible for the smooth functioning of routine tasks.

Platoon Leader: The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for leadership, discipline, training, and sustainment activities related to the platoon and for the

platoon's success in policing the district. He is also responsible for maintenance and accountability of platoon equipment.

Platoon Sergeant: The platoon sergeant is the platoon's second in command and is accountable to the platoon leader for the leadership, discipline, training, and welfare of the platoon's soldiers.

Company Command Section Staff:

Training NCO: This is the administrator who coordinates all unit training and individual training requirements with the battalion, on behalf of the commander. In the field, he coordinates mission events with the battalion staff, on behalf of the company commander.

Communications Specialist: The communications specialist is a part of the unit Administrative section. He supervises operation, maintenance, and installation of digital communications equipment, organic wire, and FM communications. This includes sending and receiving routine traffic and making required communication checks.

Company Clerks: They work directly for the Company Commander or the first sergeant, and are supervised by the Training NCO. They handle all correspondence for the commander and the unit. They organize duty rosters and other needed information. They are responsible for keeping the records of personnel and of activities during an event. In the field, they are responsible for picking up and distributing mail. They store company records using approved file systems. They assist troops in filling out and processing personnel and finance-related forms. *(In the mid 1970's, this clerical function was consolidated at the battalion S-1. Company commanders circumvented this move by diverting soldiers who could type from the platoon line, and re-purposing them.)*

Field Kitchen Section: This section of three to five is responsible for obtaining rations, and 24-hour feeding operations for as many as two hundred troops.

Supply Sergeant: The supply sergeant requests, receives, issues, stores, maintains, and turns in supplies and equipment for the company. He coordinates requirements with the 1SG and the battalion S-4.

Petroleum/Oil/Lubricants NCO: Considering the volume of fuel consumed by so many patrol vehicles, this specialized supply sergeant is responsible for coordinating for fuel. *(This function is not found in an Army company, but will be needed in Constabulary units.)*

NBC NCO: The nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) [or, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)] NCO assists and advises the company commander in planning NBC operations. He conducts and supervises NBC training within the company (decontamination, monitoring, survey, and equipment maintenance operations) and inspects detection and protective equipment for serviceability. In the field, the NBC NCO assists the First Sergeant and medics with providing personal hygiene facilities.

Armorer: The armorer/supply specialist performs organizational maintenance and repairs on the company's small arms weapons. He evacuates weapons to the direct

support maintenance unit, if required. When weapons are not in use, the armorer provides secure storage and accountability for all weapons and sensitive items.

Company Medics: The senior trauma specialist and associate company medics are attached to a Constabulary company to provide emergency medical treatment (*EMT*) for sick, injured, or wounded company personnel. Emergency medical treatment procedures performed by the trauma specialist may include opening an airway, starting intravenous fluids, controlling hemorrhage, preventing or treating for shock, splinting fractures or suspected fractures, and providing relief for pain. The aid performed by the trauma specialist is done under the indirect supervision of the battalion surgeon or physician's assistant (*PA*). They monitor troop hygiene for the commander. Medics are assigned to the battalion and attached to the company.

Maintenance Contact Team: This consists of vehicle and radio mechanics that are attached to companies, operating beyond the immediate vicinity of a base camp.

Security Section: Provides entry and egress security at the company and the location of its centralized operations. *(This function is not found in an Army company, but will be needed in Constabulary units because of the units' proximity to insurgents operating amongst the civil populace.)*

Capabilities:

- Physically executes missions based on functional design and battalion commander's directives
- Provides training management and personnel administration at the individual level
- Interacts on a daily basis with customer units or the civilian populace in the field

CONTRACTING AND ACQUISITION

One of the most urgent issues in stabilization is the ability to secure commercial resources in the quest to keep a community from sliding into the chaos of ruin after being devastated by natural or manmade disaster. For that reason, the Constabulary Brigade has offices that perform acquisition contracting (Figure 4-12) for their local communities. Contracting and acquisition is considered a sustainment function (*outside of logistics*).

Around 2007, the Army Material Command (AMC) created Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), which over the next three years, transformed acquisition, life cycle logistics, and technology (ALT) functions and capabilities. These units operate at the regional/theater level, and through the brigade SPO communicate theater policy, provide regional services, and coordinate for local community support. This service requires the use of federally trained and recognized Contracting Officers (*KO*). These KOs use Army procedures, working out of the G-5 Civil Relations section. To discourage fraud and conflict of interest, the contracting and acquisition process has a built-in system of checks and. The KOs are responsible for actually drafting the "Request for Proposal" and "Performance Work Statement" for any contract that is released by the brigade. A subject matter expert (*SME*) from outside the G-5 serves as the Contracting Officer Technical Representative to help draft the deliverable requirements and the quality assurance inspection process. Once satisfactory delivery of the contract has occurred, a Finance Officer from the G-1, Personnel section is authorized to distribute payment. At regular intervals, the Comptroller sends an auditor to reconcile contracts, with products or services provided, against funds distributed.

For local hire auxiliary worker, the G-3 SPO Contracting Support office acts as the true customer while the auxiliary workers are paid by the G-1 Finance Officer as contractors, a special function not found in the Army. The actual contracting of individual auxiliaries as well as commercial contracts is drafted by the G-5, Acquisition & Contracting bureau. Having multiple staff sections engaged in executing and paying for contracts might be bureaucratically protracted, but this serves as a check and balance against mishandling of funds. All contracts and payments are then reconciled by the Chief of Staff through the office of the Comptroller.

Advance party Multi-Modal Officer (*Captain*) is a Qualified Contracting Officer who drafts contracts for vehicle and transportation support.

When Constabulary Police Battalions operate outside of a Constabulary Brigade, a contracting team is assigned to the S-5 Public Affairs section. For COTR support, special function elements in the HHC (*i.e., maintenance, medical, signal communications, forensic evidence collection, civil engineering*) provide SMEs. (*In a full scale Constabulary Brigade, civil engineering and contract support usually shifts to the Civil Action Battalion.*)




Figure 4-12: Contracting & Acquisition process within a Constabulary Brigade.

The Civil Action Battalion has a Contracting Office in the he Battalion S-3 with three Contracting Officer Representatives (COR). They handle “civil infrastructure engineering” and “medical” acquisitions, solicit local contractors, or they may designate representatives from within the battalion. Once deliverables have passed inspection, they coordinate with

the Constabulary Brigade S-5, and the S-1 Finance Section for the distribution of funds for all such projects.

Members of the Engineering Company are available to serve contracting officers as functional experts for solicitation development. Once a contract is let, members of this company are available to serve as Contract Officer Representatives (*COR*) and as Contract Officer Technical Representatives (*COTR*). They provide the Constabulary Brigade Commander and the community with building and construction inspectors of private projects performed within the jurisdiction, to ensure that unethical or fraudulent building practices do not occur (*or, are kept to a minimum*).

Commentary: Unemployment is a leading cause of violence against an occupation force. People need “hope” that they can have a future, if they are to be happy. Happy people aren’t violent (*unless they’re deranged*). To support employment efforts, the Training Academy provides training to the local national populace in how to bid for commercial contracts in support of Brigade projects.

PUTTING THE PLAN INTO EFFECT

In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

-Sun Tzu, the Art of War

At this point, this thesis steps forward (*temporarily*), from the conceptual requirements into the development of doctrinal structures that fit the requirements focusing on a brigade-sized organization. The challenge in making recommendations to the government is to ensure that they are not only feasible, but also acceptable. One has to be realistic, and admit that an effort to stand up a completely new branch of military (*or paramilitary*) out of whole cloth is more expensive than political resolve would think to afford. (*This author would not think to presume it could be done.*) The immediate obstacle is taxpayer capacity.

BUILDUP PLAN

This author advocates a three-phase buildup to the eventual creation of a paramilitary Constabulary corps.

In Phase-1, the Department of State begins fielding three Constabulary battalions and a judiciary battalion which can be attached to a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (*MEB*). This eventually expands to five Constabulary battalions, plus another judiciary battalion.

In Phase-2, the Department of State will form the Constabulary Brigade and supporting battalions.

In Phase-3, this organization becomes an independent branch of service whose purpose would be defined by a revised Title 5 and Title 50 of U.S. Code law. This harmonizes S&R with the other American instruments of war.




Figure 4-13: Constabulary Program Development activation schedule for units and elements of the force. Each triangular pennant represents the start point of a unit's activation. The individual train-up would occur before activation. Unit collective training would still be needed for about a year after activation, before a unit would be ready to deploy.

The progression to establishing a Constabulary force (Figure 4-13) is not an overnight process. Should war, or some other urgent situation arise for which a Constabulary would be the ideal solution, one could not be brought into existence in less than three years. The effort to create an independent Constabulary Corps would probably take about six or more years from the time that congressional funding became authorized. Even using an MEB as a parent unit, the first Constabulary battalions for Phase-1 would not be available until two and a half years after funding authorization is secured. The end state in Figure 6-10 of two brigades reflects only an initial and minimal effort.

5. Conclusion

REFLECTIONS ON U.S. VICTORY IN IRAQ

In 2003, the U.S. purported to be bringing freedom and democracy to the people of Iraq. However, it appears that the most enduring legacy to the people of Iraq from the people of America will be the ruin of their country.

- During the entire course of U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003-2011), the Iraq Body Count (IBC) project, an independent UK/US group documented civilian deaths at about 114,248 based on news reports alone. The IBC project's director, John Sloboda, has stated, "We've always said our work is an undercount...."⁸³
- A November 11, 2006, Los Angeles Times article reports, "The (Iraq) nation's health has deteriorated to a level not seen since the 1950s," said Joseph Chamie, former director of the U.N. Population Division and an Iraq specialist. "They were at the forefront," he said, referring to healthcare just before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. "Now they're looking more and more like a country in sub-Saharan Africa."⁸⁴

Iraq will forever stand as a glaring example of how disastrous it is for Americans to bring democracy to a country. The inability of U.S. occupiers to get ahead of violent civil unrest and degradation of infrastructure belies a weakness in American mechanisms for crises event management. Such a reputation threatens to undermine U.S. foreign relations and support for American assistance and military intervention. What the U.S. has left behind is an unstable society which is now a threat to stability in the region.

THE SOLUTION

This thesis has provided a methodology and a comprehensive concept for a paramilitary constabulary organization. It is understandable that government civilians would turn to the military for help entering a battlefield. However, if having civilians on the battlefield will be a regular part of national strategic and foreign policy doctrine, then it is time for the civilian organs of government to create their own organizational vehicle for going on the battlefield. Simply, the time is right for the development and deployment of Constabulary Brigades.

This thesis has provided a historical evidence of the sad outcomes for several stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. There are no shortcuts available in the quest to stabilize, occupy, reorient, or rebuild a nation. Any undertaking to go to war has to factor in another five to seven years of expense from our nation's treasury. To do anything less would make the U.S. culpable for the deaths of civilians well after a military campaign was completed, even decades down the road. Whatever the solution is, it won't be cheap to establish, but the mechanics of such a vehicle are well known; they are the essence of this

⁸³ David Fuller, "Virtual War Follows Iraq Conflict," 28 April 2006, BBC News (via Newsnight) Accessed September 2, 2010

⁸⁴ Louise Roug, "Decrepit Healthcare Adds to Toll in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, November 11, 2006

thesis. The establishment and use of a Constabulary Brigade offers to address many requirements and provide several deliverables that are not being adequately performed today.

The thesis then moved on to the idea of “how to” organize a paramilitary Constabulary force: one that can provide regional stability operations, be a focal point for reconstruction efforts, and a command group for military units after the completion of combat operations. The brigade offers six major structural elements:

- **Brigade Headquarters & Command:** Unifies command and mission focus, channeling American foreign policies, with logistics reach-back capability
- **Constabulary Police Battalions (x2):** Provides security, enforces the law and suppresses civil unrest
- **Justice Battalion:** Punishes crime and affords restitution or reconciliation for victims
- **Civil Action Battalion:** Restores infrastructure and medical services facilitating economic recovery
- **Sustainment Battalion:** Managing logistics support throughout the brigade region
- **Tactical Combat Force:** Military reserve battalion

To use any other structural format would present the Army with a foreign configuration whose appearance and communication channels would appear unfamiliar. An unfamiliar organizational template would cause Army personnel to ignore the civilians, as being distracting.

This thesis presents a program for growing a solution with a clear description of an organization for such an enterprise. The program begins with a mixed military-civilian brigade. Although there are a variety of uses that a Constabulary Brigade can perform, it has only one unique domain of activity for which it is unequaled: Stability Operations. It reduces the downstream hazards posed by countries which have destabilized from American military intervention, or other brutal circumstances.

KEEP THE PEACE, PROTECT THE INNOCENT, ENFORCE THE LAW

It is time for the Department of State to step out from behind the military and stand up as an independent entity on the battlefield. The world is desperate for America to get this issue right; we can't afford to waste money getting it wrong, and we can't procrastinate because before long circumstances will force us to go down the occupation path, again. This plan will allow the Department of State to assert control over its responsibilities for Stabilization & Reconstruction.

Respectfully,

Mr. Charles W. Bissett



Author's Epilog

"It's not that I'm so smart; it's just that I stay with problems longer."

Albert Einstein

This unofficial document is an analytical thesis intended to stimulate discussion at the department level of government on how to structure an organization that can conduct battlefield-stability operations during and after war. This document serves as the touchstone for a consultation process and debate on the basis of the proposal it puts forward: It is time for the Department of State to step out from behind the military and stand as an independent entity on the battlefield by the development and deployment of Constabulary Brigades.

By vocation, I am a business systems analyst who specializes in information systems and military logistics. In the summer of 2009, I wrote a thesis proposing the need for and establishment of a constabulary force for the United States to use for occupation or nation stabilization and reconstruction (*S&R*) operations.

Since then, I have become increasingly intrigued by the subject of the fragile state collapse, occupation and nation-building. My thinking on the subject has evolved from that earlier thesis. I perceive from the academic articles and blogs on the internet that the idea of a constabulary is gaining traction.

The shortfall in the discussions which I have read is the lack of a defined organizational structure around which technical deliberation can be held. In parliamentary procedures, it is bad practice to try debating a course of action without a drafted motion on the table. Without fixed wording, it is too easy to have misunderstandings about what was intended when so many different words with different nuances are used to describe the same thought. My experience in developing the Sustainment Brigade showed me how complex the simple can become.

Without a defined level of effort and an itemized inventory of personnel and equipment, it is imposable to assess the cost-benefit ratio. Such insight is needed before legislators can act to support any significant modifications to national policy and practice. I have no illusions that this proposal reflects a best or final solution. No, it is intended as a start point from which a solution can be molded. Hopefully, this thesis will give rise to future white papers that will spur legislative action.

Mr. Charles Bissett, *MBA, MSA/MIS*

(A PDF copy of this thesis can be found on the internet at, writtenbycharles.com)

Appendix A: Subordinate Unit Specifications

From here, we begin a detailed examination of the internal technical structure of the constabulary brigade organization.

BRIGADE COMMAND AND FIELD HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL STAFF

The primary function of the brigade headquarters is to support the police and support constables working in the country side amongst the population. The last major task is the coordination of humanitarian relief resources. Thus structurally, the brigade headquarters is organized like an Army modular brigade headquarters with administrative staff reinforcements that would allow it to remain in an environment where an Army Sustainment Brigade is not immediately available.




Figure 5-1: A Constabulary Brigade Field Headquarters.

Characteristics: The commander of the first Constabulary Brigade on the scene of a mission is a general grade officer called a, Vice-Marshal (*or Marshal, for short*). This is to ensure that the commander in the field is of sufficient rank to warrant the respect of his unique mission. This is a person who has attended the Army's Command and Staff College, and is well known in military circles. Subsequent Brigades on the scene would be lead by a Colonel.

The Deputy Commander wears two hats: as the brigade's executive officer, and as the higher level commander of the Constabulary Brigade Troop Companies. Occasionally Army brigades have a Special Troops Battalion (*STB*) to oversee special function elements which

are vital to the brigade's mission, with its own battalion command and staff. In this case, the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters, through the auspices of the Deputy Commander, draws its mission service support directly from the Constabulary Brigade Sustainment Battalion or such organic assets as are needed. Not depicted in the above figure is a small Special Staff that supports the Deputy Commander as expeditors.

The structure of this organization is typical of any forward deployable field brigade. Each of its various "G" Staff sections correlates one-to-one with counterparts within the regional Army theater command. This ensures the smooth flow of routine information back and forth between the military and the civilian agencies represented by the Constabulary Brigade.

Probably one of the most challenging issues during a crisis is the distribution of funds for restoration and other services. This is a critical function of the Constabulary Brigade's ability to stabilize a territory. The G-1 handles all personnel and finance activity for the Constabulary Brigade. In terms of troop disposition and administration for assigned constables, there is no functional difference from Army procedures. Yet the G-1 has two special functions not found in the Army: recruiting of local nationals, and disbursing of payment for contracts. The actual contracting of individual auxiliaries as well as commercial contracts is drafted by the G-5, Acquisition & Contracting bureau. Having two separate staff sections engaged in executing and paying for contracts might be bureaucratically protracted, but this serves as a check and balance against mishandling of funds. All contracts and payments are then reconciled by the Chief of Staff through the office of the Comptroller. This has the unique possibility of providing limited cash financial services as a trust for NGOs and civilian agencies with liaisons operating in the G-3.

Subordinate to the G-3 is a SPO department. If deployed to an area where the Army does not have a Sustainment Brigade operating, the Constabulary's full SPO would accompany the brigade. Its logistics administrative functional capacity is robust enough to support three or four brigades (*Constabulary or Army*), and even other civilian entities operating in close proximity to each other. (*More information is available in the sub-chapter on the SPO, following.*)

Mission: The Constabulary Brigade headquarters performs command and control (*C²*) of the brigade elements. It conducts current operations, plans future operations, collects and assesses field information, and manages its logistical support. The headquarters element also provides liaison with elements of the local national state, other components of the peacekeeping force, and other actors involved in stabilization efforts, or the rebuilding of the criminal justice system.

Personnel: ≈185

BRIGADE TROOPS COMPANIES

The Brigade Troops Companies are organic to the brigade command, and directly support the brigade. They do this by providing personnel services to the command and staff, or by providing services and resources that allow the brigade headquarters to exercise command and control over the rest of the brigade. The critical staff of the brigade is based out of four companies that travel as a part of the commander's entourage. It should be immediately apparent that the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters & Headquarters Company (*Bde HHC*

in military jargon) is the home unit for almost all of the key staff in the brigade. This company is responsible for: 1) personnel life support, 2) personnel administration, and 3) the maintenance and accountability of property directly assigned to the staff and their functional activities.




Figure 5-3: Troop Companies in direct support of the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters

The next three companies are a part of the support for three critical staff officers within the brigade command. Those critical staff officers are: 1) the G-3 Operations Officer, 2) the G-6 Communications and Information Systems Officer, and 3) the Public Affairs Officer. Unlike the other staff officers who collect data and generate information upon which the commander can make decisions, these key officers use their companies to perform activities that are central to the mission of the brigade at large.

Personnel:

HHC:	≈ 335
Signal (<i>Network Support</i>) Co.:	≈ 175
Multi-Media Company:	≈ 105
<u>Support Operations Co.:</u>	<u>≈ 140</u>
Brigade Troops, Total:	≈ 755

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, CONSTABULARY BRIGADE

Characteristics: The HHC, Constabulary Brigade holds all the TO&E⁸⁵ slots for the direct personnel of the command and staff of the brigade.

Mission: The Headquarters Company provides the Constabulary Brigade Command and Staff with the technical services needed for the smooth functioning of routine direct personnel services, and initial field level support of equipment.

Personnel:

Brigade Command & Staff:	≈ 185
Company Command & Staff:	≈ 25
Executive Security Platoon:	≈ 15
General Security Platoon / Band:	≈ 25
Medical Platoon:	≈ 45
<u>Vehicle Maintenance Platoon:</u>	<u>≈ 40</u>
Headquarters Company, Total:	≈ 335

Commentary:

When one looks at the size of the HHC and the Troop Companies in total, one can't help but notice that the entire organization is personnel-heavy compared to its Army counterparts. If the brigade were to be sent into an area where the Army didn't have an ongoing Area Operation (AO), then the resources of a Division, Expeditionary Sustainment Command, and a theater-opening Sustainment Brigade would not be available. These functional resources, especially logistics planning and general support services, have to be accommodated for, if the brigade is to be able to conduct its mission for any protracted period of time.

Another factor affecting the size of the Constabulary Brigade headquarters is that the whole brigade is not a movement-enabled maneuver element. This brigade is designed for occupation duties, where it moves into an area and spreads out into a community. Unfortunately, it is an inviting target for insurgent (*terrorist*) threats. To counter such a threat, security measures like those used to protect airports and aircraft are needed. For example, executive security teams are not needed by maneuver brigades, but needed to protect V.I.P.s in the territory of a Constabulary Brigade.

CRISIS ANALYSIS UNIT

The value of good reconnaissance and intelligence analysis capability is that with a good collection of information, analysts can make reasonable projections about how the situation will evolve. Thus a Crisis Analysis Cell is needed to be sent in first with an advance party, even as the Constabulary Brigade or the MEB with an S&R mission begins to advance on to the scene of a disaster or conflict.

⁸⁵ Table of Organization and Equipment

Characteristics: The Crisis Analysis Cell (CAC) is a group of disaster management and stabilization analysts that are provided to the U.S. Army by the Department of State during deployments. These units are based where they can be easily picked up and deployed by the Air Mobility Command.

Once deployed, it is imbedded into a military unit. At the onset of a conflict or natural disaster, they are administratively attached to the division or regional command having oversight of the crisis event. This is a forward-deployed unit which sets up operations as close to the center of a conflict or disaster as possible. Once Constabulary Brigade or an MEB that is mission tasked to conduct stabilization operations arrives in the region, it is restored to the brigade or the analysis cell is operationally attached and incorporated into the MEB S-2 or S-3 Plans division. Because of the unique nature of the work done by this cell, a very detailed description of the organization and materiel is provided below.




Figure 5-4: This is a reconnaissance and intelligence unit. Not to be confused with an advance party.

The CAC will usually travel along with the Advance Party (addressed below) is designed to make logistical arrangements with the regional field command for the reception of the follow-on brigade. Advance party functions will fall on the shoulders of the brigade executive officer and the brigade S-4 logistics section.

Symbology: In September 1942, the U.S. Army directed that uniformed noncombatant civilians were to wear a modified uniform with an embroidered triangle having the letters "US" as a sleeve insignia. Since the triangle was originally the foundation for Civil Defense insignia; it became part of what was incorporated into the original symbol for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Today, the circle-triangle combination in various colors is the internationally recognized emblem of many civilian Emergency Management bodies and professionals for disaster preparedness.

- Circle, continuous cycle of management
- Triangle, delta of change (and also the military symbol for an observation post)
- Diagonal, the military symbol for reconnaissance

Mission:

- Perform situational analysis simultaneously on behalf of the Department of State and the Theater Command
- Identify the extent of humanitarian assistance requirements needed to stabilize the affected population
- Identify critical infrastructure and key historical sites in need of protection

- Project population movements resulting from a conflict or disaster event
- Assist military planners in responding to civilian requirements in occupied territories

Personnel (O/T/E=Total): 5/11/10=26

(To emphasize that this is a civilian paramilitary organization, the rank structure used here is a civilian/police style rank system.)

Cell Chief (Major / GS-14): Lawyer trained in collecting evidence of human rights abuse.

Executive Assistant (Master Sgt / GS-06): Office Supervisor

Translator (Sergeant, GS-05): Driver

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): a.m. Shift

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): p.m. Shift

Life Support Chief (Warrant-2 / GS-09): Transportation Coordinator, Logistics Chief

Supply Supervisor (Master Sgt / GS-06): Supply Expediter

Chef/Cook (Master Sgt /GS-06): Food Preparation, Rations Coordinator

Supply Technician (Sergeant / GS-05): Property Book Clerk, Driver

Maintenance Technician (Sergeant / GS-05): Vehicle Repair, Power Generation Tech

Maintenance Specialist (Corporal / GS-04): Vehicle Repair, Driver

Regional Analyst (Major / GS-13): Area Specialist, Linguist, Investigator

Constable-Police (Captain / GS-11): Population Security and Justice (Mob Control)

Senior Chief (Warrant-3 / GS-12): HUMINT Investigator, Cultural Anthropologist

Senior Chief (Warrant-3 / GS-12): Order of Battle Analyst /or/ Environmental Scientist

Senior Chief (Warrant-3 / GS-12): Regional Developer /or/ Nuclear Power Engineer

Executive Chief (Warrant-2 / GS-09): Disaster Analyst (Forecast), Refugee Sociologist

Infrastructure Engineering Analyst (Major / GS-13): Civil Engineer, Investigator

Medical Resources Analyst (Captain / GS-11): Medical Doctor, Epidemiologist, NBC Recon

Chief Logistics Engineer (Warrant-3 / GS-12): Architectural Engineer (building materials)

Chief Logistics Engineer (Warrant-3 / GS-12): Civil Engineer (roads & bridges)

Chief Logistics Engineer (Warrant-3 / GS-12): Water & Waste

Product Engineer (Warrant-2 / GS-09): Disaster Analyst (Forecast), Population Eng

Sat-Comms Engineer (Warrant-2 / GS-09): Tele-Communication Programmer, Radio Repair

Network Administrator (Warrant-1 / GS-07): Computer Repair Tech, Driver

Video Camera Operator (Sergeant / GS-5)

Equipment (all motors are diesel powered):

1ea: VSAT, Satellite Communications System

2ea: Network Server

25ea: Laptop Computers; SARSS, BCS3, PBUSE, MS Office, Video Editor, VoIP Phones

2ea: Laser Printers

2ea: Video Camera, Studio Quality

4ea: Medium Tents, Internal Framed (*totaling 2050 square feet*), with Light Sets

2ea: Small Tents (*with shower stalls*)

1ea: 3000 gallon Water Bladder, with Pump & Reverse Osmosis Filter unit

5ea: SUV, Mid-Sized, 4x4, COTS, *Armored to stop an Armor-Piercing 7.62mm Sniper*

1ea: Pickup Truck, Crew Cab, *Armored to stop an Armor-Piercing 7.62mm Sniper*

1ea: 12-Passenger Van, *Armored to stop an Armor-Piercing 7.62mm Sniper*

1ea: Tow Truck, Crew Cab, *Armored to stop an Armor-Piercing 7.62mm Sniper*

2ea: Utility Cargo Trailer, COTS

1ea: Field Feeding System

5ea: Tables, Folding, Long

25ea: Chairs, Folding

26ea: Cots, Sleeping

3ea: Electrical Generators, Diesel

?: Secure Communications Equipment set

Capabilities:

- Able to deploy to a natural/political/military crises event, within six hours of notification
- Deploys on two Boeing C-17 Globemaster III cargo planes, and 26 seats on a passenger plane.
- Establishes a liaison with U.S., Allied, and local national agencies
- Performs reconnaissance of the situation beyond the enclosure and protection of a military base camp
- Collects situational information
- Documents humanitarian disaster and the effects of conflict on civilian populations
- Establishes satellite communications with home base Headquarters and Department of State
- Attaches to the S-3 Plans section of MEB, that are mission tasked to perform stabilization operations
- Conducts operations for 72 hours, without re-supply, or local resources (*minus water*)

- Expects security squad with re-supply and barrier materials within 48 to 72 hours after arrival
- This platoon/party shall expect to operate for three to four weeks without support from a brigade headquarters, beyond the first resupply

Commentary: Here, is a planning cell whose primary concern is addressing the needs of civilians trapped in a war zone, or disaster. It is an ideal mission for the CSO-CRC-A. They will be drawing support and supplies from the local sustainment brigade, once it gets set up in the area of operations. This unit provides the Department of State with reports that are specific to its foreign affairs ambassadorial goals. This will reduce the burden on local embassy staffs who are likewise trying to deal with the crises. In cases where a local embassy is nonexistent; this puts dedicated civilian information collection assets on site of the crises. This unit provides what Sun Tzu would see as the foreknowledge needed for strategic planning of future S&R operations and assistance.

The Situation Analysis squad members are area-specialist qualified. Situation Analyst personnel speak two foreign languages at Level-2 from their region, besides English. The Situation Analyst is charged with establishing an ongoing relationship with the G-2/S-2 of the regional command, cavalry scouts and RISTA units (*reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition*) within the region.

The Senior Investigator (*Warrant-3*) Order of Battle Analyst has to be ready to go forward into the combat zone to assess how the enemy actions are affecting the local populace.

The Life Support Logistician (*Captain, Supply Officer*) and the Senior Logistics Engineer (*Warrant-3, Disaster Analyst, & Civil Engineer*) are qualified to estimate the types and volumes of humanitarian aid needed to stabilize the civilian populace. They have unique training in refugee analysis. For an assessment of the medical needs, they can draw upon the professional expertise of the local Army brigade surgeons.

All of the personnel used to staff an Advance Party coming from Corps Headquarters or the Engineer Company need to have Top-Secret security clearances.

ADVANCE PARTY

This is a special function performed by the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters immediately upon notification of a deployment mission. The advance party is not a separate element from the other organs of the Constabulary Brigade Command and Staff until a deployment is called. Army units will have their own policies and practices for doing Advance Party tasks.

Characteristics: It is a command element (*slice*) from the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters that coordinates for the follow-on of the remaining brigade. It is intended to be available immediately to in-theater military commanders and local national authorities to perform basic liaison, and to gather information in behalf of the Department of State.

Mission: Enter the location of a political/military crises event and provide “Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration” (RSOI⁸⁶). This group liaises with the in-theater military commanders and local national authorities. It arranges for the reception of the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters and the initial functional elements, which are to follow.

Personnel:

Transportation Officer (Major): Movements, Contracting

Multi-Modal Officer (Captain): Air-Movements, Load Master Trained

Multi-Modal Officer (Captain): Sea-Movements

Multi-Modal Officer (Captain): Vehicle Contracting, Qualified Contracting Officer

Executive Assistant (Master Sgt / GS-06): Office Supervisor

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): a.m. Shift

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): p.m. Shift

RSOI Officer (Captain)

RSOI Deputy Officer (Lieutenant)

Executive Assistant (Master Sgt / GS-06): Office Supervisor

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): a.m. Shift

Driver/Clerk (Corporal / GS-4): p.m. Shift

Capabilities:

- Is able to deploy to a natural/political/military crises event, within six hours of notification
- Is deployable by one military cargo aircraft (C-17), and 12 seats on a passenger plane
- Establishes a liaison with U.S., Allied, and local national agencies
- Collects situational information
- Establishes satellite communications with home base Headquarters and Department of State
- Coordinates with strategic power projection major commands for the transportation to a proper deployment location of follow-on Brigade elements and assets
- Contracts for scalable facility life support in anticipation of follow-on Brigade elements
- Conducts operations for 72 hours, without re-supply or local resources (*minus water*)
- Expects security squad with resupply and barrier materials within 48 to 72 hours after arrival

⁸⁶ Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) is the process that transitions personnel and equipment arriving in a theater into operationally viable forces.

- This platoon/party shall expect to operate for three to four weeks without support from the Constabulary Brigade Headquarters

Commentary:

Most of the Advance Party personnel are assigned to the main Constabulary Corps Headquarters G-3 Plans Division, until needed for deployment. They are then reassigned to the deploying Constabulary Brigade to help form an ad hoc platoon within the Constabulary Brigade HHC, under the Deputy Commander.

The Multi-Modal squad and RSOI team are organic to a Constabulary Brigade.

SIGNAL (NETWORK SUPPORT) COMPANY

Characteristics: This company provides direct support to the G-6, Chief Information Officer for the Constabulary Brigade Commander. The Signal (*Network Support*) Company [*S(NS)C*] consists of a headquarters and network support platoon, two network extension platoons, a NETOPS cell, the Joint Network Nodes (*JNN*), subordinate CP nodes and single channel signal support teams. The network control center is resourced to interface directly with the strategic network, manage bandwidth to subordinate battalions, and extend the strategic information assurance plan into the tactical formation.

Most of the battalion headquarter elements have signal personnel who are focused on setting up a wide area network, and cellular phone communications. Every member of the Constabulary Brigade carries an individual Personal Locator System device that is monitored through an enhanced position location reporting system (*EPLRS*) network.

Mission: The mission of the Signal (*Network Support*) Company is to integrate tactical, strategic and sustaining field communications, information processing and management systems into a seamless global information network that supports knowledge dominance for the Constabulary Brigade throughout a disaster relief or occupation mission.

Personnel: ≈ 175

Capabilities:

The S(NS)C is intended to establish the organic communications for the Constabulary Brigade and provides the following communication capabilities:⁸⁷

1. A tactical internet (*TI*) supporting the Constabulary Brigade and below with command and control data exchange capabilities to link, logistics, and command and control elements
2. Combat net radio retransmission of voice using:
 - Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (*SINCGARS*)
 - Improved high frequency radio
 - Single channel tactical satellite (*TACSAT*) for command and control

⁸⁷ Design is based on, Army FM 3-90.31, Chapter 2; MEB Mission and Organization

3. Global Broadcast Service with the ability to receive high bandwidth products such as imagery, logistics data, and digital map information to support Army Battle Command System (*ABCS*) employment by commanders and staffs
4. Multichannel Tactical Satellite (*TACSAT*) to extend the range of the brigade's communications services
5. Management of the brigade's command and control network
6. Establishment of primary command post voice/video capabilities for the brigade
7. Field level maintenance of organic communication-electronics and communications security (*COMSEC*) equipment
8. Planning for all matters concerning signal operations, automation, management, and information security for the brigade

Commentary:

The *S(NS)C* has a secondary role of data retransmission where enhanced position location reporting system (*EPLRS*), TI, or Army Common User System capabilities also exist for the brigade.

Considering the size of the brigade, there are about 325 to 350 total signal personnel in this company and disbursed throughout the brigade.

MULTI-MEDIA COMPANY

Characteristics: The Multi-Media Company is the public voice of the U.S. government and the Constabulary. It performs marketing services, producing radio, television, print, and internet products.

Mission: The Multi-Media Company produces media products that are used to induce or reinforce local national behavior which is favorable to US objectives.

Personnel: ≈ 105

Capabilities:

Company Headquarters Platoon: Not only performs company administration, it provides vehicle maintenance, and power generation.

Public Analysis Platoon: A team of producers, editors, marketers, and writers; augmented by field journalists and camera operators.

New Media Platoon: Works through the internet to inform the local national public about Constabulary activity.




Figure 5-5: Multi-Media Company

Publication Platoon: This element employs layout editors, multimedia specialists, graphic artists, and animators. It produces a variety of digital visual products that can be printed, projected or screened. This element also operates digital presses that could produce ready-to-disseminate dry leaflets, posters, handbills, booklets, magazines and stickers.

Studio Production Platoon: This platoon operates two radio/audio studios, and three television studios.

Broadcast Engineering Platoon: This platoon is tasked with erecting and operating a radio transmission tower that supports five public stations: radio and television. It also operates two remote location trucks for capturing and reporting live events.

Commentary: Although acting to effect positive behaviors and relationships for the occupation force, this is not a true PSYOPS unit. Its capabilities are limited compared to a military PSYOPS unit. Its target audience is only civilians.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS COMPANY (SPO)

Characteristics: There is the expectation that the Constabulary will be sent to places where at the tactical level, the logistics resources of the U.S. Army will not be available. This may be due to the Army's having finished their job and redeployed back to their home bases, or because they were not there in the first place. Thus, the Constabulary Brigade will have to have organic sustainment management capability that can coordinate with and requisition support from the U.S. military's global supply network. The reader needs to understand that there is a difference between logistics as a general concept, logistics planning, and logistics operations.

Mission: The Brigade SPO is a company, and the principal staff division, under the G-3, that does sustainment (of which logistics is a subset) planning providing coordinating support for all units within the Constabulary Brigade and authorized civilian activity within the territory under the Constabulary Brigade's jurisdiction. *(This is different from the responsibilities of the G-4 or S-4 which is focused on the internal logistical activity of its immediate unit.)* The SPO provides technical supervision of all sustainment operations conducted by the Constabulary Brigade and is therefore the key interface between supported units and the Theater Sustainment Command. The Brigade SPO provides planning, preparation, and command and control of the execution of all sustainment operations within the Constabulary Brigade's jurisdiction. This includes logistical storage, maintenance, and distribution, as well as non-logistical support such as human resources and quality of life operations. The SPO section provides centralized planning and coordination of all logistics activity supporting Brigade units, internal and external.

Personnel: ≈ 140

Capabilities:

The SPO produces future plans and operational oversight of all logistic and other sustainment activity for the brigade, subordinate units, and the local community of the assigned region. Because the SPO does planning and produces operational services for elements outside of the immediate brigade, the SPO is a division of the brigade G-3, Plans & Operations section. The SPO is not a part of the G-4, Logistics section because; the G-4's

focus and services are limited to the internal logistic activities of the Brigade Headquarters and its four support companies in property accountability, maintenance.

Sustainment⁸⁸ is the provision of the logistics (G-4), personnel services, and health service support (G-1) necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment (*see FM 3-0*). The endurance of a deployed Constabulary force is primarily a function of their sustainment bureaus. The sustainment capabilities in the above areas are what determine the extent to which Constabulary forces can conduct stability operations.

Endurance is the ability to employ assertive force wherever directed for protracted periods. Endurance stems from the ability to generate, protect, and sustain a force. It involves anticipating requirements and making the most effective, efficient use of available resources.

Sustainment also enables strategic and operational reach. Constabulary forces require strategic and operational reach to deploy and immediately conduct operations wherever directed.




Figure 5-6: The Brigade SPO is the sustainment planning and coordination element for the Brigade G-3 Plans and Operations Staff section.

⁸⁸ Derived from Army FM 4-93.2; *"The Sustainment Brigade," Chapter 2, "Mission and Organization"*

The Brigade SPO, as a staff division, is capable of coordinating and processing the sustainment requirements for two or three Army brigades, in the absence of an Army Sustainment Brigade. The SPO is more than administrative coordination of internal matters; it is intended to support military units performing civil support missions in the region who do not have the robust administrative capacity to support extra-mission activities.

Sustainment functions consist of three sub-functions: 1) logistics, 2) personnel services, and 3) health service support. These three sub-functions are further broken down as follows:

1. Logistics Sub-Function:

- Maintenance
- Transportation
- Supply
- Field Services
- Distribution
- Contracting
- General Engineer Support

2. Personnel Services Sub-Function:

- Human Resources Management
- Financial Management
- Legal Support
- Religious Support

3. Health Service Support Sub-Function:

- Organic and Area Medical Support
- Hospitalization
- Treatment Aspects of Dental Care
- Behavioral Health & Neuropsychiatric Treatment
- Clinical Laboratory Services & CBRN Treatment
- Medical Evacuation
- Medical Logistics

The Brigade SPO performs sustainment planning and coordinating at the operational level over tactical level elements. Operational sustainment focuses on theater operations that involve mission deployment/reception, movement distribution, sustainment, and reconstitution. The initial focus is on generating an organization which is ready to conduct operations. Support begins during mission generation but becomes the primary focus once operations begin. Key Constabulary functions associated with operational level sustainment include the following:

- Planning, coordinating, managing, and supervising the positioning and security of sustainment activities
- Directing the direct support field maintenance to units in its assigned operational territory
- Coordinating supply of arms, munitions, vehicles, radios, shelter and equipment
- Synchronizing supply and distribution of fuel and water
- Managing materiel, controlling movement, and managing distribution
- Scheduling and coordinating replenishment operations (*RO*)

- Ensuring effective cross-leveling of supplies and efficient retrograde and redeployment of equipment, personnel, and supplies
- Monitoring the maintenance of equipment and stocks that support the supply system
- Coordinating support of troops, to include personnel, human resources, supply, equipment, field services, health, religious support, financial management, and legal services
- Providing pass-through capability for Army lead-service common user logistics (CUL) to other services, multinational partners, and civilian agencies; on order
- Establishing, managing, and monitoring of facilities, including storage areas and maintenance areas
- Coordinating contingency contracting of intra-brigade requirements. *(This is worked out with the Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) and the Brigade G-5, Acquisition & Contracting bureau.)*
- Maintaining visibility of customer locations and information regarding support relationships

Sustainment at the tactical level encompasses those performance activities that maintain and supply U.S. forces and civilian agency field-bureaus. Following are the two ways that a Constabulary Brigade provides support for a deployed crisis event or occupation mission at this level:

1. The Sustainment Battalions and Forward Support Companies (FSCs)
2. Replenishment of civilian operations, echelons above brigade (EAB) and attached organizations on an area basis

Replenishment operations (RO) are planned operations that allow military and Constabulary units to replenish routinely. An RO is a deliberate, time-sensitive operation to replace used stocks within the brigade. These operations which may be, but are not normally, augmented with assets from an Army sustainment brigade, are quick and in stride with the brigade commander's operational rhythm. It may be either deliberate or hasty depending on the circumstances. Typical activities that take place during the RO include rearming, refueling, maintenance, medical support, and essential personnel replacement to meet immediate needs. The Sustainment Battalion conducts RO to its FSCs and the FSCs also conduct RO to the mission loads of individual troop and defensive platforms. The Constabulary Sustainment Battalion SPO will need to coordinate the timing of the RO with the regional Sustainment Brigade or the Theater Sustainment Command to ensure that the delivery from whichever source supports both the required stockade levels and the timing of its RO.

Commentary:

This unit stands as an exception to design principle of tactical echelons are to achieve operational objectives, rather than to review and transmit paperwork. However, the presence of this 140-troop organization within the G-3 operational staff means the Constabulary Brigade can operate in a region where an Army Sustainment Brigade is not available. The reason for this staff division existing as its own company is that it has too many people to not be supported by a company headquarters element.

Throughout the brigade are battalion level SPO teams that perform transaction processing on logistic management information systems. Together, the SPO network creates a Logistics Common Operating Picture.

(Most of this information on sustainment is derived from Army FM 4-93.2; Chapter 2.)

THE CONSTABULARY POLICE BATTALION

Developing Indigenous Police Services: The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally be provided by a demilitarized police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a community-based police service, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and the military. However, while police primacy for internal security remains an aspiration, community policing models assume consent which is unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. The policing model must be realistic.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom (MOD-UK), Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, "Security & Stabilization: the Military Contribution," November 2009




Figure 5-11: A police battalion can protect a community of 126,500 people.

Characteristics: This is the center piece of a permanent expeditionary police force that conducts the bulk of civilian policing chores that are routinely assigned to the Department

of Defense. This is a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.⁸⁹ This would allow the nation's warfighting structure to commit itself to preparation for winning major combat actions. It would also create a two-tier decision path for the deployment of American forces overseas.

Mission: Perform rear area security, refugee relief, population control, occupation, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, humanitarian relief security, and other community based exercise of police powers.

Personnel: $(\pm)200 + (4 \times 191) \approx 965$

The commander has a lawyer added to his personal staff. Special function elements in the HHC are maintenance, medical, signal communications, forensic evidence collection, civil engineering, and contracting. *(In a full scale Constabulary Brigade, civil engineering shifts to the Civil Action Battalion, and contracting is managed by the G-5.)* The S-1 has two internal affairs investigators. In the S-4 there are three special bureaus for petroleum, water, and rations.

Capabilities:⁹⁰

- Provides police security services for an initial population of 90 to 130 thousand people
- Has an ample quality of survivability, mobility, and firepower to deal with insurgents and hold a threatening company level force of light infantry
- Precisely defines and locates the enemy or criminal elements *(if one exists)*
- Engages populations to participate in their own security needs, reinforcing local authorities wherever found
- Uses the appropriate amount of force needed in each circumstance
- Provides or encourages physical and social infrastructure needed to release the unit from long-term presence.
- Preserves evidence in a centralized location

Commentary: The Constabulary Battalion is the heart of the the Constabulary Corps' *(or an MEB's)* ability to provide stability and security. The Constabulary Battalion is the first-line counter-subversive tool. In dealing with mob violence, a Constabulary can deliver direct offensive action against extreme, hostile domestic forces beyond the level of normal police services. In the face of an extensive, organized, armed enemy capable of maneuver and massed firepower, a Constabulary battalion is intrinsically inadequate. However, this unit is a set aside part of a total force, allowing it to work under a different set of constraints common to police powers.

⁸⁹ Erwin A. Schmidl, *"Police Functions In Peace Operations: A Historical Overview,"* in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Elio M. Goldberg (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 22.

⁹⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest, *"Expeditionary Police Service,"* Military Review, June 1993, pg. 50-56

CONSTABLE POLICE COMPANY

Characteristics: Though similar to its military police counterparts, it also has organic criminal investigation capability.

Mission: The units would be able to control crowds, deter vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators, while at the same time winning the trust of the communities where they are deployed. This is the primary tactical level unit tasked with improving the U.S. ability to effectively manage or resolve inter and intra-state conflict.

Personnel: Officer/Technician/NCO/Journey Police: 5/9/64/113 = 191




Figure 5-12: The Constable Police Company is focused on community policing.

Capabilities:

- Performs police functions at the community level
- Fills the initial security S&R Gap and establishes a clear rule of law in intra and post hostility environments
- Is able to deal directly with counterparts in the indigenous police forces, governments and judicial systems
- Apprehends and detains suspected criminals

- Conducts raids and police searches
- Segregates and neutralizes explosives with an organic Explosive Ordinance Disposal squad.
- Has organic forensic units for processing crime scenes, and developing trial evidence
- Exercises skill sets not common to soldiers

Commentary: The Constabulary has the ability to provide widespread police patrolling, and to interrogate residents or refugees on a modularly expandable scale. They also have the ability to provide static defense for some installations, and a well-developed crowd control capability that includes a variety of non-lethal weapons options. They have a criminal investigation capability as well, gathering and securing evidence for trial.

CIVIL ACTION BATTALION

Characteristics: Here the indirect method is by winning the hearts and minds of the populace. This battalion is that element of the Constabulary Brigade which develops and performs humanitarian aid and project management. The objective of this battalion is to redirect the community into constructive pursuits by preemptively identifying and removing the underlying causes of conflict and opportunities for criminal activity.

Mission: The Civil Action Battalion (*CABn*) supports the stabilization efforts and opens the reconstruction of critical infrastructure of the territory within the area of the Constabulary Brigade. It also attempts to secure employment for the members of the local populace.

Personnel:

HHC:	≈ 190
Aviation:	≈ 175
Engineer:	≈ 80
Medical:	≈ 155
<u>Academy:</u>	<u>≈ 175</u>
Civil Action Battalion, Total:	≈ 775

Capabilities:

Battalion Headquarters Capabilities: The battalion S-3's special operations S&R Mission Branch, operates three coordination offices:

Regional Development Office: This office is staffed by a *civil engineer*, *utilities engineer*, and a *regional planner*. The office members sit down with a local residents' committee to plan long term regional development. The office produces a master plan for the region. It produces a zoning map of the region. It promulgates in the role of "True Customer" the definition of requirements for all civil engineering contracts. *[Actual project management, and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTR) for government-produced or procured products, or engineering inspection of contracted products and services are performed by the Engineer Company.]* The office holds public community meetings to present its plans and report on development efforts.

Contracting Office: The Battalion S-3 has three Contracting Officer Representatives (COR). They handle "*civil infrastructure engineering*" and "*medical*" acquisitions, solicit

local contractors, and designate representatives from within the battalion. Once deliverables have passed inspection, they coordinate with the Constabulary Brigade S-5, and the S-1 Finance Section for the distribution of funds for all such projects.

Community Health Office: This group is responsible for estimation of all epidemiological threats to the people and livestock of the regional community. This group uses scientific and medical knowledge to assess the causes and transmission of the most probable diseases within the population. This is done with the intent of implementing programs that will manage the environmental risks. This team consists of an epidemiologist (*medical doctor*), environmental biologist (*water analyst*), veterinarian (*livestock inspector, doctor*) and a maternity nurse (*midwife*). This office provides medical reconnaissance of the regional environment.




Figure 5-7: The Civil Action Battalion with its supporting companies

Aviation Company: The Constabulary Aviation Company is organized to provide mission-related aviation transportation using rotary blade or fixed wing aircraft. It conducts direct aviation support, aircraft maintenance, and light airfield operational management.

Engineer Company: This company serves as the city engineer for the region. It analyses the major structures and public utilities for the region. It also proposes contracts, and inspects the work on building projects.

Medical Company: The primary objective of this company is to restore capability to local national hospitals, and to address overflow conditions caused by conflict or disaster in the territory.

Civil-Police Academy Capabilities: The initial focus of the academy is to train local national auxiliaries in how to participate in the Constabulary Brigade to stabilize and rebuild their region.

Commentary: If we apply the theory of Maslow's hierarchy of needs to stability efforts, this battalion is intended to facilitate the "safety" needs. It is the idea that you are out of danger, and can next go about the business of taking care of yourself.

AVIATION COMPANY

Characteristics: Upon arrival into the Constabulary Brigade's operational region, this unit is responsible for providing aerial mapping of damage done by disaster or conflict, and identifying critical natural and real-estate resources.

Where necessary, this company can provide limited airfield operational management.

The primary, but not the most frequent task for this unit, is the transportation and incursion of a police strike force or military assault force to a targeted area.

More often, Constabulary aircraft are tasked with civil assistance missions, bringing relief where wheeled transport cannot go in a reasonable amount of time.

Medical Evacuation (*Medivac*) resources are available.




Figure 5-8: Types of aircraft which might be used by the Constabulary force

Mission: The Constabulary Aviation Company is a multi-functional organization which provides Constabulary mission related aviation resources using rotary blade or fixed wing aircraft. It conducts direct aviation support: air traffic control services, airborne command and control; air transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies; aerial sustainment operations, and aviation assault operation support, as required.

Personnel: ≈ 175

Capabilities:

Airfield/Flight Operations Platoon: Provides a base flight operations center and regional control tower service for an airfield hosting Constabulary and military aircraft.

Flight Platoon: The actual mix of aircraft in the flight platoon




Figure 5-9: A possible aircraft mix for the flight platoon

could vary according to the circumstances. It is therefore the rule of thumb that the flight platoon will have no more than eight turbine power plants on all its aircraft, in total; regardless of the aircraft mix. *(This is due to limitations of the maintenance elements' workload capacity.)*

Field Fueling Platoon: This platoon (*FFP*) is tasked with supporting all Constabulary and reinforcing Army aviation assets of the Constabulary Brigade. The platoon has four sections: 1) Platoon Headquarters team, 2) Refueling Handler section, 3) Fuel Storage Section, and 4) Fuel Truck section. The platoon can handle three (3) days of supply (*DOS*) to support surge operations. It can perform split operations to support a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (*FARP*) operation.

Maintenance Platoon: Provides aviation fleet ground support capable of fixed base operations and sufficient maintenance capability to keep the air fleet functioning for over a year. It performs Aviation Unit Maintenance (*AVUM*) and limited Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (*AVIM*) support to all aircraft assigned to the Constabulary Brigade (*including one company of medium lift [UH-60, Blackhawk] military aircraft from the tactical combat force reserve element*). Support includes planning and supervising administration and logistics support for organic and attached units. The maintenance activity within this unit occurs at two levels:

Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM): This is quick turnaround through repair by replacement, minor repairs, adjustments, cleaning, lubricating and servicing. It provides mobile responsive support through maintenance response teams (*MRT*). The general concept is for crew chiefs assigned to specific aircraft to perform daily servicing, daily inspection, and high frequency, remove-and-replace-type aircraft repairs. Scheduled maintenance (*other than daily inspections*) and the more time consuming operator-type repairs are normally performed by an AVUM maintenance element within the organization.

Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM): This is support that within the Army is usually performed at the division level. It maintains an authorized operational readiness float of selected items such as radios and aircraft armament systems. Command, technical, supervisory, and mission coordination relationships involving this service are somewhat unique. AVIM support for the Aviation Company aircraft includes:

- a) A shop stock of 450 items
- b) Retrograde of repairable aviation equipment
- c) On-site maintenance support and technical assistance with forward repair/recovery teams organized from internal assets
- d) Maintenance test flight evaluator support incorporated into the unit TO&E

Commentary: The amalgamation of functional capabilities presented in this company is not normally done in an Army aviation company. What the author has done here is created, what the Army calls a, Task Force. It is tailored to a very limited scope of activity, and lacks an on-the-move, maneuver organizational capability. The aviation assets in this company would be woefully inadequate to support an infantry brigade in combat. It has much of the functionality of a general aviation battalion; just, scaled down into one company.

The resources and functional capabilities, normally provided to an Army aviation battalion by a forward support company of a brigade support battalion, are scaled down to two companies' workload and incorporated directly into this one company. This support is then extended to the attached Army aviation within the Tactical Combat Force.

This company is more focused on ground support than aircraft.

ENGINEERING COMPANY:

Characteristics: This company serves as the city engineer for the region. It analyses the major structures and public utilities for the region. It requests contracts be drafted by the Brigade G-5, and inspects the work on building projects. It is not set up to do actual construction work.

Mission: To oversee the restoration of critical civil and architectural engineering within the jurisdiction of the Constabulary Brigade

Personnel: ≈ 80

Capabilities:

The members of this company are available to serve the G-5 Contracting Officer (*KO*) as functional experts for solicitation development.

Once a contract is let, members of this company are available to serve as Contract Officer Representatives (*COR*) and as Contract Officer Technical Representatives (*COTR*).

They provide the Constabulary Brigade Commander and the community with building and construction inspectors of private projects performed within the jurisdiction, to ensure that unethical or fraudulent building practices do not occur (*or, are kept to a minimum*).

Vertical Engineering is focused on all buildings and architectural structures. It assesses the safety and functionality of structures. This capability includes experts in the building trades, such as surveying, electrical wiring, carpentry, masonry, and plumbing.

Horizontal Engineering is involved in road maintenance, water delivery, agricultural farming, environmental protection, hazardous material clean-up, and CBRN reconnaissance.

Power Engineering is concerned with the functioning of power generation and transmission throughout the region. This includes the availability of petroleum for civilian commerce.

In the event of an emergency need, the company can seek and request the priority support of military engineers to perform repairs to damaged or destroyed utilities or infrastructure.

MEDICAL COMPANY

Characteristics: The primary objective of this company is to restore capability to local civilian hospitals, and to address overflow conditions caused by conflict or disaster in the territory (*as different from the evacuation focus of military medical units*). Every effort is made to reinstate the employment of medical personnel who have been displaced by the disaster, conflict, or situation which caused the Constabulary brigade to be deployed into the region. Additional medical support is provided on an area basis by U.S. Army Medical Command units.




Figure 5-10: Medical Company is primarily tasked to treat civilians, and stabilize community medical activities within the territory of the Constabulary Brigade.

Mission: To provide brigade-level Community Health Support (*CmHS*) to organizations subordinate to the brigade, and to civilian hospital organizations operating within the brigade's territory. This support includes the employment and coordination of Theater/Regional-level military Combat Health Support (*CHS*) assets attached to the brigade for S&R operations.

Personnel:

Headquarters Platoon: ≈ 40
 General Care Platoon: ≈ 30
 In-Patient Care Platoon: ≈ 40
 Treatment Platoon: ≈ 25
Ambulance Platoon: ≈ 15
 Medical Company, Total: ≈ 155

Capabilities:

The Medical Company includes but is not limited to Echelons I and II medical treatment which involves:

- Emergency medical treatment
- The capability of performing triage, initial resuscitation/stabilization, and preparation for further evacuation of wounded and Disease and Nonbattle Injury (*DNBI*) casualties generated in the brigade support area, and unit-level *CmHS*, on an

area basis, for all elements without organic medical capability operating in the Constabulary Brigade's territory

- Advanced trauma management
- Evacuation of casualties from within the brigade area to outside treatment facilities. Plan, prepare, and execute aero medical evacuation operations when augmented with a theater Forward Support MEDEVAC Team (*FSMT*)
- Treatment teams capable of operating independently, for limited periods of time, to provide support for sub-community operations or to perform reconstitution/reinforcement operations, as appropriate
- Patient-holding capability to include nursing care for up to 20 patients
- Preventive dentistry
- Dental services including emergency dental care focused on stabilization of maxillofacial injuries and other dental emergencies, essential dental care designed to prevent or intercept potential dental emergencies, and limited preventive dentistry
- Laboratory and radiology services commensurate with the brigade level of supporting essential medical care and treatment including: basic hematology, chemistry, parasitology, urinalysis, and plane/regional films with digital radiological processing capability
- Limited pharmacy services
- Psychiatric consultation and diagnosis, and post traumatic stress control therapy
- Preventive medicine (*PVNTMED*)
- Limited optometry services: emergency and essential optometry care
- Medical evacuation support by air and ground ambulances
- Class VIII (*Medical*) resupply and blood support
- Medical equipment maintenance
- Maternity and pediatric treatment
- Morgue and mortuary affairs services

Brigade Medical Operations Section: This is a staff section that is relocated and attached to the S-3 section of the Civil Action Battalion (*CABn*) upon arrival into the territory of the Constabulary Brigade. The BMOS's mission is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize the brigade's CmHS with technical medical advice from the brigade surgeon. The brigade surgeon and the Medical Company medical chief have joint responsibilities for CmHS operations in the brigade. Their staff positions in the brigade and CABn require a close working relationship and coordination of their CmHS activities. The BMOS consists of:

- Medical Operations Section
- Medical Supply Section
- Patient Disposition And Reports Squad

- Troop Patient Records Team

The Brigade Medical Operations Section plans and coordinates:

- Command and Control of attached medical units to include combat health support planning, policies, and support operations as well as coordination of patient movement within and outside of the brigade area.
- Current information concerning the medical aspects of the CmHS situation to higher command elements.
- Development, preparation, and coordination with the Constabulary Brigade Surgeon Section (*C-BSS*) on the medical portion of the brigade plans and policies.
- Allocation of medical resources (personnel and equipment) to ensure adequacy of medical treatment to all units operating in the Constabulary Brigade's territory.

Commentary:

Generally, Army medical companies are mission tasked to provide services predominantly to their assigned brigades from within their rear base camps. The Constabulary medical companies are sent out to support the community hospital, where one exists.

Generally, Army medical companies are structured to stabilize patients and evacuate them to hospitals outside the combat zone. For Constabulary medical companies, evacuation is not an option for local nationals. All treatment has to be done in country since it can't be passed on to another medical entity. Hence, there is a more robust personnel load.

TRAINING ACADEMY

Characteristics:

Mission: Train local nationals in how to participate in the Constabulary Brigade to stabilize and rebuild their region; as auxiliaries to the brigade, or as local contractors. The Academy reaches out to the community, strengthening or establishing local schools for the children and trade-skill training for adults.

Personnel: ≈ 175

Capabilities:

1. The Training Academy provides training to the local national populace in three functional areas:
 - Providing Auxiliary support to the Constabulary Brigade
 - Developing local governance
 - Engaging in commercial contracting in support of Brigade projects
2. The Training Academy operates seven schools:
 - The Police School
 - The Logistics School

- The Maintenance & Construction Trades School
- The Farm & Husbandry School
- The Teachers School
- The Contracting School
- English Second Language School (ESL)

Commentary: Unemployment is a leading cause of violence against an occupation force. People need “hope” that they can have a future, if they are to be happy. Happy people aren’t violent (*unless they’re deranged*). The Brigade will try to provide four to six weeks of training by each school.

The ♦Police School, the ♦Logistics School, and the ♦Maintenance & Construction Trades School are precursors to a follow-on OJT (*on the job training*) that these people will do as auxiliaries within the Constabulary Brigade. Learning English will be a big part of this training.

The ♦Farm & Husbandry School, the ♦Teachers School, and the ♦Contracting School are for people who are already in the profession. In the short operating period of time, there is not much that can be taught in class. Most of these schools are really conducting seminars for people already engaged in the trades. The real value then becomes a two way dialogue between the locals about how they do business, and how the S&R practitioners will be better able to get the region back on its feet, in a way that’s consistent with regional traditions.




Figure 5-11: Training Academy

JUSTICE BATTALION

The Justice Battalions is incorporated into the structure of each Constabulary Brigade, and supports the brigade’s mission to maintain the orderly government of a foreign territory. The commander of this battalion is an experienced trial judge. He also serves as the Staff Judge Advocate to the Brigade Commander.

Mission: The Justice Battalion protects individuals from public persecution, intimidation, reprisal, and other forms of criminal exploitation or systematic violence by the application of law. Its period of jurisdiction is during the occupation, stabilization, and reconstruction of a foreign nation by the U.S. Government, whether operating solo or in conjunction with allies. The Justice Battalions detects and investigates systems of criminal exploitation or acts of violence done outside the purview of military operations. It interdicts or disrupts criminal activity by authorizing extraordinary powers to use police force and applying the rule of law. It detains non-combatant individuals, and combatants accused of civil crimes who are on hold for arraignment or bound over to the courts for trial.




Figure 5-12: Justice Battalion

Personnel:

HHC, Justice Bn:	≈ 190
Investigations Co:	≈ 90
Confinement Co:	≈ 145
Judiciary Co:	≈ 190
Justice Battalion, Total:		≈ 565

Battalion Capabilities: The Justice Battalion is organized, staffed, and equipped to:

- Provide operational intelligence to the Constabulary Brigade, sharing intelligence of military value with U.S., allied, and coalition partner(s)
- Move amongst the public in search of sedition, criminal activity, and public official malfeasance, developing prosecutorial evidence for use in court
- Review local law for modification, repeal or suspension
- Arraign individuals to determine if a sufficient prima fascia case exists, to direct that an individual be bound over for trial
- Make a determination whether a defendant will be allowed bond or be detained pending trial
- Provide detention facilities which are for suspected criminals (*not enemy prisoners of war*), and criminals convicted of petty misdemeanors

- Maintain secure detention facilities and house prisoners or internees
- Conduct pretrial hearings on the nature of evidence and arguments, and make rulings on what may be presented at trial
- Use an American version of mixed European and Egyptian “Civil Law” to administer court proceedings.
- Conduct public trials of individuals accused of crimes against U.S. occupation or the people of the territory under the jurisdiction of the Justice Battalion
- Deliver individuals found guilty of civil crimes to a prison
- Develop and coordinate procedures and plans for the use of local national civilian (*LNC*) employees in judicial operations and for the expansion of manpower to satisfy the caseload demands in a timely manner
- Provide training to local nationals on logistics, and on subjects related to judicial governance and good policing, working as translators

Commentary: This is a capability not currently available in the Department of Defense units.

CONSTABULARY INVESTIGATIONS COMPANY

Characteristics: In terms of organization and equipment, the Investigations Company is almost identical to its military counterpart, the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (*ISR*) Military Intelligence Company (*MICO*). Beyond that, the similarities end. The *ISR-MICO* focuses on intelligence preparation for the battlefield (*IPB*).

The Investigations Company works to flush out, and neutralize or apprehend criminals. Whereas intelligence in the military is a combat support role, investigations is a direct operation of a stability mission.

Mission: Constabulary Investigations Company operations provide information necessary to assess influences and conditions that threaten the United States, its allies, and the local community.

Personnel: ≈90

Capabilities:

Investigation missions may provide continuous surveillance or as-required reconnaissance, in order to provide warnings of impending threats or attacks, as well as to monitor compliance with international agreements. The commander and staff strive to understand the composition, activities, and attitudes of the civilian population. They consider the impact of civilian activities on policing operations.

Intelligence and investigation requirements generally focus on meeting the brigade commander's intelligence needs in order to:

- Prevent surprise
- Identify fragile infrastructure, cultural centers, and natural resources in need of protection




Figure 5-8: The Investigations Company seeks out threats to the peace and stability of the local community. It is capable of receiving and sharing information from and with military sources.

- Support community relations
- Support decisions related to interdiction, apprehension, and prosecution of organized crime and terrorism
- Engage high payoff targets in support of critical community needs for stability
- Conduct intelligence “reach” to ARFOR (*theater, joint, and national agencies*) to access, retrieve, and manipulate intelligence databases and products
- Track the current battle and advise the brigade S-2 and S-3 on the repositioning and retasking of R&S assets
- Conduct all-source analysis to support S&R
- Fuse distributed analytic products to provide input into overall Common Operating Picture (COP)
- Support the planning of police investigations
- Conduct HUMINT collection and limited HUMINT analysis
- Store and analyze HUMINT products

- Conduct tactical criminal investigation activities and limited criminal investigation analysis

CONSTABULARY CONFINEMENT COMPANY

Characteristics: A Constabulary Confinement Company establishes and operates a detention facility (*jail*) which is used solely for the purpose of detaining suspected criminals pending trial, or pending transfer to a long term incarceration (*prison*) facility. It is not a detention activity for uniformed combatants or prisoners of war going through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (*DDR*). Confinement is not a detention center for prisoners of war who are good people being constrained from engaging in war, but for suspected criminals whose period of imprisonment is a product of a judgment against them for having committed a crime. The exception to the “no combatants” rule is individuals being charged with crimes against humanity or criminal activity against the local population, under local law. The wisdom of Sun Tzu’s words extends beyond the soldiers, even into the population over whom one wishes to assert authority.




Figure 5-9: The Confinement Company

Mission: Constabulary Confinement Company ensures the public as well as the correctional staff have a safe environment that provides detention, rehabilitative and

reentry services to those who are incarcerated so that they may live in a clean, humane, and secure environment, and re-enter the community as a productive members.

- Provides a safe, sanitary and secure place of detention for all persons committed to this jurisdiction for detention or correction; at a 1 jailer to 45 inmates ratio per shift.
- Returns inmates to the community in no worse condition than when they were committed to our custody. Strives to return inmates in better condition, physically and emotionally, and encourage convicted offenders not to repeat their criminal activity.
- Develops programs where certain inmates can benefit the community through public service during their term of incarceration.

Personnel: ≈145

Capabilities:

- Assuming 15 guards per shift; the maximum capacity is 675 inmates, if operating in an ideal facility (*Prisoner to Guard ratio of 3 to 1 under less than ideal facilities*)
- Detains suspected criminals pending arraignment or trial
- Conducts in-processing to receive and record the arrival of prisoners
- Removes and secures personal property of prisoners for return at the conclusion of their internment.
- Provides food, hygiene and medical treatment
- Provides secure transportation to and from the confinement facility
- Provides secure space were defendants can meet with their layers

Commentary: This is a capability not currently available in the Department of Defense units.

JUDICIARY AFFAIRS COMPANY

Characteristics: International law mandates that the occupying power has to conduct trials of local nationals within their own country. At the same time, the occupation authority has an obligation to enforce public security. The wisdom of Sun Tzu's words extends beyond the soldiers, even into the population over whom one wishes to assert authority.

Mission: The Judiciary Company shall provide judicial services to the civil community within the territory under the military authority of the brigade to which the company is assigned or attached.

Personnel:

HQ Section:	≈ 25
Judges:	≈ 14
Court Recorders:	≈ 14
Court Clerks:	≈ 39
Prosecutors:	≈ 28
Defenders:	≈ 28
Security:	≈ 42
Judiciary Company, Total:	≈ 190

Capabilities: Fourteen Courts:

- 1ea: High Court
- 2ea: Appeals Courts
- 5ea: Superior Courts
- 6ea: Magistrate Courts

Commentary: This is a capability not currently available in the Department of Defense units. It will allow the U.S. to hold trial of foreign nationals, without using military tribunals.

Soldiers (*even the enemy*) who commit crime under the color of uniform would be subject to military tribunal; Uniform Code of Military Justice (*UCMJ*). However, double jeopardy does not apply to suspects whose heinous atrocities have risen to the level of Crimes-Against-Humanity, where the crime was public enough to not only anger but, emotionally traumatize the greater community. In such cases, this court system is available within the country, in question.




Figure 5-10: The Judiciary Company operates 14 courts.

SUSTAINMENT BATTALION

Characteristics: This battalion has two major objectives: 1) Keep the supplies moving from the theater command to the brigade, and 2) Keep the local population adequately supplied.

The Sustainment Battalion command staff provides command and control support to the commander for units organic or attached to the Sustainment Battalion. It is normally located where it can best support the Constabulary Brigade, based on the tactical situation. As a general planning factor, the Sustainment Battalion has the capability to provide logistic command support for 5 to 8 battalions within the operational area over unspecified distances, via a combination of throughput and supply point distribution methods from the Sustainment Battalion. The Sustainment Battalion may require additional capabilities based on the logistics estimate prepared to determine sustainment capabilities, anticipate support requirements, identify and resolve shortfalls, and develop support plans. This may require the Sustainment Battalion to coordinate local area support through a neighboring

sustainment brigade when supported battalions cannot be reached due to excessive distance or heightened threat conditions.

The *Headquarter Company (HHC)* provides support common to all Constabulary HHCs, along with a personnel & finance detachment to manage personnel activity within the Constabulary Brigade.




Figure 5-13: Sustainment Battalion

Personnel:

Headquarters Company:	≈ 150
Distribution Company:	≈ 160
Supply Company <i>(when required)</i> :	≈ 175
Water Company:	≈ 185
Maintenance Company:	≈ 250
<u>Forward Support Companies (x7):</u>	<u>(155 x 7)</u>	<u>≈ 1,085</u>
Sustainment Battalion, Total:		≈ 2,000

Mission: This unit provides command and control for all organic and attached units of a character normally found in an Army Brigade Support Battalion or Sustainment Brigade. It performs all tactical coordination, planning and execution of brigade wide mission service and support

Capabilities: ⁹¹

- Command and control, personnel accounting/strength reporting and casualty reporting for units organic or assigned to the Sustainment Battalion
- The planning, direction, and supervision of mission service and support for all assigned and attached units in the Constabulary Brigade

⁹¹ Derived from Army FM 3-90.31, Chapter 2, "*MEB Mission and Organization*"

- Movement management for internal and external transportation assets operating in the brigade area
- The planning, direction, and supervision of administration and logistics for units organic or assigned to the battalion
- Limited unit-level administration and religious services for units of the battalion
- The planning and direction of base operations and limited area security as assigned by the supported brigade commander
- Information and advice to the supported brigade commander and staff on support capabilities provided by the battalion
- The planning and execution of unit-level mortuary affairs in conjunction with the Medical Company
- Readiness oversight with linkages to organic distribution company Class IX (*Repair Parts*) section
- Field feeding and field feeding support for an additional 350 transient personnel
- The battalion service support automation management office (*AMO*) supports of all logistics information automation systems and Standard Army Management Information Systems (*STAMIS*) within the brigade. It provides complete customer-oriented assistance in using and operating logistics automated systems

Commentary:

The fundamental design distinction between an Army Brigade and a Constabulary Brigade is in the logistics capacities of the two types of organizations. The Army attempts to focus its organizational design efforts on projecting combat power. Army units have to move quickly, using limited transportation assets, while still presenting the optimal combat force essential for victory. Thus, the sustainment elements of an Army brigade are just big enough to meet its mission essential needs while being as lean as possible. Any sustainment functions which could be shifted to corps or theater level are consequently placed there. Army doctrine has “Units of Action” brigades call upon the Army’s regional sustainment brigade to provide reinforcing material support.

(The author is aware of the ongoing debate in the Army about the meanings and relationships between such terms as logistics, sustainment, service, support and so forth. Over the last century, the Army has flipped its definitions and divisions of labor, several times over; and this author doesn’t intend to intrude upon that debate here, by arguing semantics and terminologies. Currently, the author is referencing, Army FM 4-93.2; “The Sustainment Brigade,” Chapter 2, “Mission and Organization”)

The Sustainment Battalion is the organic organization providing command and control of personnel, distribution, supply, maintenance, and medical logistics for the Constabulary Brigade and consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (*HHC*), a distribution company, warehouse, water, and support maintenance companies. Usually, these companies form the foundation of a field operating base. Amenities, such as hot meals and clean water are available at an operating base. This organization is designed to meet the needs of all the organic elements of the Constabulary Brigade and selected task-organized service-support units. Since the task organization of the Constabulary Brigade exceeds the logistics demands of a normal Army Brigade Support Battalion, the Sustainment Battalion is

task-organized with commensurate sustainment structural capabilities, making it very large by Army standards. An example of this would be the provisioning of a quartermaster Water Company, with detection and drilling capabilities normally found in an Army theater-level engineering unit is organic within the Constabulary Brigade.

DISTRIBUTION COMPANY

Characteristics: The Army uses a just-in-time delivery system that employs information systems to provide management oversight. Hence, supplies are not stored on the ground for more than 48-hours. Whatever an Army unit needs is sent to them; transported by the vehicles of the parent unit. Logisticians call this a push system. As long as a Sustainment Brigade is operating in the region, it will be possible for the Constabulary to use a push system.

However, in an unstable environment a push system might not always be the best or even available, especially for NGOs. The Constabulary Distribution Company has excess capacity so that it can pull supplies from an external distribution center, if necessary.




Figure 5-14: Distribution Company

Mission: To transport and distribute supplies throughout the Brigade territory, providing logistics and field service support to the Constabulary Brigade.

The *Distribution Company* is employed in the brigade support area (BSA) providing logistics support to the brigade. It operates as part of the Sustainment Battalion with subordinate elements that operate throughout the brigade area.

Personnel: ≈ 160

Capabilities:

- Planning, direction, and supervision of supply distribution points, transportation, and field service support to the Constabulary Brigade
- The transportation of up to 286 short tons (ST) of cargo daily
- Daily receipt and issuance of all Classes of supply (*minus Class VIII, medical*) to the Constabulary Brigade
- Class III-B (*bulk fuel*) retail fuel support to the Constabulary Brigade of up to 31,500 gallons per day
- Class III-B (*Bulk Fuel*) retail fuel support to the brigade of up to 70,000 gallons per day

SPO-DMC Mission: To provide coordination and control over all aspects of supply operations and Supply & Support operations

Personnel: ≈ 11

Capabilities:

- Split operations
- Unit plans and operations for the company
- Stock accounting operations

Commentary: With the recent advances in automated inventory management systems, in transit visibility, and just-in-time supply systems, Army logistics doctrine has changed from a focus on warehouse-based management to distribution based management. Thus, this company has a mini-SPO built into its organization. It provides global tactical visibility of real-time, current supply activity.

A water distribution platoon is not a part of this company's capabilities (*as it would be in an Army unit*) because the brigade as a whole is substantially larger than the typical Army brigade. Hence, water supply and management is provided by a separate company.

SUPPLY COMPANY

Characteristics: The Supply Company is an optional module. Its presence is contingent upon the lack of available support from an Army Sustainment Brigade.

Mission: The quartermaster heavy materiel supply company will receive, store, maintain, deprocess (*as required*), and issue to support units Class VII (*major end items*) items of equipment, including aircraft and medical mission-oriented equipment. It may also receive, store, issue, and classify Class VII Major End Items which results from theater two-level maintenance and retrograde actions. The supply company may recover, receive, process, secure, account for, and evacuate deceased U.S. military, obligated U.S. civilian personnel,

and their personal effects. It may provide storage capability in support of Class-X (*Non-Military Programs*), and humanitarian relief in conjunction with NGOs.

Personnel: ≈ 175




Figure 5-15: Sustainment Battalion Supply Company provides warehouse storage and cargo transfer services.

Capabilities:

- Receives, warehouses, and issues approximately 1,400 tons of Class VII (*major end items*) materiel per day. Initially, these items may be part of the PWRMS.
- Is capable of deprocessing approximately 150 tons of Class VII equipment to ready-for-issue status per day. The Deprocessing section is staffed for a single 12-hour shift because approximately 80% of Class VII items received in the theater will have been previously deprocessed. Only the Supply operation office and Transfer Point Receiving section operate on a 24-hour basis.
- Provides in-storage maintenance (*not to exceed unit maintenance*) on all materiel warehoused by the Storage platoon.
- Sets up and operates a Mortuary Affairs Collection Point (*MACP*) to receive, process, and coordinate 10 remains and personal effects per day. This includes the evacuation of remains to CONUS/OCNUS military mortuaries.

Commentary: (Derived from TRADOC Document SRC: 42427L100)

WATER COMPANY

Characteristics: Army organizational designers have not thought to incorporate water companies into the structure of their field units. Since the size of the force in the field is a given factor, it is simple enough for theater planners to have the requisite amount of water pre-positioned or shipped to the brigades in question. However, in a stability operation, if the local water utility infrastructure has become damaged, the civilian demand cannot be discerned from a remote location.

Water can then become an unforeseen knock-on issue. This will create a strain on the Constabulary's efforts to maintain the peace. Scarcity of water is forecasted to be a major global issue that Americans will probably have to deal with. Boots on the ground will have to be ready with an answer for each community to which we are sent to occupy or stabilize.

Assessments conducted by the intelligence community indicate that climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.

Quadrennial Defense Review, Report; Department of Defense, February 2010

Mission: To provide command and control for two to four platoons for company level administration, unit supply, food service and unit maintenance. It provides coordination and control over all aspects of water finding, purification, storage and distribution for the QM Water Purification and Distribution Company. To find and produce potable water. To receive, issue and transport potable water.




Figure 5-16: Water Company organization.

Personnel:

HQ Platoon:	≈ 20
SPO Section:	≈ 10
Water Drilling Platoon:	≈ 45
Water Purification Platoon:	20 (x2): ≈ 40
<u>Water Storage & Distribution Platoon:</u>	<u>35 (x2): ≈ 70</u>
Water Company, Total:	≈ 185

Capabilities:

- Provides company-level command and control
- Provides food-service water
- Provides supervision and common tools for unit level maintenance
- Is task organized with one (1) Well Drilling platoon, two (2) Water Purification Platoons and two (2) Water Storage and Distribution Platoons
- Produces 360,000 gallons of potable water using a fresh water source per day (enough to support 10,000 people)
- Maintains water storage facilities for 168,000 gallons of water
- By means of the Distribution Platoon, can provide for static storage of 160,000 gals of potable water at one location or 80,000 gallons at two locations
- Distributes up to 66,000 gallons of water per day based on 75% availability of equipment and two trips per day

Commentary: Operations in the desert pose a number of unique problems, because there is so little water and because our troops and much of the Army's equipment cannot survive without it. Water is a critical item of supply in the desert. Forces trying to survive in the desert without adequate water supplies have always met with disaster. Finding and keeping water sources may be the most crucial issue in future conflicts. A 50-person platoon-sized forward operating base uses 1,600 gallons of water per day and generates 1,500 gallons of gray water (*the wastewater that results from laundry, bathing and other such uses*). A 150 person company-sized forward operating base uses 5,000 gallons of water a day, producing 4,500 gallons of gray water.⁹²

Hence, this company contains a mixture of engineers (*the presence of which is not found in the equivalent Army unit: including a "Water Detection Response Team from the Army Corps of Engineers [FM 5-484, Chapter 1]"*) who hunt for water supplies, quartermasters who purify the water, and transporters who distribute the water. This is substantially more robust than its Army equivalent.

(Derived from TRADOC Document SRC: 10567FA00)

⁹² Bob Brewin, "Army Seeks Water Recycling System for Afghanistan Outposts", Nextgov - National Journal Group, Inc., November 4, 2011; http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111104_6257.php

MAINTENANCE COMPANY

Characteristics: This unit is structured to operate overseas within a fixed operating base. It does protracted repairs of equipment that would not be fixable in the field environment of a company motor pool. Yet, this company doesn't rise to a depot level strip-down overhaul.

Mission: To provide Field Maintenance Support to a Constabulary Brigade. The Maintenance Company deploys with Sustainment Battalion into the Brigade Support Area (BSA). It has maintenance support teams which reinforce battalion maintenance activities throughout the Constabulary Brigade Area. The *Maintenance Company* headquarters provides command, control, administrative, and logistical support for an automotive/armament maintenance platoon, ground support equipment maintenance platoon, and electronic equipment maintenance platoon in support of the Constabulary Brigade. This unit provides field maintenance support to units in the BSA, technical inspection services, shop stock and bench stock, maintenance management and production control functions. The Maintenance Company provides lift capabilities for the repair shops, recovery of organic equipment, recovery to supported units, and support of maintenance evacuation. The number and type of modules attached to the company may fluctuate based on mission requirements.




Figure 5-13: Maintenance Company organization

Personnel: ≈ 250

Capabilities:

- Provides command and control for organic and attached personnel
- Maintains mission related spare Class VII End Items and Class IX Repair Parts to include receipt, storage, issue, retrograde, and exchange
- Provides Field Maintenance (*Unit Level / Direct Support*) for a Constabulary Brigade
- Maintains situational awareness through the automated information management systems
- Consolidates unit administration, maintenance, supply, and field feeding support for up to 250 assigned personnel
- Oversees maintenance control, shop stock, and wheeled vehicle recovery
- Provides field maintenance and technical inspection of small arms, artillery, fire control equipment, armament, tracked and wheeled vehicles
- Provides field maintenance and technical inspection of utilities equipment, power generators, construction equipment, quartermaster, and chemical equipment
- Provides field maintenance, operation, and technical inspection of microwave equipment, COMSEC/radio equipment, support electronics devices, and radar

Commentary: The Maintenance Company's structure is focused on servicing units that are dominated by wheeled vehicles. Its configuration is based on the Maintenance Company of a Brigade Support Battalion (*BSB*) for a Stryker BCT. Thus, it can support an attached wheeled Tactical Combat Force (*the attached Infantry Task Force*). Aviation maintenance sustainment and field support are not factored into this company, but are instead designed directly into the Constabulary aviation company's maintenance platoon.

(More information is available in, Army FM 4-30.3 Maintenance Support Operations, July 2004. This design is derived from; Modular Logistics Capabilities Book, September 29, 2005, SRC: 43107F400).

CONSTABULARY FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY:**Characteristics:**

Forward support companies provide the type of specialized services that go beyond routine field sustainment. Repair services are just short of depot-level restoration. Usually the battalion headquarters and company supply trains will take up residence at these field operating bases.

Mission: To provide direct and habitual combat service support to itself and the battalion to which it is assigned.

Personnel: ≈ 145

Capabilities:

- Support field battalions by reinforcing maintenance, field feeding, distribution, and supply missions

- Provide information and advice to the battalion and supported commanders and their staff on support provided by the company.
- Water storage and distribution for the battalion up to 4,000 gallons per day.
- Planning, direction, and supervision of supply distribution points, and field service support.
- Daily receipt, storage, and issue of all Classes of supply to the supported field battalion.
- Receives, stores, issues, and distributes up to 8,500 gallons of bulk petroleum daily using HEMTT POL tankers and a Tank and Pump unit.
- Food service support to supplement the supported field battalion and organic personnel.




Figure 5-13: Sustainment Battalion

Commentary:

Once a battalion's motor pool sets up operations from a fixed location, the Forward Support Company joins them with their reinforcing Maintenance Platoon.

The companies in the Brigade have enough cooks to support two hot meals a day from Class-B field rations, and two Meals Ready to Eat (MRE). Once the Constabulary Brigade settles into operating from a fixed territory, the additional cooks from the Forward Support Company's Field Feeding Section have the resources to provide the supported battalion with enough assets to help provide four hot Class-A rations per day, for a 24-hour feeding operation.

Constabulary Brigade battalions do not have organic supply capability. All supplies are direct delivered through a “just-in-time” supply system that delivers once every 48 hours, or more frequently. The distribution platoon is responsible for moving supplies from the Brigade cargo transfer point to the company-level recipients, and moving retrograde back to the Sustainment Battalion.

INFANTRY BATTALION TASKFORCE

“In wars among the people, if you are using a lot of firepower, you are almost certainly losing.”
General Sir David Richards (Geneva, September 2008)

Characteristics: Where the Constabulary in general does not have sufficient combat power to stop or repel a true military force, this battalion can project destructive force beyond line of sight. Response options are oriented toward an Air Assault company performing rapid reaction to deny enemy consolidation of its operations; and, a Stryker company to defeat threats in detail. The Artillery battery is specially trained to provide precision munitions and direct aviation ground attack on military targets. In the event of a major breach by enemy forces into a rear area, this battalion operates to blunt the attack, while police evacuate non-combatants, pending the arrival of superior friendly military forces.




Figure 5-13: Infantry Task Force (Mixed Infantry), is a security reserve which may be referred to as a Tactical Combat Force by the National Guard.

Mission: A combined arms infantry-focused reserve-battalion, taskforce organized to rapidly provide full military suppression of military threats to Constabulary operations.

Personnel: =?

Capabilities:

- Maintain a common operating picture (*COP*) of combat mission events within the brigade area of operation
- Conduct maneuver and patrol operations against military threat, and directly engage enemy forces
- Use helicopters to seize and hold contested key terrain which has not been fully secured
- Conduct airmobile and air assault helicopter operations, using rapid tactical deployment of infantry troops, by such methods as slingload operations, rappelling and fast-rope insertion of combat soldiers
- Use light armored wheeled vehicles to maintain rapid tactical movement
- Use light armored wheeled vehicles to move combat troops through or into a contested combat zone for superior maneuver capability
- Employ artillery for beyond line of sight, indirect engagement of enemy threat
- Provide mortar illumination in support of Army and Constabulary forces operating within the Brigade territory
- Perform radar target acquisition to detect, identify, and locate targets for engagement by artillery or ground attack aircraft

Commentary:

Mortar Platoon vs. Artillery Battery: The value of mixing these two systems in the same battalion is the flexibility they have in addressing threats. A wheeled vehicle based four-gun mortar platoon that can be deployed from helicopters would provide the field commander with unparalleled immediate direct support especially for illumination. Further, 120mm mortars can use GPS guided rounds. On the other hand, the information gathering and management capability of counter-battery radar, specialized forward observers, and an artillery fire direction control center provides added opportunities for precision attack or massed fires from external sources.

155mm Cannon: The objective is to keep collateral damage and innocent deaths as low as possible. The use of 155mm cannon provides the ability to use GPS-guided, precision point targeted and area targeted artillery fire. In a high-angle arching trajectory, precision rounds are the best way to deliver high explosives on a target, while minimizing damage to the neighboring area. Anything smaller doesn't have GPS-targeting accuracy (*although the technology is coming*). In the heavier arena, it is possible to use MLRS or HiMARS rocket systems for precision long-range strikes. However, these weapons use extremely expensive munitions whose destructive effects are usually excessive. Heavy rocket artillery doesn't just neutralize a threat; it also obliterates the building. The 155mm towed howitzer is therefore the best candidate for supporting occupation operations.

Appendix B: Terminology

For the sake of this discussion, we must define terms more completely.

Over the past decade and a half, there has been an evolution in the vocabulary used to refer to activities that are undertaken to maintain, enforce, promote and enhance the possibilities for peace in unstable environments. "Peacekeeping" has been the traditional generic term for the operations undertaken for those purposes by the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations. More recently, in an attempt to capture their ambiguity and complexity, and perhaps also to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping, they have become known as "stabilization and reconstruction" operations, or, more simply, "stability" operations. Use of any term with the word "peace" created a semantic dilemma, conveying the misleading impression that an operation is without risk, when in fact, peacekeeping operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. As knowledge increased about the conditions needed to establish peace, operations increasingly included extensive nation-building (or state-building as some prefer to call it) components to build or reform government structures.

The term "peacekeeping" gained currency in the late 1950s, when U.N. peacekeeping mostly fit a narrow definition: providing an "interpositional" force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed, but it continued to be used as the range of activities grew. In 1992, the U.N. began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of activities in securing and keeping peace. It created the term "peace enforcement" to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force to maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. "Peacebuilding" was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions (including re-creating police or civil defense forces), election-monitoring, and promotion of political participation and human rights. Organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts can be a part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," Congressional Research Service ~ Library of Congress: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division / May 18, 2006

Suffice it to say there is a lot of ambiguity in this subject area. For any term defined below, there are other organizations with completely different if not contradictory definitions. For this thesis certain terms are critical to understanding the principles and context of the subjects under examination, and hence the author offers the following definitions:

◆ We begin by distinguishing how military activity is different from civilian functional activity; this was a key question in the thesis statement. "A **military** is an organization authorized by its greater society to use lethal force... in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats."⁹³ The distinction is, the military exists primarily to be the

⁹³ "Military," From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_military, 18 April 2012

nation's warriors and protectors. "First and foremost is ***the military's distinct mission***. The military is the only organization with the mission to ***destroy and kill enemies of the nation***. No one, neither police nor police-like organizations, is authorized to kill in this manner. Although the military may be charged with a host of other missions, ***the foremost use of deadly force against the nation's enemies***, whether by aggressive and defensive actions, is its defining characteristic. No other organization has a similar mission.⁹⁴ They are tasked to take and hold land by inflicting casualties amongst the enemy whose center of gravity they seek to destroy.

◆ "Police power is the capacity of a state to ***regulate behaviors and enforce order*** within its territory, often framed in terms of general welfare, morals, health, and safety.⁹⁵ As a civilian organization, the general mission of police is to establish and ***administer a system of security and promote and foster the enforcement of law and order*** advocating the rule of law. Article 43 of the Hague/Geneva Conventions would extend this authority beyond the political boundaries of a state into the occupied territories. For police, this is done by working with the community citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility. A very important tool of police is community policing based on a partnership between the police and the community whereby, together, neighborhood problems are solved and the quality of life is enhanced. For a constabulary, the use of military organizational tools and equipment does not alter its fundamental policing mission. *(The author researched about twenty mission statements from police departments around the country to identify a common theme, which led to the above principle.)* That distinction has little to do with paramilitary organization, equipment, automated infrastructure, uniforms or even guns.

◆ "Crisis event" is an overarching term used in this thesis to loosely refer to natural disaster, government destabilization, war, peace enforcement, occupation, stabilization, reconstruction, or any other event or activity associated with the degradation or loss of tangible or intangible life-sustaining community resources.

◆ "Military Operations Other Than War" (*MOOTW*) is used by the U.S. military to signify operations outside of war for which there exists the possibility of violent confrontation, such as deterring war, resolving conflict, occupation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace building, arms control, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. Each MOOTW situation requires the use of an organized body of people who are familiar with crisis and violence management.

◆ "Crisis event management" or "crisis management" is a nebulous term, used in this thesis, to suggest the processes used in pursuit of objectives related to a disaster response, occupation, pre-conflict, post-conflict, S&R, nation-building, etc.,; that is focused on an outcome intended to satisfy U.S. political and economic interests (*which can vary over time*). *(The author's definition)*

⁹⁴ Daniel Druckman, Jerome E. Singer, and Harold Van Cott, Editors; *"Enhancing Organizational Performance,"* The National Academy Press, 1997

⁹⁵ *"Police Power," Encyclopedia Britannica.* <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9060615/police-power>. Retrieved 2007-02-08.




Figure 1-2: The U.N. model of activities related to Peace Operations for conflict resolution.

- ◆ “Conflict prevention” involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. (U.N. definition⁹⁶)
- ◆ “Peacemaking” generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. (U.N. definition⁹⁵)
- ◆ “Peace enforcement” involves using a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. (author’s variation of the U.N. definition⁹⁵)
- ◆ “Peacekeeping” is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. (U.N. definition⁹⁵)
- ◆ “Security Force Assistance” (SFA) is defined as unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.⁹⁷
- ◆ “Occupation” is the presence of a victorious national power asserting dominion over a defeated foreign nation by the use of military authority to perform nation management. (This definition is a simple reworking of the Hague/Geneva Convention, Article 43 performance requirements.) It is a post-combat phase of war.

Nation-building is a normative concept that means different things to different people.⁹⁸ For example, the RAND Corporation says the definition of nation-building is, “The use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to

⁹⁶ United Nations, “*Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 18 January 2009

⁹⁷ William B. Caldwell, IV (Lt. Gen), “*Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance*,” Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 14 July 2008, pg. 1

⁹⁸ Carolyn Stephenson, “*Nation-building, Beyond Intractability*,” Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2005 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-thesis/nation_building/>.

democracy”.⁹⁹ *(This thesis is not advocating that U.S. foreign policy embrace Nation-building, but it does acknowledge that constabulary operations could easily find their way into being a part of such a U.S. endeavor.)*

This author finds that to be a rather self-limiting, ethnocentric and simplistic definition. The RAND definition fails to account for those political and economic objectives where U.S. policy makers may decide to install a minority or autocratic government. It further assumes that the vanquished population desires a Jeffersonian or parliamentary democracy. It assumes that an armed force is necessary to transition a nation into democracy; sounding like the Karl Marks’ hypothesis that a cadre is needed to guide the masses into finding the true socialist utopia. Yet significantly, this definition is the product of a major think-tank with substantial influence.

◆ “Nation-building” is an effort to stabilize the civil society of a nation, reestablish or build community infrastructure, and establish a functional level of state governance. *(The author’s definition) (A successful outcome could be thought of as being where state functions are equally accessible to all members of the national society, and state performance is comparable to the pre-conflict standards of the local nation’s civil norm. It furthermore has the capacity for being self-sustaining while being non-belligerent after the departure of occupying forces and assisting agencies. Nation-building has two components: 1) Stabilization, and 2) Reconstruction.)*

◆ A distinction is made between “occupation” versus “nation-building”. Nation-building often involves occupation, but not all occupation is nation-building.

◆ A distinction is made between “peacekeeping” versus “nation-building”. Nation-building often involves peacekeeping, but not all peacekeeping is nation-building.

◆ Nation “stabilization” operations *(the author’s own, 2ND definition)* are the actions taken to segregate systematic belligerent violence from a civil population, and institute intervening governance to alleviate the effects of governmental decay, violence or devastation so that people may engage in productive enterprise and profitable commerce.

◆ “A “stability operation” is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.¹⁰⁰ *(This author amends that to include paramilitary and civilian governmental agency missions, tasks, and activities involved in related efforts.)*

◆ Nation “reconstruction” is the endeavor to establish an inclusive civil government which is capable of providing its citizenry with a broadly participatory social, political and material infrastructure that facilitates the welfare of the population. It is self-sustaining and non-belligerent after the departure of occupying forces and foreign assistance agencies.

⁹⁹ James Dobbins, “*Nation-Building, The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower,*” RAND Corporation, Summer 2003
www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation1.html

¹⁰⁰ Department of Defense, Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, “*Stability Operations,*” September 16, 2009

Appendix C: Acronym List

AFSB	Army Field Support Brigades
AFSBn	Army Field Support Battalion
AID	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
ALT	acquisition logistics and technology
AMC	Army Material Command
AO	area of operations
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BCT	Brigade Combat Teams
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
C ²	command and control
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CBRN	chemical biological radiological and nuclear
CIVPOL	civilian police
CMMI	Capability Maturity Model Integration
CO	commanding officer
COR	contracting officer representatives
COTR	contract officer technical representatives
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
CRC-A	CRC Active Response Component
CRC-S	CRC Standby Component
CSB-ME	Combat Support Brigade, Maneuver Enhancement
CSO	Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOS	Department of State
EMT	emergency medical treatment
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulations
FM	field manual
G-1 / S-1	Personnel Section
G-2 / S-2	Intelligence Section
G-3 / S-3	Plans & Operations Section
G-4 / S-4	Logistics Section

G-5 / S-5	Civilian Relations Section
G-6 / S-6	Communications Signal & Information Systems
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HHC	Headquarters and Headquarters Company
IGO	international governing organizations
ISO 9000	International Organization for Standardization, quality management systems
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication, of the United Kingdom
JP	Joint Publication, of the U.S. Department of Defense
KO	contracting officer
M.P.	Military Police
MACOM	major command
MEB	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
METT-TC	mission enemy troops terrain time and civilian
MOD-UK	Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear chemical and biological
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NGO	non-governmental organizations
NSA	National Security Agency
OCONUS	outside the continental U.S.
ORHA	Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
ORLO	Office for Rule of Law Operations
PA	physician's assistant
PDD-71	Presidential Decision Directive 71
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDRIP	Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
RAC	Regional Analysis Cell
RDO	rapid decisive operations, or rapid dominance operations
RLR	Rule of Law Reserves
RSOI	reception staging onward movement and integration
RSTA	reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition
S&R	Stability and Reconstruction

SME	subject matter expert
SPO	Sustainment Operations
STB	Special Troops Battalion
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOC	tactical operations center
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace
XO	executive officer

